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ABSTRACT 
 
Why do some democratic transitions succeed while others fail? While most explanations focus on 
macro-level and structural factors, such as economic growth or institutional reform, I suggest two 
related factors that should be systematically examined.  First, if and how democratizing states and 
societies address questions of national identity and belonging (national reimagining), particularly 
with respect to collective memory, legal & institutional reform, and pluralization.  Second, to what 
degree is there a broad societal consensus concerning these issues of national identity (national 
consolidation). Through the case of Tunisia (2010-14) I examine how Islam in particular is 
constitutive of Tunisian national identity and how the post-revolutionary process of 
democratization has affected and been affected by this relationship. In examining Islam and 
nationalism in the post-revolutionary period, I describe a period in which debates over national 
identity initially threatened to derail Tunisia’s democratization project with respect to addressing 
past grievances, reforming laws and the constitution, delaying elections, and nearly unseating 
Tunisia’s first democratically elected government. I argue that it was only the presence of a violent, 
existential threat to the state that allowed for a national reimagining and consolidation necessary 
to continuing the democratization process.   
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
 
The streets of Tunisia ran red, filled with Tunisians carrying their nation’s red and white flag.  
Following the December 17, 2010 self-immolation of street cart vender Mohammed 
Bouazizi in the interior town of Sidi Bouzid, protests spread across the country, reaching the 
capital by the year’s end.  Initially the protestors called for “work, freedom, and dignity,” but as 
President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali either ignored these requests or deployed the police to quash 
them, the protestors began demanding his departure after twenty-three years in power.  
Demonstrators filled Tunisia’s main thoroughfare Avenue Bourguiba, named after the county’s 
first president-dictator, waving flags, singing protest songs, and chanting “dégage,” French for 
“get out.”1  Spectators from around the region and the world watched the protests unfold with the 
expectation that something significant would occur, either a massive government crackdown or, 
even more unimaginable, the end of the dictatorship.   
 However, for a reader of La Presse, one of Tunisia’s most important pro-regime 
newspapers, they would know none of this, even though La Presse’s office sits just two blocks 
from the absolute center of what everyone knew to be the most significant protest in the 
country’s modern history.  The front page of the Tuesday, January 11, 2011 edition, however, 
projected stability and continuity: public outpourings of gratitude for Ben Ali’s announcement to 
create 300,000 jobs; football analysis; and, just beneath a photograph of Ben Ali, the headline 
“Islamism will not happen Tunisia.”  By Friday, Ben Ali would flee to Saudi Arabia.  Nine-and-
                                                
1 Arabic is Tunisia’s official language, however, as a result of being a French protectorate from 1881 to 1956, 
French is taught in Tunisian schools and spoken as a second language, particularly by the middle and upper classes.   
 2 
a-half months later, birthed by the revolution, an Islamist2 party would win Tunisia’s first 
democratic election. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Front page of La Presse, January 11, 2011.   
Note the article at the bottom: “L’islamisme ne passera pas en Tunisie” (“Islamism will not succeed in Tunisia”).  
Photo: La Presse. 
 
                                                
2 By Islamist I refer to an individual or group who advocates political decisions or laws grounded in and justified by 
shari’a Islamic law, particularly in reaction to a perceived secularization of society (Bokhari and Senzai 2013). I 
discuss this definition further in Chapter 2.  
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These unforeseeable events were not limited to Tunisia.   Eleven days after Ben Ali’s 
departure, protests, inspired by Tunisia’s revolution,3 broke out in Egypt, followed by the wave 
of public uprisings across the region that would be labeled the Arab Spring, signaling the 
possibility for increased democratization and an opening for political Islam in countries where it 
had been repressed or tightly regulated. However, while the revolutions of 2011 were also 
successful in toppling dictatorships in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, by 2014 efforts at establishing 
democracies either slipped back into dictatorships or civil war, leading commentators to remark 
on an “Arab Winter” of increased regional instability and authoritarianism.4  
 
 
                                                
3 In this text whenever I discuss the Tunisian Revolution, I am referring to the December 18, 2010 – January 14, 
2011 popular uprising, also referred to, particularly in its immediate aftermath, as the Jasmine Revolution.  
4 While they did not lead to regime change, Arab Spring-inspired protests took place across the region, most 
significantly in Bahrain and Syria, the latter of which descended into a protracted civil war.  Protests on a more 
limited scale, some leading to government nods to reform or government reorganization, also occurred in Algeria, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, and Sudan. 
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Figure 2: Graffiti along Avenue Bourguiba in downtown Tunis.  
Photographed immediately prior to the October 2014 Parliamentary elections, it reads “Tunisia is victorious.  First 
democratic country in the Arab homeland.”5 The writer has notably ignored the case of Lebanon and, to a lesser 
extent, regional constitutional monarchies, instead emphasizing a view of Tunisian exceptionalism and Tunisia’s 
role as the vanguard of the Arab Spring.  Photo: Elizabeth Young. 
 
Why did Tunisia’s democratic transition succeed while other transitions, part of the same 
democratic “wave” (Huntington 1991), failed?   How, if at all, did the dramatic transition from a 
system in which Islamists were jailed and portrayed by the government as an existential, terrorist 
threat to a system in which they led the government affect discourses over the nation and 
national identity?   
It was this transition from a “secular” to Islamist government that become a primary 
narrative of the revolution.  Particularly in the immediate aftermath of the revolution and 2011 
                                                
5 Next to the Arabic version of this graffiti is a nearly identical French version that instead of “Arab homeland” 
chooses the expression “Arab world,” which seems closer to the intent the statement.   
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elections, many scholars of Tunisia and especially journalists wrote about the Tunisian political 
landscape as a conflict between religion and secularism.6 As I describe in this dissertation, there 
is a divide among Tunisians in the ways they situate themselves within the nation, not to mention 
whether they accept the nation to begin with or not, and what they envision the state looking like, 
particularly with respect to particular religious expressions.  However, as I also discuss, to 
consider a sizeable number of Tunisians as secular is a mistake with respect to the ways they 
refer to and situate themselves.  
When I first arrived in Tunisia in June 2013, my goal was to begin to deconstruct this 
binary of the religious and the secular and to better situate them in the Tunisian context socially 
and historically. However, over the next two years, which included ten months of fieldwork, I 
was increasingly struck not just by tensions between those I refer to as Islamists and 
Bourguibists, the later many others would term secularists, but rather the uncertainty of the 
democratization process itself.  The 2011 Tunisian Revolution had ushered in hopes not just for 
Tunisia’s democratic future, but also the entire region.  However, by the time I arrived in 
Tunisia, optimism among Tunisians was significantly waning and the prospect of 
democratization seemed contingent: would the democratic transition progress or would Tunisia 
slip back into authoritarianism?   
One of the key concerns was the ever-increasing delay in finalizing the constitution and 
holding a second set of elections.  The Constituent Assembly, elected in October 2011, was 
intended to sit for only a year with the primary responsibility of writing and voting on a new 
constitution that would additionally lay the legal groundwork for presidential and parliamentary 
                                                
6 For example, in one representative article The Chronicle for Higher Education describes the situation in Tunisia as 
“a clash between the religious and the secular,” December 18, 2011.  https://www.chronicle.com/article/In-Tunisia-
a-Clash-Between/130120. 
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elections.  However, announced election date after announced election date had to be cancelled 
and further delayed because the constitution had not yet been finalized.  Projected election dates 
included October 2012, June 2013, Fall 2013, and, finally, October 2014.  Some Tunisians 
voiced concerns over both when and whether there would be future elections.  As a result, they 
began protesting what they saw as a power grab on the part of the Ennahda-led government as it 
moved beyond its original constitutional mandate to take up other legislative tasks during its 
eventual three-year session to address immediate needs in the country that could not be 
postponed any further.  
During this time period, the country faced numerous economic, security, and social 
challenges that led to further disillusionment with the democratization process.  According to one 
longitudinal survey conducted by the International Republican Institute, a global democracy-
promotion NGO, in March 2011, 79% of respondents felt that Tunisia was moving in the right 
direction and only 14% reported that it was moving in the wrong direction.7  However, by June 
2013 these numbers were dramatically reversed into mirror images: 77% said that Tunisian was 
moving in the wrong direction and only 19% in the right direction.8  Little did anyone know that 
the situation was on the verge of becoming even worse.9 
On July 3, 2013, I was eating dinner at a restaurant in Tunis as the news broke that in 
Egypt, after a week of anti-government protests dubbed the Tamarod or “rebellion” movement, 
General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi had led a coup d’état to remove the democratically-elected Muslim 
                                                
7 Each wave of the survey was conducted by a professional polling firm and included approximately 1,200 
respondents.  The face-to-face survey was conducted in all 24 Tunisian governorates using a multi-stage 
stratification method resulting in margin of error of plus-or-minus 2.8% of the 95% confidence interval.  
8 In the June 2013 wave, 37% of respondents reported that they did not think that Tunisia was currently a democracy 
at all, 35% considered it a flawed democracy, and only 21% considered it either a full (7%) or nearly full (15%) 
democracy.   
9 In October 2013, the numbers had slightly changed with 79% indicating the country was moving in the wrong 
direction and 16% in the right direction.  
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Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi and had also suspended the constitution. Tunisia had 
its own Tamarod movement, modelled after the Egyptian movement, calling for the dissolution 
of parliament, calls that would become even more vocal three weeks later when Tunisian 
opposition leader Mohammed Brahmi was assassinated.    
Watching the Egyptian coup from Tunisia, made me realize how truly contingent the 
democratization process was, a point that would be driven home as other promising transitions 
across the region, particularly in Libya and Yemen, failed and devolved into violence and civil 
war.  It was also at this point that, rather than continuing to focus on religion and secularism, I 
began to explore a different academic and pragmatic question: why do democratic transitions 
begin in the first place, and, more importantly, why do some democratization processes succeed 
while others fail?  
 
I. Theory and Contribution 
Why do Democratic Transitions Succeed or Fail?  
Over the past sixty years, the number of democratic states worldwide has more than 
tripled: by one count, the number of democratic states, defined as those holding contested 
elections for both the legislative body and chief executive office increased from 38 (out of 81 
states) in 1950 to 118 (of 192) in 2008 (Cheibub, et al. 2010). However, many states have begun 
the democratization process only to fall back into authoritarianism or armed conflict. Why do 
some democratic transitions succeed while others fail? 
Before exploring potential explanations, it is important to articulate what exactly is meant 
by a “successful” democratic transition.  There are many competing definitions of what criteria 
are necessary for a state to be considered a democracy.  These range from minimalist, procedural 
 8 
definitions only requiring competitive elections (Schumpter 1942), or also coupled with basic 
freedoms of expression and association (Dahl 1971), to more maximal definitions that, in 
addition to free and fair elections, also include state-sovereignty and the independence of the 
elected government from non-elected individuals or bodies such as the military (Schmitter and 
Karl 1991);  or the robustness of civil society as a measure of democratic consolidation (Linz and 
Stepan 1996).  
Here I use a more minimalist definition that treats a democratic transition as the period 
starting with which a state makes commitments to hold transparent, competitive elections and be 
bound by the results of those elections, and ending, that is being “successful,” once the state has 
held a second round of national elections in which the incumbent representatives (or party) leave 
or are prepared to leave power based on the electoral results.  I choose not to focus on the quality 
of democracy, for example evaluating aspects of democratic consolidation such as the extent of 
specific legal reforms or the size of civil society, but on the likelihood of its endurance as 
evidenced by peaceful transitions of power.  I base this decision on evidence showing that 
alternations of power by political parties or leaders are good predictors of whether future, 
democratic elections will happen (Przeworski 2015). 
Returning to the overarching question of why countries undergo a democratic transition 
and whether those processes succeed or fail, numerous explanations have been proposed. Early 
theories of democratization were inextricably linked to modernization theory in which 
democratization, along with industrialization, capitalism, increasing education, and urbanization 
were an inevitable societal progression occurring together (Lipset 1959).  The modernization 
theory of democratization has been challenged and refined, a process that has also led to a search 
to better understand factors in democratization and has touched on virtually every conceivable 
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variable ranging from the level of trade volume (Rigobon and Rodrick 2005) to whether the 
country is an island (Clague, et al. 2001; Anckar 2002).  Teorell (2010) provides a helpful 
typology of various concepts that have been proposed to positively or negatively impact the 
likelihood of democratization: 
• Social determinants: colonial legacy, religious heritage, social heterogeneity, 
population size, etc. 
• Economic determinants: economic development, education levels, GDP, natural 
resources, income disparity, etc. 
• International determinants: volume of international trade, neighboring democratic 
countries, participation in regional international organizations, foreign policy 
intervention, etc.  
Almost invariably, studies of these factors have been based on regression models.  While such 
analysis can suggest compelling evidence, it is limited by a number of factors inherent to many 
cross-national analyses.  First, it is limited by the number of possible cases (even when looking 
at multiple years for a single country), especially when compared to the number of variables that 
have been proposed to affect democratization outcomes.  Second, all these concepts must be 
operationalized in a standard measurement that is obtainable across the globe on a yearly basis.  
As a result, many of these variables examine structural factors, such as economic indicators, or 
population-level statistics, such as education obtainment or the ethnic distribution of a 
population, that are measured typically by state governments.10  Additionally, they do not reveal 
causal mechanisms or ground these indicators from their relevant cultural, historical, and social 
contexts.   
                                                
10 There are also the important questions of a) comparability of such statistics across states, and b) the reliability of 
self-reported data, such as economic growth.   
 10 
This is not to say that structural indicators do not help to provide useful explanatory 
arguments for democratization.  For example, structural factors such as the presence of a strong, 
independent military, almost certainly played a role in the differing outcomes in Tunisia and 
Egypt.  In Egypt, the military, led by General el-Sisi, instigated a coup that toppled the 
democratically elected, Muslim Brotherhood-led government in June 2013.11  As I previously 
described, Tunisia faced similar calls for the government to step down.  However, Tunisia has a 
weaker, non-politicized military, a product of Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s fears of a body that could 
be a separate seat of power and potentially capable of removing them from office.  Ironically, it 
may have been this legacy of the authoritarian regimes that Tunisia’s military did not play a role 
in the 2013 protests and enabled Tunisian political elites and the broader society to compromise 
and preserve electoral integrity and the democratic transition.   
 However, there are also structural factors that can’t explain differing outcomes.  In 2010, 
democracy scholar Larry Diamond, published a piece entitled “Why Are There No Arab 
Democracies?” a title that the following year seemed destined to be discarded, but which may 
have proven more prescient given the near universal failure of the Arab Spring with the relevant 
exception of Tunisia. In the piece, he rejects commonly proposed theories that Islam or 
“Arabness” are the key factors in understanding the lack of democratization in the Middle East 
and North Africa. Instead he proposes that the region suffers from two factors that hinder 
democratization.  First, the presence of oil means that states do not rely on citizens for taxation 
and do not need to win broad public support, the “oil curse.” Second, Arab states enjoy economic 
and political support from the United States and Europe, which enables authoritarian regimes to 
                                                
11 Similarly, in Turkey the military, maintaining its role as protector of the state, instigated either physical coups or 
the threat of coups, “coups by memorandum,” to changed elected leadership in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, in 
addition to a failed coup attempt in 2016.  
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endure. In the case of the Arab Spring, countries with similar backgrounds, in this case a lack of 
oil had differing outcomes.  For example, while both Tunisia and Egypt, comparatively low oil 
producers in the region, did democratize as opposed to the oil rich Gulf States, the Egyptian 
democratization process ultimately failed.  Additionally, both states, post-revolution, enjoyed 
broad support from the international community, however, this support did not translate into the 
preservation of democracy in Egypt.   Here, the point is not that structural factors don’t play a 
significant role in democratization outcomes, they certainly do, but that there are complex 
interaction effects among these factors and it is often insufficient to reduce substantial societal 
transition and upheavals to quantifiable or dummy variables. 
 More important in the context of this study, they focus on macro-level and structural 
factors, such as economic growth or institutional reform (Linz and Stepan 1996, Przeworski et al. 
1996, Diamond 2011, etc.), and neglect the importance of cultural transitions, which help to 
illuminate the “meaning” of the transition for its participants (Zubrzycki 2006). In instances 
where studies have included cultural factors, such as religion, they have often been viewed as 
potential causal factors in whether states democratize, resulting in them being reified as a static 
variable (Anderson 2004, Driessen 2014).12  They fail to capture the complexity of the 
democratization process itself, the societal-level social change as experienced and understood by 
citizens.  For example, sitting in the restaurant in Tunisia watching the coup unfold in Egypt, I 
was surprised that it was Egypt and not Tunisia experiencing the coup.  Both countries had 
Islamist parties win a plurality of elected seats, but the Egyptian authoritarian regime under 
President Hosni Mubarak had allowed members of the Muslim Brotherhood to stand for election 
since 2000, albeit as independent candidates, whereas Ben Ali had banned Ennahda from 
                                                
12 See for example the World Values Survey (World Values Survey Association 2014) where religion acts as a 
static, dependent variable. 
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political participation since 1992.  Given the histories of political inclusion or lack thereof under 
the authoritarian regimes, I would have expected the reversed outcome.   
 This dissertation is motivated by a desire both to understand why Tunisia succeeded in 
its democratic transition by examining cultural factors, here national identity, that cannot be 
reduced to quantifiable, macro-level variables.  As I discuss in the next section, I turn to Sewell’s 
theory structural transformation as a means of developing the outline of a mid-range theory to 
explore the role national identity can play in the democratization process.     
 
Eventful Approaches to Democratization  
For many Tunisians, there was a clear break before Friday, January 14th and after, as 
Tunisia began its democratic transition from authoritarianism. After twenty-eight years in power, 
Ben Ali was gone overnight, destabilizing the institutions and systems of surveillance and 
punishment.  After decades of abuse and repression, political dissidents were able to speak out 
against the oppression of the regime, and political representatives were freely elected for the first 
time in Tunisia’s history.  Islamists who had gone underground or into exile during decades of 
abuse were not only able to express themselves freely in public, but also to represent and make 
laws for the entire Tunisian public.  How are we to understand how and why such significant 
social and political transformations took place when even a month prior, or even several days 
prior in the case of the La Presse coverage discussed that the start of this chapter, it seemed 
inconceivable.   
Sewell’s theory of events offers a useful theoretical framework to explore democratic 
transitions, such as Tunisia, that takes into account macro-level factors as well as cultural 
meaning to explain how structures are transformed. Sewell articulates a theory of how a 
 13 
historical event, such as the storming of the Bastille, creates ruptures in society that “durably 
transforms previous structures and practices” that in normal circumstances would only gradually 
change (1996: 843).   
 For Sewell, structures have three components.  First, cultural schemas that provide actors 
with meaning, guide behavior, and articulate norms.  Second, resources, both material and 
incorporeal, that give individuals the means to take social action.  Finally, modes of power 
privilege certain individuals or groups to act, both in obtaining resources and the legitimizing 
certain schemas above others.  Because structures are, by definition, enduring, therefore any 
sudden change to such structures are unusual and the product of historical events.  For Sewell, 
events are “1) a ramified sequence of occurrences that is 2) recognized as notable by 
contemporaries and that 3) results in a durable transformation of structures” (844). An eventful 
analysis, is particularly useful in examining transformations such as democratic transitions 
because it is attuned to the nuances of culture that are impossible to examine in the macro-level 
studies of democratization described in the previous section.  In particular, Sewell points to the 
importance of emotion, symbolic interpretations, ritual, creativity, and the interconnectedness of 
events.  
Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests that led to Ben Ali’s 
overthrow were the impetus that led to the end of authoritarian rule and the beginning of the 
democratization process, which had previously been unimaginable.  In this case, arguably the 
most significant structural transformation was Tunisia’s shift from authoritarianism to 
democratization, though it is not the only one.    With Ben Ali’s departure and its domino effect 
on countries across the Middle East and North Africa, spectators and participants immediately 
lauded Bouazizi’s actions as being structurally transformative, an event that would be 
 14 
remembered.  However, the durability of these transformations came quickly into question as 
authoritarian regimes across the region held out against protestors and new democracies, such as 
Egypt, began to backslide into authoritarianism.  In Egypt, this occurred dramatically in July 
2013, less than two years after its first post-revolution election, with a coup that ousted the 
Islamist president, imprisoned hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood supporters, and suspended the 
constitution.   
In Tunisia, there were many instances when Tunisians feared – due to terrorism, cultural 
transformations, and political infighting – that Tunisia’s “democratic experiment” might fail. In 
July and August 2013, at the same time as the Egyptian coup and massacres of Islamists, it 
seemed that Tunisia’s democratic experiment was at risk: elections had been delayed with no 
date in-sight; two political leaders were assassinated; protests called for the removal of the 
government and elections for a new parliament; and, parliamentary activity was suspended for 
several months.  However, Tunisia did move beyond this democratic impasse, not only to 
finalize the constitution, but also to hold free-and-fair parliamentary and presidential elections 
the following year.   
Why, to this point, has Tunisia’s democratic transition endured despite the obstacles?  
Using Sewell’s framework, I examine how the events of Bouazizi’s death and the revolution lead 
to structural changes in Tunisian society that facilitated the democratic transition.  This 
dissertation focuses on expressions – existing, new, and re-articulations – of Tunisian national 
identity during the democratic transition, focusing on the period from Ben Ali’s departure in 
2011 through the second set of elections in 2014.  I do not suggest that national identity is the 
sole or primary factor in whether a state successfully transitions into a democracy, but one that 
acts in conjunction with other factors. 
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Democratization presents openings for new institutions, and also creates opportunities for 
structural and cultural transformations, particularly with respect to “national reimagining:” are 
previously marginalized groups integrated into views of the nation?  Are other groups excluded?  
Do previously marginalized groups actively embrace a national endeavor of democratization?  
How do new laws and institutions reflect changes in understandings of the nation and national 
identity?  How do democratic demands for pluralism negotiate national specificity? How is the 
nation’s experience under the previous authoritarian regime understood by citizens with respect 
to national narratives and identity? Do articulations of the nation and national identity by state 
institutions, elites, and ordinary citizens reflect the durability or rearticluation of pre-democratic 
forms, or are they altogether new inventions and formulations?  Or, alternatively, are questions 
of nation and national identity altogether ignored during the democratic transition, and if so, 
why? 
Democratization, frequently moving in parallel to increased pluralism, presents an 
opportunity for contestation over who comprises the nation and who has legitimacy to act in its 
interest.  Therefore, one must also examine “national consolidation,” the degree to which there is 
a broad societal agreement on who and what are constituent of the nation, throughout the 
democratization process.   
In the following chapters, I point to three types of “national reimaginings” that have the 
potential to take place during a democratic transition – re-narrativization, legal and institutional 
reform, and pluralization – and examine the extent to which they occurred in the Tunisian case 
and their impact, or lack thereof, on Tunisia’s democratic transition.  Additionally, I explore by 
means of the 2014 Tunisian elections the degree to which there was “national consolidation.”  
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Religion & Tunisian National Identity  
 In examining these possible “national reimaginings,” I focus on how and to what degree 
Islam constitutive of Tunisian national identity and how the post-revolutionary process of 
democratization has affected and been affected by this relationship. In Bouazizi’s self-
immolation and during the month-long protests that followed, religion played a relatively small 
role with respect to organized mobilization, symbolism, and protestor demands.  However, 
religious interpretation and practice had been a key social cleavage both prior to and after the 
January 14, 2011 transition.  The role of organized religion and religious discourse in public life, 
quickly became one of the most contentious political and social issues in the post-revolutionary 
landscape in what one journalist described as “a contest for [Tunisia’s] soul.”13 After nearly sixty 
years of strict control by two dictators, the democratic transition has provided an opening for 
religious institutions and practices that have challenged Tunisia’s reputation as a “secular oasis” 
in the region.  There are ongoing legal and social debates ranging from whether women should 
be permitted to wear the full-face covering niqab to whether blasphemy of Islam should be 
criminalized.  The assassination of two leftist politicians in February and July 2013 by a 
fundamentalist Salafi-jihadist organization led to concerns over religiously motivated terrorism 
that continue.  
To understand the centrality of religion in Tunisian national identity in the democratic 
transition, I trace the process by which Tunisia’s president-dictators, Habib Bourguiba14 and Ben 
Ali, nationalized and institutionalized a very particular practice and way of understanding Islam 
in pursuit of state aims, Tunisianité (Tunisian-ness).  In Arabic, there are references to “Tunisian 
                                                
13 “Tunisia Faces a Balancing Act of Democracy and Religion” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/world/africa/tunisia-navigates-a-democratic-path-tinged-with-religion.html 
14 I describe Bourguiba, his reforms, and his commemoration, in more detail in Chapter 2.  
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identity” (al-hawiya al-tunisiya).  However, when referring to Bourguiba and his legacy, the 
French phrase Tunisianité, is almost always used, indicative of Bourguiba’s western oriented 
efforts at Islamic reform.  
Habib Bourguiba (lived 1903-2000, President 1957 - 1987), a lawyer by training, was one 
of the most influential leaders of the Tunisian nationalist movement to end the French 
protectorate.  After the end of both the protectorate and the client Tunisian monarch, he became 
the Republic of Tunisia’s first president.  Through a state where he and his party (Neo-Destour 
and later the Socialist Destourian Party) held a monopoly on state power, he instituted sweeping 
reforms aimed at modernizing the Tunisian state, particularly through unilateral religious 
reforms, such as changes to women’s rights in the Personal Status Code. In doing so, he 
contrasted himself with conservative Islamists.   
Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (born 1936, President 1987-2011) was a military officer who 
also served as Prime Minister before deposing Bourguiba in a bloodless coup.  He reformed the 
state party into the Constitutional Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionnel 
Démocratique, RCD), which held a virtual monopoly over Tunisian politics during his rule.  Ben 
Ali briefly offered increased freedoms to Islamists and religiously conservative Tunisians, but 
cracked down on these as it became apparent that Islamist political candidates had public support 
and could threaten his regime.  Afterwards, he instituted repressive policies against Islamists and 
other dissidents. 
In the post-revolution period, debates over national identity initially threatened to derail 
Tunisia’s democratization project with respect to addressing past grievances, reforming laws and 
institutions, delaying elections and the constitution, and nearly unseating Tunisia’s first 
democratically elected government. In particular, tensions arose between Tunisians advocating 
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for a general continuation of the status quo vis-à-vis the state’s relationship with religion, whom 
I refer to as Bourguibists, after Tunisia’s first president-dictator Habib Bourguiba, and those 
advocating for more expansive role for religion, Islamists, including the main Islamist political 
party Ennahda.1516 
In the newly democratizing state, the shifting of structures and repertoires that had 
regulated society for decades were dislocating, both positively and negatively.17 For Islamists 
and those whose religious beliefs and practices were excluded during the dictatorship, Ben Ali’s 
departure opened up an unimaginable future.  Ennahda supporters returned from years of exile, 
including leader Rachid Ghannouchi18 who had fled threats of imprisonment and execution.  
Women could wear the hijab19 in public without fear of being stopped by the police.  
Interpretations of Islam that ran counter to the state-controlled Tunisianité could be preached and 
                                                
15 I do not mean to reify Bourguibists or Islamists as clearly defined groups nor to suggest homogeneity, but rather 
to be able to articulate the two predominant ends of the spectrum in debates over Tunisian Islam.  In using the term 
“Bourguibist” I seek to avoid a pitfall common of commentators on Tunisia who describe Bourguiba and his policies 
as “secular”.  As, I describe in-depth in the second and third chapters, Bourguiba, who saw his role as President as 
“none other than the Imam, religious leader, whose investiture is a result of the suffrage of the national community,” 
was not a secularist. 
16 Ennahda literally means “the renaissance,” a reference to the 19th and 20th century Islamist Modernist movement 
which sought to end the Muslim world’s cultural and political stagnation and reform the state.  As a result of 
changing socio-political structures and the increased heterogeneity of public discourse, Islamic Modernists became 
champions of religious reform in response to European critiques of Muslim society. 
17 As Ajmi Lourimi, an Ennahda leader, describes, somewhat condescendingly: “The Islamist movements are afraid 
for Islam, and the secularists are afraid of Islam. And the secularists are afraid for their own individual way of life. 
They are afraid for their own individual rights. This is not about political rights, or citizenship rights, or religious 
rights. They are afraid not to be able to buy their wine at the cafe, not to be able to dress the way they want” (in 
Zeghal 2013: 10). 
18 Rachid Ghannouchi (born 1941) is a Tunisian intellectual who, after studying in Syria, became active in the 
Muslim Brotherhood and other political Islamist movements. In Tunisia, he co-founded the Islamic Tendency 
Movement (MTI), which would become today’s Ennahda Movement.  He was imprisoned multiple times by the 
dictatorship and ultimately went into exile in the United Kingdom, only to return to Tunisia in 2011 after the 
revolution.  He is the head of the Ennahda movement and its primary political ideologue, though he has not held a 
government or parliamentary position.  
19The hijab, simply referred to as a veil or headscarf in English, is a cloth covering that some Muslim women wear 
that typically covers the entire head, neck, and hair while the face remains visible. There are variations in the hijab 
based on how exactly it is worn that can indicate geographic and religious differences.  The niqab additionally 
covers the entire face except for the eyes.  The niqab is most often black and typically worn with an abaya, a loosely 
fitting, full length robe-dress, while the hijab is worn with anything ranging from an abaya to a long-sleeved shirt 
and jeans, depending on the wearer’s preference and religious convictions.   
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discussed openly.  Additionally, both members of Ennahda and other members of the opposition 
could speak out against the human rights abuses, imprisonment, and torture they endured during 
the dictatorship.   
However, for Bourguibists and those whose religious beliefs and practices were 
compatible with the dictatorship’s articulation of Tunisianité, the revolution seemed, in part, like 
a dystopian vision of a future Tunisia that they had been warned could come to pass without the 
protection of Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Islamists, whom Bourguiba and Ben Ali jailed and vilified 
as terrorists, were suddenly not only elected to parliament, but holding its highest offices.  The 
niqab, which they presented as an anathema to Tunisian identity was suddenly visible and legal.  
And, for perhaps the first time for some, Bourguibists had to justify everyday practices – dress, 
art, consumption – that some Islamists, particularly Salafists20, proclaimed as blasphemous.  
As I describe in the body of the dissertation, this struggle over Tunisian national identity 
and who would define it threatened the democratic transition.  In examining the relationship 
between nationalism and Islam during Tunisia’s democratic transition, this dissertation’s primary 
goal is to explore how cultural factors, primarily those concerning nationhood and national 
identity, influence and are influenced by the democratization process, particularly with respect to 
its consolidation and ultimate durability.   
The Tunisian case is useful in exploring the relationship between national identity and 
democratization for two key reasons. First, with global decolonization and the fall of the Soviet 
Union, most new democracies are likely to be the products of democratizing authoritarian and 
semi-authoritarian regimes, rather than self-determination and independence movements. 
                                                
20 Salafism is a diverse religious, fundamentalist orientation that calls for a return to what it sees as authentic and 
unmediated religious tradition.  It ranges in expression with respect to use of violence and participation in the state, 
nuances which I explore further in Chapter 3.  In post-revolution Tunisia, Salafism and Salafi practices, such as 
wearing the niqab and protesting perceived blasphemy, became particular points of contention.    
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However, many sociological studies, whether focusing on democratization from a cultural or 
structural perspective, have utilized cases of states transitioning from socialist regimes following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union (e.g. Linz and Stepan 1996, Stark and Bruszt 1998, Kennedy 
2002, Zubrzycki 2006).  One key way in which post-authoritarian states, such as Tunisia, vary is 
the absence of an “external” power during the preceding, non-democratic period, whether a 
colonial state or a foreign dominant state.  Unlike post-colonial or post-communist states, these 
states cannot attribute authoritarianism or abuses to outside “others.” Instead, part of the national 
reimaging that potentially occurs during the democratic transition is looking inward to explain or 
to take responsibility for problems of the past, a more fraught undertaking, especially with 
respect to obtaining a broad societal consensus.   
Second, Arab Muslim states, such as Tunisia, face a particular challenge in democratizing 
with respect to national identity.  Following the end of both the Ottoman Empire and European 
colonialism, the 20th century Arab world was caught between multiple ways of imagining 
communities –pan-Islamism, Arab nationalism, and territorial nationalism – which have affected 
contemporary articulations of nationhood.  Furthermore, while territorial nationalism has become 
nearly hegemonic in the twenty-first century, Muslim states must compete with a small but vocal 
opposition of resurgent pan-Islamists comprised of groups such as al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hizb al-
Tahrir, and Ansar al-Shari’a that not object to the state in its current form, but to the very idea of 
the nation-state as a legitimate, organizing body, as I describe in Chapter 3.   
In addition to contributing to an understanding of the relationship between national 
identity and democratization, this dissertation furthers the understanding of the relationship 
between Islam, democratization, and nationalism by moving beyond the tendency of scholarly 
works that have focused on examining whether Islam is compatible or not with democratic 
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principles (e.g. Esposito and Piscatori 1991, Huntington 1996, Stepan 2000; Bayat 2007 being 
exceptions).   In particular, it focuses on how multiple understandings of Islam (e.g. Bourguibist, 
Islamist, Salafi, etc.) interact with one another in defining national identity.   
Finally, it contributes to the study of post-revolution Tunisia by examining the full 
spectrum of social and political actors rather than focusing on one particular segment. While 
much existing analysis has focused on either on the Tunisian secular elite (Ghorbal 2012, Hajji 
2011, Moore 1965) or Tunisia’s Islamist(s)21 and Salafi movements (Hamdi 2000, Mabrouk 2012, 
Wolf 2017), this dissertation examines multiple segments of Tunisian society and their mutual 
influence on each other, and discourses on Tunisia’s national identity without privileging one 
trajectory over the other.   
 
II. Data and Methods 
The data in this dissertation comes from extensive archival research, interviews, and participant 
observation.  While only a fraction of the research is actively discussed in this dissertation, the 
body of it shaped my understanding and interpretation of Tunisian nationalism and history. I 
reviewed numerous newspaper accounts in Arabic, French, and English, as well as secondary 
historical accounts to reconstitute and analyze past events, providing a sociologically informed 
interpretation. I also paid particular attention to forms of cultural production – political cartoons, 
visual art, TV shows, graffiti, and theatrical productions – to trace issues of key public concern 
and as a form of non-state articulation of national identity. I examined Tunisian history textbooks 
                                                
21 In Chapter 3, I discuss the importance in some instances of conceptually differentiate traditional Islamists(s), such 
as Ennahda supporters, from Salafis in order to illustrate important distinctions in understandings of Tunisian 
national identity.  In the places where it is important to draw a conceptual distinction between Salafists and the more 
standard and traditional usage of the term Islamist(s), I include the subscript (s) to indicate the standard usage. 
 22 
to see how Bourguiba was portrayed before and after the revolution. I also analyzed electoral 
campaign materials, campaign platforms and advertising, from the 2011 and 2014 elections and 
attended campaign rallies for the 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections. 
In June-July 2014 and January 2014, six weeks in total, I participated in a political 
speaker series, the Tunis Exchange, that incorporated presentations from representatives across 
Tunisian society (politics, social justice, business, media, etc.) followed by a free-ranging Q&A 
discussion between the speaker and participants, primarily academics and journalists, on relevant 
current events.  This resulted in approximately one to one-and-a-half hours of dialogue with each 
of the speakers. These meetings occurred primarily in and around Tunis, but also in Gafsa, 
Kairouan, Monastir, Redeyef, Sidi Bouzid, Sfax, Siliana, and Sousse, which allowed for 
additional perspectives from outside national centers of power and influence.  
Meetings included representatives from major and minor political parties and elected 
government; national and regional government ministries and agencies; domestic civil society 
organizations; international NGOs: universities, research centers, and think tanks; and, 
independent actors. In total, I met with over eighty political and civil society leaders (see 
Appendix 2 for a full list of speakers).   
The Tunis Exchange was conducted under the Chatham House Rule meaning that 
specific information cannot be attributed information to certain individuals, although participants 
did consent for their names to be publically listed as participating speakers on the Tunis 
Exchange’s website.  Because of this limitation, I do not include or analyze information from 
these talks.  However, these discussions, covering topics ranging from economic marginalization 
to religious education, deeply influenced my contextual knowledge of Tunisia and the ways in 
which I understood and approached my research.   Because of the range of speakers, with respect 
 23 
to both the diversity of orientations and the range of sectors represented, it provided a cross-
section of influential and knowledgeable Tunisians.   
In addition to these formal engagements, my perception of Tunisian nationalism is also 
informed by numerous everyday interactions: casual conversations with Tunisians ranging from 
journalists to olive farmers; walking through the backroads of Tunisian towns and stumbling 
over multiple personal memorials to Habib Bourguiba; discussing immigration and integration; 
attending political rallies and national festivities; visiting museums and historic sites; going to 
see plays and musical events; listening to Tunisian radio and TV; watching Star Wars, filmed in 
Tunisia, with an LGBTQ Tunisian and an ex-Salafi-jihadist fighter; photographing graffiti; and, 
more generally living and socializing with Tunisians and politically informed foreign journalists 
and academics on a daily basis.  
This collective field experience, formal and informal, allowed me to provide an 
examination of historical changes that took place in Tunisia, primarily from 2011 to 2015 
through a cultural analysis of events and symbols to unpack their meaning both for Tunisian 
participants at the time and in the greater context of Tunisia’s democratic transition through a 
synthesis of a variety of data sources.  For example, in Chapter 2, I examine national 
reimaginings concerning a) re-narrativization in the context of Bourguiba’s role and meaning in 
Tunisia and b) laws and state institutions through the writing of the 2014 Constitution.  I first 
provide a historical background based on secondary histories to describe how Bourguiba and 
Ben Ali articulated and promoted Tunisianité during their rule and to demonstrate how 
Bourguiba became an integral part of Tunisian national identity.  I then turn to analyze post-
revolutionary representations of Bourguiba – in plays, political campaigning, public, non-state 
commemorations –, all collected through participant observation fieldwork, to demonstrate the 
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durability of Bourguiba’s legacy and his continued importance in Tunisian public life and 
national identity.  I then turn to examine and compare the written texts of the 1959 and 2014 
constitutions, again in order to show continuity in cultural schemas and laws concerning the 
relationship between the state and religion. 
In total I spent ten, non-consecutive months living in Tunis from June 2013 to May 2015. 
Visiting on multiple occasions allowed me to be more fully cognizant of changes in societal 
attitudes between my visits.  Additionally, I was fortunate to be in-country during several 
socially and politically significant events.  When I first went to Tunisia in June 2013 for two 
months, I arrived at a moment of extreme political and societal tension: the legislative elections 
had been postponed for a second time, there was a stalemate over the constitution, and growing 
frustration with the Troika government.  I arrived on the heels of the conviction of FEMIN 
activist Amina and the government’s decision ban the Salafist group Ansar al-Shari’a from 
meeting publicly. 
Furthermore, the country was continuing to debate what to do about the increasingly 
visible Salafist movements, analyzed in Chapter 3.  While I was in Tunisia, the Egyptian Islamist 
government was overthrown, an event watched with great attention – both by those seeking to 
emulate it and those to avoid it – in the country. On my final morning in Tunisia, the leftist, 
opposition member Mohammed Brahmi was assassinated, allegedly by Ansar al-Shari’a 
members, setting off nationwide protests.   
When I returned for January 2014, the Tunisians I met expressed even more pessimism 
given delays in the constitution and elections (again), as well as growing concerns about 
declining service delivery and security.  Just as I arrived, however, the constitutional process 
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unexpectedly resumed and I was present for its completion, as well as the celebration for the 
third anniversary of the revolution.  
In September 2014, I arrived for my longest continual stay, until May 2015, in order to 
observe the legislative and presidential elections finally take place after repeated delays.22  Over 
the course of the three campaign months, I travelled to campaign rallies held by multiple parties 
in a variety of cities, occasionally crossing the country to attend multiple events in a single day; 
attended press briefings; and, observed the everyday atmosphere of the electoral period.  
Additionally, I volunteered with the National Democratic Institute (a political development NGO 
for whom I had previously worked in the United Sates and Yemen), writing summary reports, 
serving as an electoral observer, and helping to staff their election day headquarters. On a darker 
note, I also was also in Tunis when the Bardo Museum was attacked by terrorists, resulting in the 
deaths of twenty-two Tunisians and foreign tourists.  Subsequently, I participated in a memorial 
march and also witnessed the increasing securitization of Tunisia.   
While I spent most of my time in Tunis, I also travelled extensively, both for research and 
personal leisure, throughout the country to all of the main regions, with the exception of the far 
northwest along the Algerian border.  Significant locations I visited included Bizerte, Dougga, 
Douz, Hammamet, Gabes, Gafsa, Jerba, Kairouan, Le Kef, Matmata, Metlaoui, Monastir, Nefta, 
Redeyef, Sidi Bouzid, Sfax, Siliana, Sousse, Tatouine, Teboursouk, Tozeur, and Zaghouan.  
 
III. Organization  
Chapter 2, Nationalizing Islam: The Construction of Tunisianité, begins with an overview of the 
religious landscape in Tunisia and presents “Bourguibists” and “Islamists” as ideal types to 
                                                
22 They were legally mandated to occur two years earlier in October 2012.  
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better understand conflicts over national identity. It then provides a brief historical account of 
how Bourguiba and Ben Ali linked certain religious practices and discourses to the notion of 
Tunisianité and then instrumentalized it to legitimate their regimes.  Afterwards, it turns to two 
examples to show how Tunisianité has persisted as a part of Tunisian national identity even in 
the democratizing state: commemorations of Bourguiba and the 2014 constitution.  It addresses 
how commemoration happens in democratizing societies and how competing visions of the past 
are, or are not reconciled and to what effect.   
Chapter 3, Crises of Faith: “Old” Salafism in “New” Tunisia, focuses on the tension 
between national homogeneity and democratic pluralism by examining conflicts between 
Bourguibists and Salafists in order to understand how conflicts over pluralism and national 
identity threaten democratic consolidation.  It emphasizes elements of discontinuity and conflict 
in expressions of national identity, particularly in everyday practices and the arts. After 
providing a very brief overview of Salafism in Tunisia, it turns to examine the tension between 
national unity and pluralism in three arenas.  First, it examines the hijab and the niqab as forms 
of “everyday nationhood,” using the lens of a dispute over the niqab at Manouba University in 
Tunis in order to discuss a lack of national empathy.  Then, it moves to the sphere of cultural 
production looking at both Salafi protests against certain types of art, and also how artists use 
their art to critique Salafism, as being contrary to Tunisianité in order to highlight not just a lack 
of national identification, but how Tunisian Salafists came to be viewed as a national, existential 
threat.  Finally, it turns to discuss jihadi-Salafism and to show how it has influenced public 
debates about Salafism more broadly. It also suggests that it was only the increase in jihadi-
Salafism that enabled Bourguibists and Islamists to consolidate their national reimaginings into a 
shared, albeit vague, language about Tunisian Islam.   
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In Chapter 4, Electing the Nation: Islamists vs. Bourguibists, Malikis vs. Salafis, I show 
how this consolidation around “Tunisian Islam” played out in practice by examining the 2011 
parliamentary and the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections.  By analyzing party 
platforms and political speeches, it demonstrates that while the 2011 elections focused heavily on 
questions of national identity and religious practice, these were almost absent during the 2014 
elections, replaced with nearly identical language about Tunisian Islam and an anti-Salafi 
discourse.  However, I also point to the contingent nature of this discursive convergence and the 
potential for these debates to reemerge in the future. 
In the conclusion, I return to the question posed at the beginning of the dissertation: what 
enables a structural transformation to be durable, in this case the democratic transition? Why do 
some democratic transitions succeed while others fail?  I conclude this dissertation by proposing 
the outline of a theory of the role nationalism, specifically “national reimaging” and “national 
consolidation,” plays in the democratic consolidation process and provide two examples to 
demonstrate the importance of examining nationalism.   
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CHAPTER 2 Nationalizing Islam: The Construction of Tunisianité 
 
“Supreme combatant, builder of new Tunisia, liberator of women.” These three titles are 
engraved onto the monumental doors of Habib Bourguiba’s mausoleum in his hometown of 
Monastir.  Each of these titles reveals a key element of Tunisianité, the specific discourse 
surrounding Tunisian nationalism, which was propagated by Bourguiba and later Ben Ali.  Most 
importantly for this study, Tunisianité should be understood as deriving from a particularly 
religious frame, as illustrated by the titles Bourguiba assumed: 
• “Supreme combatant” (al-mujahid al-akbar): literally the one who struggles the most to 
defend Islam, in this case a vision of a particularly Tunisian Islam – characterized by 
claims of modernity and tolerance – which Bourguiba viewed himself as responsible for 
defending;   
• “Builder of new Tunisia:” founder of the modern state, freed from traditionalist and 
conservative views of Islam, and:  
• “Liberator of women:” author of the modern Personal Statue Law that granted women 
sweeping liberties compared to other Muslim-majority nations.      
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Figure 3: Doors at the entrance to Habib Bourguiba’s mausoleum in Monastir.   
They read: “Supreme combatant, builder of new Tunisia, liberator of women.”  Photo: Elizabeth Young. 
 
The notion of Tunisianité is at the core of understanding the post-revolution tensions over 
re-imaging the Tunisian nation. At its heart Tunisianité claims to be an authentic interpretation of 
Tunisian Islam, which, it describes as modern, open, and, easily co-existing with the 
contemporary state.  This chapter begins by briefly providing empirical polling evidence to 
highlight the societal divisions between “Bourguibists” or “Islamists,” used as ideal types. Then 
it provides a brief historical overview of how Bourguiba and Ben Ali linked certain religious 
practices and discourses to Tunisianité and then instrumentalized it to legitimate their regimes.   
Then, I examine two potential avenues of “national reimagining” -- national re-
narrativization and changes in laws and state institutions – in specific relation to Tunisianité.  
First, I interrogate Bourguiba as a Durkheimian sacred figure in the Tunisian national narrative 
and specifically look at how he has been treated, both publicly and privately, following the 2011 
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transition.  Given that Bourguiba’s legacy in Tunisia is divisive – to Bourguibists he is to be 
emulated, to Islamists he was not just a source of political and religious misdeeds, but also 
personal suffering – I highlight how new commemorations, without concurrent state efforts at 
reconciliation, such as truth and reconciliation commissions had the potential to hinder a lasting 
democratic transition.  
I then examine a second form on “national reimagining” through the writing of the 2014 
constitution, particularly Article 6 of the constitution which regulates the relationship between 
the state and religion.  I point out that while Article 6 was not included in the previous 
Bourguiba-era constitution it follows directly from a tradition of Tunisianité.  In this sense, there 
is little “national reimagining” taking place in the constitution; these are, in Sewell’s parlance, 
schemas representing the durability of certain structures pre-and post-revolution.  However, 
importantly for the for the overarching question of democratic transitions, there was ultimately 
consensus over this article from both Bourguibist and Islamist parties, a broadening of the modes 
of power, which helped to consolidate the transition.  
 
I. Bourguibists and Islamists as Ideal Types 
Tunisia is relatively religiously and ethnically homogeneous with approximately 99% of 
the 11 million inhabitants identifying as Sunni Muslims and 1% as Christian and Jewish (U.S. 
Department of State 2012).  The remaining 1% of Tunisia’s population consists of approximately 
6,000 Christians and less than 2,000 Jews.  Less than 1% of the population is estimated to 
identify as ethnically Berber Muslims, the indigenous population of North Africa. To date, 
neither the Jewish nor Berber communities are politically mobilized, though there are hints that 
the Berber community may utilize the post-revolutionary public sphere to advocate for the 
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institutional preservation of Berber language and heritage.  While Tunisians from the interior of 
the country frequently contrast themselves with Tunisians living on the coast whom they believe 
to benefit from higher levels of government investment, this distinction is primarily raised in 
discussions of the national budget and regional development. 
This is in contrast to most countries in the Middle East and North Africa that are either 
split between or have sizeable minorities of Sunni, Shiite, or other Muslim traditions, or minority 
populations of non-Muslim faiths or non-Arab ethnicity.  Almost all of Tunisia’s Muslims are 
from the Sunni Maliki tradition, one of four main schools of Sunni jurisprudence (madhab). The 
schools of jurisprudence differ among themselves on what sources and methodologies are used 
in legal rulings, resulting in variations on issues ranging from the proper way to pray to marriage 
contracts and inheritance laws.  The Maliki school is the primary madhab in North and Sub-
Saharan Africa, with the notable exception of Egypt.  Tunisia’s identity as a specifically Maliki 
country was presented to me by numerous Tunisian politicians and intellectuals as a 
distinguishing element Tunisianité.     
However, despite its superficial homogeneity, there are significant differences in 
religious attitudes and practices within Tunisia representing two general schemas.  On the one 
hand are “Bourguibists,” Tunisians who broadly agree with Bourguiba’s vision of society in 
which Islam has more limited role in the public sphere and more contemporary interpretations. 
For example, the veil being anachronistic and it being permissible to drink alcohol.  In using the 
term Bourguibist I seek to avoid a pitfall common of commentators on Tunisia who describe 
Bourguiba and his policies as “secular”.  As I discuss, Bourguiba, who described his role as 
President as “none other than the Imam, religious leader, whose investiture is a result of the 
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suffrage of the national community,” was decidedly not a secularist (in Camu 1978: 270).23  
However, in my use of the term Bourguibist, I do not imply one’s support for Bourguiba’s 
administration; there were numerous Tunisians who broadly agreed with Bourguiba’s conception 
of Tunisianité, but disagreed with other policies or wanted him to step-down from office and 
give way to democratization.  
On the other end of the spectrum are Islamists, who advocate for the implementation of 
shari’a, Islamic law, either through a caliphate or through the laws of a modern nation state and 
oppose what they see is the increasing secularization of society (Bokhari and Senzai 2013: 19).  
As with Bourguibist, I use the term generally and it encompasses a range of ideologies, 
including, Ennahda supporters and Salafists.  My use of the term Islamist is to contrast with 
Bourguibist.  However, as I discuss, particularly in Chapter 3, it is important in some instances to 
conceptually differentiate traditional Islamists(s), such as Ennahda supporters, from Salafis, and 
also different types of Salafists, in order to illustrate significant distinctions in understandings of 
Tunisian national identity.  In the places where it is important to draw a conceptual distinction 
between Salafists and the more standard and traditional usage of the term Islamist(s), I include the 
subscript (s) to indicate the standard usage.  
In using the terms Islamists and Bourguibists I make reference to two, general cultural 
worldviews of the role of religion in Tunisia and how it is properly expressed.  These 
worldviews also come with political implications for how religion should be function in the 
public sphere and the laws that should govern it.  However, these do not necessarily translate to 
specific political groupings.  Not all Islamists support Ennahda and many Bourguibists reject 
                                                
23 In a 1975 speech on the occasion of the Prophet Mohamed’s birthday, insinuating a comparison between the two.   
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aspects of Bourguiba’s policies, similar to not all-American conservatives also identifying as 
Republicans.  
I do not mean to reify Bourguibists or Islamists as clearly defined groups nor to suggest 
homogeneity, but rather to be able to articulate two ideal types when exploring Tunisian 
nationalism.  While these are ideal types, the general bifurcation of attitudes towards religious 
practices and beliefs is born out in empirical data, which lends support to the usefulness of these 
ideal types as tools for analysis.     
With respect to religious observance, 63% of Tunisian respondents in a Pew Forum of 
Religion & Public Life survey reported performing all 5 daily prayers, with only another 2% 
reporting praying some, but not all of the prayers daily.24   51% of respondents reported reading 
the Qur'an daily, and another 46% reading it a lower frequency. However, 96% of respondents 
fasted during the month of Ramadan (Pew Forum 2012). 
With respect to religion and politics there is a significant bipolarization in attitudes, 
which I examine in this dissertation, between those who think there should be a close 
relationship between religion and politics, Islamists in this study, and Bourguibists who want a 
clearer divide. 58% of respondents believed that religious leaders should have an influence in 
politics and 56% favor making shari’a the official law of the country.  This was an important 
issue early in the constitutional debates of whether shari’a should be “the” or “a” source of the 
law that I discuss later in this chapter.  In a related question in the Pew Forum survey, 42% of 
respondents favored shari’a courts deciding family law and property matters.25  
                                                
24 The survey consisted of 1450 Tunisian respondents in a nationally, representative sample of adults in urban and 
rural areas. The sample pertains both the Pew Forum’s 2012 and 2013 reports.  
25 One might expect that a larger percentage of respondents would favor this more limited scope for shari’a, limited 
just to personal status issues.  However, the fact that fewer respondents favor shari’a with respect to personal status 
laws is a testimony to the reforms Habib Bourguiba implemented shortly after independence that brought all these 
matters into civil courts and which increased the rights of women to marry, divorce, work, and own property. 
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Survey respondents were also almost evenly split into two groups with how they view the 
relationship between national laws and Islamic laws: 40% of respondents reported that Tunisian 
law follows shari’a "very or somewhat closely" while 56% said that they do not follow shari’a 
"too closely" or "not at all closely”.  Of those that didn't think the country's laws follow shari’a, 
25% thought that this is a good thing and 54% a negative thing. This difference in attitude is felt 
among Tunisians: 51% said that "tensions between Muslims who are very religious and Muslims 
who are not very religious" is a very big or a moderately big problem.  Only 12% said it's not a 
problem at all.  Similarly, 83% of respondents described conflict between religious groups as a 
very big (65%) or moderately big (18%) problem in Tunisia, more than Iraq or the Palestinian 
Territories (Pew Forum 2013).  From the survey instrument, it is unclear how “religious groups” 
might be interpreted by respondents given the country’s overall religious homogeneity. It is 
possible that respondents might interpret this question as asking about conflict between a) 
secular Tunisians and their more religious countrymen or more probably b) Salafis and Tunisians 
who follow the Maliki tradition.  I highlight this tension throughout the dissertation, but pay 
particular attention to conflicts between Bourguibists and Salafists in Chapter 3.  
Of the 21 countries surveyed in the Pew Forum’s study, Tunisia is notable with respect to 
the number of respondents who asserted that Islam is plural and tolerant within Tunisia.26  
Tunisia ranks the highest by far in saying that shari’a is open to multiple interpretations (72%) 
and not limited to a single interpretation (Pew Forum 2013), 27 indicative of the influence of 
Tunisianité, to which I now turn to.  
                                                
26 The Pew Forum report includes data from surveys conducted in South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Russia), Central Asia (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan), 
Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand), South Asia (Bangladesh, Pakistan), and the Middle East & North 
Africa (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, and Tunisia).  
27 Morocco, with 60% of respondents agreeing that there are multiple interpretations, is the only other country 
surveyed where more than half of respondents agreed to this statement.  
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II. The Construction of Tunisianité during the Dictatorships  
Debates over the proper practice of Islam have been at the center of many moments of 
contentious politics in Tunisia’s modern history starting with anti-French protests in the 1930s 
over whether Tunisian Muslims who acquired French citizenship should be considered apostates 
and denied burial in Muslim cemeteries, an early indication of the importance of nationality – as 
expressed through formal citizenship and also perceived social solidarity – in Tunisia. Both 
Bourguiba and Zine Ben Ali claimed to be defenders of “Tunisian Islam” which they 
characterized as modern, pluralistic, and tolerant, in order to justify their state policies and 
silence political opponents.  In doing so, they actively linked specific Islamic discourses and 
practices with Tunisian nationalism and positioned “alternative Islams” as threats to the nation, 
thereby creating a “hegemonic Islam” that is incorporated into state institutions and state 
nationalisms (Cesari 2014).  
The history of Islam in the contemporary Tunisian state has been covered extensively 
elsewhere (Ghorbal 2012, Hajji 2011, McCarthy 2014, Perkins 2014) and this chapter does not 
break new ground with respect to the incidents discussed. However, understanding the ways in 
which Bourguiba and Ben Ali linked particular religious practices and discourses with Tunisian 
nationalism, is critical for analyzing debates over national identity in post-revolution Tunisia.  
During their combined fifty-four years in office, Bourguiba and Ben Ali eradicated 
shari’a courts, mandated that mosques be closed outside of prayer times, required government 
approval of imams, and restricted wearing the hijab in public places.  Bourguiba ordered 
Zeytouna University – the oldest and one of the most important institutions of Islamic education 
in the Islamic world – closed, its libraries emptied, and the millennium-old institution 
incorporated into the secular higher education system.  However, both argued that they were 
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doing so in the name of Islam, citing Qur’anic verses and Islamic legal principles.  Bourguiba, 
asserted that as president he was selected by the nation as its “Imam” and in such a role was able 
to engage in independent interpretation (ijtihad) of Islamic laws and doctrine.28   
For example, during Ramadan in 1964, Bourguiba infamously drank a glass of orange 
juice during the day on national TV, thereby breaking the Ramadan fast.  He called on Tunisians 
to also break their fast as a means of jihad, religious struggle, so that they could work harder 
during Ramadan and improve the Tunisian economy.  To justify this departure, he cited Islamic 
precedent that the Prophet Mohamed and his companions broke their fast during their capture of 
Mecca (Wolf 2017).   The decision was not publicly popular and nearly all major Tunisian 
religious leaders objected to it, forcing Bourguiba to abandon the proposition for good.   
 The radical act of drinking the glass of orange juice cannot be understated.  Fasting 
during the holy month of Ramada is one of the five pillars of Islam and is considered compulsory 
for all Muslims, except those for whom the fast would be physically harmful, such as the ill or 
pregnant women.  Bourguiba, in exercising his self-proclaimed role as the nation’s Imam, is not 
making a judgment about a minor or esoteric topic, but, rather, is trying to reconstruct one of the 
few tenants of Islam that is universally accepted by Muslims around the world.  He does not 
simply use state power to outlaw or curtail fasting, but instead uses the religious metaphor of 
jihad to argue that a sacrilegious act is actually a sacred one in the service of the Tunisian nation.  
While unsuccessful, the fact that Bourguiba would attempt such an act is testimony to the degree 
of influence he believed he had on religious practice in Tunisia and the extent to which he 
thought Islam should be in service to the nation.  For Bourguiba modernization and reform of 
Islamic teachings and practices was at the heart of Tunisianité (Hibou 2011).  
                                                
28 Bourguiba also styled himself with the religiously laden title of Supreme Combatant (mujahid al akbar). In this 
case the term used for combatant is etymologically related to jihad implying a religious struggle.   
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In effect, both Bourguiba and Ben Ali used religious discourses and religious institutions 
in the service of nationalism. However, they claimed to promote a progressive model of 
“Tunisian Islam,” Tunisianité, which they characterized as modern, pluralistic, and tolerant, in 
order to justify these reforms.  They did not argue that they were trying to promote secularism 
and should not be understood as secularists in a strict usage, but rather articulating a form of 
religious nationalism that links particular religious interpretations and practices with Tunisian 
nationalism.  
Also of significance, is the emphasis that Bourguiba placed on the modernity of 
Tunisianité.  Bourguiba came to power at a time in which modernity was at the forefront of the 
global imagination, and people were using the term self-referentially ranging from art and 
furniture to everyday life, embodied through the “modern man” and woman.   While 
“contemporary” merely refers to the current time, “modern” makes reference to how one situates 
oneself to all that has come before and contains a normative evaluation, best exemplified through 
modernization theory, which presents itself in a teleological, normative framework.   
Islam, more so than Christianity or other religions, has had a fraught history with its 
relationship to modernity, which is inextricably linked to Western political and cultural 
colonialism.  During the nineteenth and twentieth century Muslim philosophers and historians 
attempted to reconcile differences between Europe and the Muslim World, particularly to explain 
Europe’s domination and the Muslim World’s perceived “backwardness.”  This resulted in 
examinations of nearly every aspect of life, including how religious texts were interpreted, the 
role of women in society, political structures, and the role of science (Moaddel 2005). For some 
scholars, this meant trying to bridge the divide between Europe and the Muslim World and 
resulted in justification for adopting “European” features, such as women’s education and the 
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concept of the citizen, by justifying them through Islamic texts.  However, other Muslim scholars 
viewed this as a rejection of traditionalism, which it was, but also an embrace of the secular 
world.   
For many observers, Bourguiba’s ascension to power and his early reforms – including 
state seizure of religious endowments and the incorporation of Zeytouna, the renowned Islamic 
center, into the state-run University of Tunis – could be seen as confirmation of prevailing 
theories of global secularization.  Secularization theory, a cornerstone of the Western 
modernization paradigm, deeply influenced early sociological theorists seeking to understand the 
rapid social transformations occurring around them in which they believed “the former gods 
[were] growing old or dying” (Durkheim 1995, 429) and that “the sacred [would] disappear 
altogether except, possibly, in the private realm” (Mills 1959, 33).  As capitalism and democracy 
expanded, traditional religion’s hold of both the individual consciousness and the public sphere 
would weaken (Berger 1967).   
However, Bourguiba did not demand that religion disappear, rather he tried to have it to 
conform to his views of “the modern” and to further elements of modernization.  For example, 
his justification to break the Ramadan fast was not that the fast wasn’t meaningful, but that the 
more important jihad was to economically develop the country.  He did not end the study of 
Islam in schools, a subject that is still part of the Tunisian curriculum.  Instead he ended a dual, 
colonial system by which a student either perused a “religious” or a “secular” education and 
combined them into a single, unified curriculum, although certainly deemphasizing the centrality 
of both the subject and the authority traditional religious teachers in the process.  
Bourguiba’s reforms did draw strong challenges from the traditional, conservative elites.  
This was due not only to flaunting key tenants of Islam, such as the Ramadan fast, but also 
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because such reforms were associated with French colonialism and laïcité.  As a result, 
Bourguiba’s vision of Tunisianité would associated by opponents as being an unacceptable 
secularization of Tunisian society.  
 
Opposition to Bourguiba and Ben Ali 
Bourguiba’s radical reinterpretation of Islam, and its relationship to the state did not go 
unchallenged.  In the late 1960s, the Islamic Tendency Movement (Mouvement de la tendance 
islamiste, MTI), a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, was founded initially as a space for 
intellectual discussions of Islam, but it quickly oriented itself toward political goals in order to 
counter Bourguiba’s reforms and increase the role of traditional Islam in Tunisian society.  
Rachid Ghannouchi, one of its founders and the intellectual leader of MTI’s successor party 
Ennahda, also adopted the discourse of a moderate and pluralistic “Tunisian Islam” but, unlike 
Bourguiba it did not include breaking the Ramadan fast, drinking alcohol, or discarding the veil 
or other religious traditions.  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the MTI gained followers and 
expressed an interest in participating in elections, which they were denied.  
In 1987, eighty-four-year-old Bourguiba ordered the execution of twelve members of the 
MTI, including Ghannouchi, on charges of inciting violence and civil unrest. Military and 
political leaders close to Bourguiba deemed that the planned execution would almost certainly 
ignite a civil war and decided to intervene before it could be carried out. With a doctor’s 
evaluation that Bourguiba was no longer mentally capable to rule, Bourguiba was ousted during 
a “medical coup” in favor of his newly appointed Prime Minister Ben Ali.  Following the 
November 7th “Change,” as the coup is euphemistically called in Tunisia, Ben Ali initially made 
reconciliatory gestures towards Islamists, allowing them to legally organize and publish a 
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newspaper.  He did this not out of affection for MTI or out of a belief in democratic practices, 
but rather as a form of appeasement in order to blunt what he saw as an Islamist threat to his 
authoritarian rule due to their popular appeal among religiously conservative Tunisians.  While 
the MTI, by now rebranded as Ennahda, was not allowed to field candidates in the 1989 
legislative elections, many members ran as independents and are believed to have won 
approximately 15% of the vote.  However, due to Tunisian electoral laws designed to maintain a 
single-party government, this did not translate into any political seats for them.  
In the wake of the election, Ennahda members questioned if there would ever be a true 
political opening and Ghannouchi left Tunisia in voluntary exile, which would last until Ben 
Ali’s 2011 ouster.  Subsequently, Ennahda centered their resistance to Ben Ali’s regime in 
Islamic discourse and principles.  Attending Friday prayers and wearing the hijab were not only 
religious acts, but also became acts of political resistance.   
When members of Ennahda were accused of attacking a police station and murdering 
police officers, Ben Ali launched a massive crackdown on what he perceived as an Islamist 
threat to his regime, which associated religious observance with terrorist sympathies. Using the 
membership list Ennahda supplied the government in their attempts to legalize the party, the 
government arrested thousands of Ennahda members and supporters.  For the next twenty years, 
Ben Ali’s secret police and network of informants arrested anyone believed to be a threat to 
regime stability.  While not the only targets, anyone perceived as having Islamist leanings – 
whether wearing a beard or lingering too long at prayer – was routinely arrested and tortured, 
often alongside their spouses. By the time of the 2010 revolution, which removed Ben Ali from 
office, organized Islam in Tunisia was firmly in the hands of the state with thousands of Ennahda 
members behind bars or in exile and mosques controlled by the state.  However, as will be 
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discussed in the following sections, Tunisianité endured the demise of both Bourguiba and Ben 
Ali’s regimes. 
 
III. The Mantle of Bourguiba: Remembering a Dictator in a Democratizing State 
In this section, I turn to the first type of “national reimaging” that has the potential to 
occur during a democratic transition: re-narrativization.  How do the state and citizens 
understand and address the nation’s past?  Democratization processes often are a newly gained 
opportunity for historical revisionism to address past events that have been censored, or integrate 
the democratic transition into the national narrative. Collective memory, a commonly shared 
understanding of a groups past, is an import tool in nationalist projects (Olick and Robins 1998, 
Olick 2003, Schwartz 2000). 
I examine the re-narrativization that has and hasn’t taken place in post-revolution Tunisia 
by focusing on state and non-state treatment of Bourguiba as the embodiment of the principle of 
Tunisianité.  In post-revolution Tunisia, Bourguiba acts as a Durkheimian sacred figure (1995) 
surrounded by informal, but prevalent, taboos on critique that, in what I observed, extended to 
Islamists as well.   Additionally, there is a vocal nostalgia and public commemoration of 
Bourguiba by private citizens.  However, the state has remained largely silent on how to treat the 
former dictator.   
I highlight the underlying tensions in celebrating the memory of a dictator while 
simultaneously promoting democratization, and without addressing the suffering that still-living 
Tunisians endured under his policies.  While other scholars have pointed out the potential in a 
democratizing process for “narrative shock” (Zubrzycki 2006) or amnesia/forgetting, the 
contrasting ways in which Ben Ali and Bourguiba have been publicly remembered represent an 
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example of national narrative dissonance, threatening to further polarize Tunisian society, with 
supporters celebrating him as embodying Tunisian Islam.  
***** 
Habib Bourguiba, who lived in relative isolation from the 1987 coup until his death in 
2000, has experienced a renaissance in post-revolutionary Tunisia, and is arguably the single 
individual benefiting most from a post-revolutionary rehabilitation. Ben Ali had presented his coup 
as an act of benevolence, a “medical coup” to remove the eighty-four-year-old, mentally aging 
president while praising Bourguiba’s service. Bourguiba retired, or was placed under house arrest 
according to his supporters, in his palatial home in Monastir until his death in 2000.   
While Ben Ali refrained from outright attacks on Bourguiba and his legacy, he did seek to 
minimize Bourguiba as a symbol in the public sphere, without doing so too overtly.  For example, 
Ben Ali removed or relocated to less prominent places statues of Bourguiba and, instead of 
replacing them with new ones of himself, installed large sculptures of the number “7,” the symbol 
of his regime commemorating November 7th, the day he took office in 1987 (Chomiak 2013). 
Similarly, Ben Ali issued new currency, not with his face as Bourguiba did, but featuring the 
number 7.  While Bourguiba was not actively maligned, he and his supporters were removed from 
influence and visibility.   
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Figure 4: Five Dinar banknote from the Ben Ali era.  
The number 7 (and text reading “November 7, 1987”) form part of a boat labeled Tunisia and flying a Tunisian flag.  
In the background are mosaics from the Carthage ruins. Photo: Wikipedia Commons. 
 
This treatment speaks to Bourguiba’s unique status in Tunisian society and his role as a, 
if not the, sacred figure in contemporary Tunisian history, around whom certain taboos against 
denigration exist.  For example, unlike many dictators, Bourguiba was removed from office non-
violently and allowed to remain in the country rather than be exiled or executed.  While Ben Ali 
removed public images of Bourguiba, such as the statues, he did not destroy them; he merely 
moved them away from traditionally influential spots.  He also did not replace Bourguiba’s 
image with his own on money, and only six postage stamps bore his image, compared to more 
than fifty for Bourguiba.  Ben Ali also did not embark upon a campaign to slander his 
predecessor and, as I will describe below, certain taboos around speaking about Bourguiba still 
exist that have implications for Tunisia’s democratic transition.    
 
Bourguiba in the Public Sphere 
The revolution provided a new space and freedoms not only to discuss, but also venerate 
Bourguiba.  In particular, there have been numerous public, but instituted by private citizen, acts 
of nostalgia and interest in Bourguiba. For example, following the revolution, an Institute for 
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Bourguiba Studies opened and numerous books have been published, not only about his life, but 
also at least three specifically re-examining his relationship with Islam.29   
Playwright Raja Farhat wrote, directed, and stared in a six-hour, one-man play, 
Bourguiba, Dernière Prison (2012). Celebrating Bourguiba’s life, it was performed for several 
years across the country, including multiple performances in the National Theatre in the center of 
Tunis on the eponymous Avenue Bourguiba.  I attended the play twice.  On both occasions, the 
audience appeared to thoroughly enjoy it, laughing at the frequent jokes, and also giving it a 
standing ovation. Due to its length, the play, performed in Tunisian Arabic, was most often 
staged in two-hour blocks and on holidays or other events with national significance.  For 
example, a performance was staged at the National Theatre in Tunis the evening before the 2014 
legislative elections, a timing which was suggestive of encouraging viewers to consider 
Bourguiba’s legacy when they voted the next day. The play was “retired” in 2015 so that the 
Farhat could write and perform other works, including two more plays about Bourguiba’s years 
in office.30  
                                                
29 Bourguiba and religious issues (Amal Mousa) - Arabic/French; Bourguiba et ‘Islam: Le Politique et le Religieux 
(Lofti Hajji) - Arabic/French; Orphelins de Bourguiba et héritiers du Prophète (Samy Ghorbal) – French.  
30 The first Bourguiba: Le Discours du Palmarium (2015) recounts Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi’s 1972 visit 
to Tunisia and Bourguiba’s defense of Tunisian nationalism and rejection of al-Gaddafi’s proposals for a pan-Arab 
union in North Africa.  The second play, Bourguiba in America (2016) depicts Bourguiba’s 1961state visit with 
President John F. Kennedy in Washington, DC.  
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Figure 5: Scene from Bourguiba, Dernière Prison. 
Raja Farhat stars as Habib Bourguiba in the play he also wrote and directed.  Here he is visited by a nurse.  In the 
background images from Bourguiba’s life are displayed, including this one showing President Zine el-Abidine Ben 
Ali, who overthrew Bourguiba in 1987, looking on.  February 2015.  Photo: Elizabeth Young.  
 
During the 2014 election, Béji Caïd Essebsi, the leader of Nidaa Tounes and the 
ultimately victorious presidential candidate, presented himself not only as Bourguiba’s political 
and ideological heir, but also sought to physically embody Bourguiba, imitating the dead leader’s 
dress and mannerisms throughout the campaign. He opened his presidential campaign in front of 
Bourguiba’s mausoleum and in an announcement for the event he stands with Bourguiba’s 
ghostly image staring over his shoulder.  
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Figure 6: Campaign advertisement for Essebsi’s presidential campaign launch. 
November 2, 2014.  Essebsi stands next to Bourguiba’s mausoleum in Monastir with a “ghostly” face of Bourguiba 
hovering behind him.  Source: Nida Tounes Facebook page.  
 
While not frequent, I also encountered a number of public homages to Bourguiba made 
by private individuals.  Not surprisingly, two of these were in his hometown of Monastir, where 
Bourguiba’s face and name are ubiquitous.  One was piece of graffiti, labeled “Grand Leader” 
with Bourguiba’s image, his birthday, and the symbol of the local football club, surrounded by 
laurels.  An individual raises his arms in salute.  
 
Figure 7: Graffiti of Bourguiba in Monastir, Bourguiba’s hometown. 
A figure waves what are possibly olive branches at a drawing of Bourguiba, the city symbol on Monastir, and 
Bourguiba’s birthday.  The figure may be wearing a hooded sweatshirt, loosely associate with the Arab Spring 
protests, but it is not clear. The original text in English “Grand Leader” and French “August 3rd” renders the graffiti 
not just for a local audience, but also for the international community.  January 2014.  Photo: Elizabeth Young.  
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Also in Monastir, not far from the train station, is a private memorial, created by a man 
whose father had worked with Bourguiba, featuring original photos and prints spanning 
Bourguiba’s life.  
 
Figure 8: A private memorial to Bourguiba in Monastir.  
These photos form a personal memorial by one Tunisian man to Bourguiba’s memory, which is also accompanied 
by a donation box for its upkeep.  The photos span Bourguiba’s entire life and include official portraits as well as 
action photos of Bourguiba interacting with Tunisian citizens. Photo: Elizabeth Young, January 2014. 
 
Finally, in downtown Tunis, I found a street vendor selling copies of photographs 
mounted on hand-painted wood.  In addition to movie stars and the Eiffel Tower, he had a large 
collection of Bourguiba photos spanning his lifetime – as a young lawyer, attending ceremonial 
events, dressed in religious garb, swimming in the ocean – which he reported to me were good 
selling items for him.31  As I stood, trying to decide which Bourguiba to buy for myself, two 
                                                
31 I bought one of these photos and packed it in an outside pocket of my suitcase when leaving Tunisia along with 
several books and other items of insignificant monetary value. The Tunis-Carthage Airport has a documented issue 
with theft from unsecured luggage, and I later discovered that that pocket had been gone through after I checked-in.  
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elderly men paused next to me to look at the images and one commented simply to the other “Il 
était un bon homme” (“he was a good man”), a spontaneous acknowledgment of Bourguiba’s 
legacy. 
 
 
Figure 9: Photos of Bourguiba for sale in downtown Tunis. March 2015. 
These photos, mounted on a wooden backing, were sold along with other travel and celebrity images, however photos 
of Bourguiba constituted the largest single category. These include photos of Bourguiba as a young man, images from 
identity documents, Bourguiba’s leisure life, meetings with Tunisians, and Bourguiba fulfilling government duties.  
Of particular note for this study is the photo of Bourguiba at prayer (top center, Bourguiba is dressed in white religious 
dress).  Photo: Elizabeth Young. 
 
These public acts of commemoration by private individuals weren’t common by any 
means, and it was rare that Bourguiba was spontaneously brought up in daily conversation.  
However, they do point to Bourguiba’s enduring legacy, not just as an important figure in 
Tunisian history, but also a figure who resonates with their lives to the extent that Tunisian 
                                                
However, the photo of Bourguiba was the only thing taken from the pocket, though I don’t know if this was out of a 
desire to keep the photo, destroy it, or merely not being able to squeeze it back into the bag. 
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citizens spend time creating and maintaining public memorials and also buy photographs of 
Bourguiba as personal items.    
Why do Tunisians engage in these public displays of commemoration – books, plays, 
graffiti, photographs? Bourguiba, like other authoritarian leaders before him, through his project 
of modernization and promotion of his vision of Tunisianité, has become not just a symbol of the 
nation, but its embodiment.  As one scholar describes the Bourguiba’s reform tradition, 
Tunisianité, it is the country’s “central myth” (Hibou 2011: 213).  Tunisianité offered Tunisians 
a place of pride in the world and a self-vision of Tunisia as both modern and Muslim, 
particularly when compared to other countries in the Middle East and North Africa.  “Tunisian 
exceptionalism” both with respect to Tunisianité and the Arab Spring is still frequently cited by 
Tunisians. Bourguiba, as the progenitor of the ideology of Tunisianité, has provide a segment of 
Tunisians, particularly those of the generations who came of age during his independence 
struggle and early years of the Republic, with a worldview that emphasizes Tunisia’s uniqueness 
in the world, a way to reconcile Islam with modernity, and also justifications for choices like not 
wearing the veil or drinking alcohol.  Displaying photos of Bourguiba or sitting through a six-
hour play, for these Tunisians, is an enactment of Tunisian-ness as much as attending Bastille 
Day celebrations are for the French.   
In understanding Bourguiba’s place in Tunisian national identity it is useful to take a 
Durkheimian approach to how over time his memory has been treated.  While he certainly could 
also be analyzed as a charismatic leader, I analyze him through a Durkheimian lens for two 
reasons.  First, Weber’s analysis of charisma focuses primarily on leaders during the course of 
their lifetime, while a Durkheimian approach allows more traction in understanding how a leader 
may also be memorialized in a community after the death.  Second, and more importantly, I 
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analyze specifically taboos around how Bourguiba is discussed or commemorated in post-
revolutionary Tunisia that are more easily analyzed through Durkheim’s sacred-profane 
dichotomy.  As the embodiment of the nation, Bourguiba, as previously discussed, is a 
Durkheimian sacred figure around whom there are certain taboos.  In all of the time I was in 
Tunisia, I never heard or saw anyone actively disparaging Bourguiba as individual, though 
plenty were quick to criticize Bourguiba’s specific polices if asked.  This is in contrast to Ben Ali 
who was universally criticized when discussed.  The only negative displays towards Bourguiba, 
that I am aware of, were two attempts by alleged Salafis in 2012 and 2013 to vandalize his 
mausoleum in Monastir, one of them reportedly screaming “this is idolatry (shirk)” in reference 
to Bourguiba’s Islamic interpretations and the mausoleum built in his honor.  However even 
these acts point to Bourguiba as a powerful symbol of the nation that can be attacked in proxy. 
The unwritten taboos around criticizing or insulting Bourguiba as a person, as opposed to 
his policies extends, to those whom were persecuted under his regime.  Ennahda leader Rachid 
Ghannouchi’s response to a reporter when pressed about his views on the re-erection of a statue 
of Bourguiba in the center of Tunis, embodies this taboo:   
Ghannouchi: Yes. Bourguiba is a great personality. You cannot airbrush him out of our 
history. He guided a national movement which liberated Tunisia. I cannot negate that. It 
is a reality. 
 
Reporter: So you support the re-erection of the statue? 
 
Ghannouchi: I am not in favour of this statue. When I was in prison Bourguiba wanted 
to retry me, so that my sentence would be increased from life imprisonment to the death 
penalty.  He wanted to repeat the behaviour of the sultans, but he was deposed within 
three days. But he has his place in Tunisia’s history. In my speech at the 
opening ceremony of the party conference, I mentioned a number of national leaders and 
one of them was Bourguiba.32 
 
                                                
32 Rachid Ghannouchi Q&A: Thoughts on Democratic Islam.  http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/rached-
ghannouchi-qa-thoughts-democratic-islam-1636082038 
 51 
It can’t be determined whether Ghannouchi’s comments about Bourguiba are his genuine 
feelings or a political calculation to not be seen as rejecting a figure many Tunisians revere.  
However, even if it is the latter, it demonstrates how taboos around Bourguiba, even today, 
regulate public speech in Tunisia.   
Despite Ghannouchi’s acceptance of Bourguiba’s importance in Tunisian history and a 
lack of public critique, Bourguiba is a divisive figure and was responsible for exiling, 
imprisoning, and torturing a significant portion of the population, in particular Tunisian 
Islamists. By the time of the second elections there was not at an active, public process at trying 
to reconcile these abuses.33 Additionally, the state, with respect to Bourguiba’s legacy, has 
chosen silence rather than to actively try to historicize him and decontextualize him. I suggest 
that this is a strategic silence rather than disinterest or passive approval.  While Ben Ali’s has a 
clear role as the foil of and antithesis to the newly democratizing Tunisia state, Bourguiba’s 
legacy still remains unclear and it is not apparent that many Tunisians are eager to address it, 
except for those deeply supportive of Bourguiba, especially given more pressing societal issues 
such as terrorism and the economy.  No new postage stamps have been issued portraying 
Bourguiba.  History textbooks have not been revised since the revolution to address Bourguiba’s 
administration or his legacy (Andrieu 2016).  In 2013, the Ministry of Culture opened 
Bourguiba’s palatial home as a museum.  However, there are no historical details about 
Bourguiba’s life or interpretation of his legacy.  The only posted information details the material 
and origin of the 1960s-1970s furniture that fills the house, leaving it up to visitor to interpret 
what they see.   
                                                
33 Tunisia launched its Truth and Dignity commission in mid-2014, however, it did not begin collecting testimony 
until late 2015.  Its role is to examine financial and human rights abuses since Tunisia’s independence, but the body 
has remained marred in controversy.  
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In understanding the success of democratic transitions, I proposed that national re-
narrativization could play a role particularly in trying to make national narratives and invocations 
of collective memory more inclusive.  First, non-state actors have very publicly celebrated 
Bourguiba, while those that suffered under Bourguiba’s regime look on.  Second, by the time of 
the 2014 elections, the state had not taken a role, through education or other avenues of trying to 
reconcile different experiences and understandings of Tunisia’s past, and particularly 
Bourguiba’s role in constructing Tunisianité and exacerbating social divisions between 
Bourguibists and Islamists.  
While the state’s silence and non-state commemorations of Bourguiba did not create 
social cleavages, neither the state nor other actors have worked to alleviate the strong social 
divide in Tunisian society.  As described in the following chapters the tension and distrust 
between Bourguibists and Islamists nearly derailed the democratic process in Tunisia, 
particularly in the summer of 2013.  Tunisia did not undergo a significant re-narrativization in 
the post-revolution period and, while this fact alone did not derail the democratic process, it 
helped contribute to political instability by not providing a stronger basis for a shared national 
identity or national cohesion.  
 
Bourguiba as Father of the Nation 
Bourguiba joins the pantheon of other “fathers of the nation:” George Washington, 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Ho Chi Minh, Kim Il-Sung, and many others.   Some of these founders 
may be consigned to relative, contemporary obscurity, while others may take on a near deified 
status, quite literally in the case of Kim Il-Sung.  Jansen (2007) offers a three-part framework for 
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their “reputational trajectories” that is useful in considering Bourguiba’s role in post-
revolutionary Tunisia.  
First, with respect to salience, the degree to which the individual is remembered at all in 
contemporary society, Bourguiba looms large, both figuratively and literally.  Statues and busts 
of Bourguiba are returning to Tunisian public places.  Major roads bear his name in nearly every 
town.  His photo is sold and displayed by private citizens on the street.  Even for those disliking 
Bourguiba, no Tunisian would not acknowledge him as the most salient figure in contemporary 
Tunisia, certainly above any of the current political leaders.  While Bourguiba was more 
marginalized during the Ben Ali era, he was too important to be excluded from it.  
Second, ownership: who can claim to be a legitimate heir.  As described, Essebsi most 
clearly claims ownership of Bourguiba’s legacy in post-revolutionary Tunisia and explicitly 
utilizes that ownership to encourage voters to elect him.  
Finally, is a leader’s “valence,” are they viewed nearly universally as positive or negative 
or neutral.  Bourguiba, as described above is a polarizing figure, both do to his authoritarian 
implementation of his vision of Tunisianité and also his severe repression of political dissidents.  
Even more so than Ben Ali, he is a polarizing figure.  However, as discussed, in Tunisian society 
only positive valences are expressed publically due to continuing, informal taboos.  Here is the 
area in which there may be the greatest potential change in the future as, with the truth and 
reconciliation committees more Tunisians are likely to express the negative aspects of 
Bourguiba’s rule and legacy.  
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IV. “Guardian of Religion:” Renegotiating the Boundaries of State-Mosque Relations  
A second potential avenue for national reimagining is through laws and state institutions.  
In this section, I examine how the Tunisian Constituent Assembly revised the Tunisian 
constitution to address the relationship between religion and the state.  In contrast to attempts at 
re-narrativization, on first appearances it appears that the constitution underwent significant 
changes with respect to the state’s relationship with religion.  However, upon further 
examination, I show that the constitution is another example of continuity rather than change 
with respect to Bourguiba’s legacy of Tunisianité.  
Despite the importance of Islam, identity, and Tunisianité in Bourguiba’s political 
platform, these elements figures do not figure prominently in the country’s first constitution, 
which Bourguiba was instrumental in creating. The preamble of the 1959 constitution urges its 
citizens to “remain faithful to the teachings of Islam,” but also to the Maghreb, the Arab world, 
and all those who “struggle to achieve justice and liberty.” Like most Arab-Muslim constitutions, 
its Article 1 states that Tunisia’s “religion is Islam.” However, unlike many of these other 
constitutions, it doesn’t mention shari’a as being a source or the source of legislation as is 
common in many Muslim states.  Article 5 reads that “The Republic of Tunisia shall guarantee 
the inviolability of the human person and freedom of conscience, and defends the free practice of 
religious beliefs provided this does not disturb public order.”  Taken together this reading 
suggests that while Islam is a defining characteristic of Tunisia, it does not supersede freedom of 
belief and practice.   
However, in an authoritarian state the contents of the constitution matter less than the 
dictates of the dictator, particularly one who styles himself as Imam of the nation. Bourguiba 
would demonstrate this in his attempts to regulate religious practice, contrary to the Constitution, 
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such as forbidding women to wear the hijab and punishing Islamists for their religious and 
political views.   
After the 2011 elections, rewriting the constitution became a priority to address a number 
of issues stemming from the dictatorship: the balance of power between government branches, 
the functioning of the judiciary, electoral procedures, and the role of religion in the new state. 
The two articles concerning religion, Article 1 and Article 6, were particularly controversial. In 
January 2014, two years after beginning the post-revolution constitutional drafting process, 
Tunisia’s legislative body, the National Constituent Assembly (NCA), met to cast the final votes 
on the constitution article by article.   
The decision of whether to revise Article 1 to include a reference to shari’a as an 
inspiration for Tunisia’s laws was heavily contested (see Zeghel 2013).  Ennahda initially pushed 
to have shari’a referenced in the constitution, which Bourguibists worried would set the 
precedent for theocratic rulings that ran contrary to freedoms guaranteed elsewhere and 
precedent during the Bourguiba-Ben Ali era.  After several constitutional drafts, it was agreed 
that Islam would be mentioned in Article 1 as the religion of Tunisia as a sociological fact, but 
within the context of a secular state, preserving the 1959 wording.  Additionally, Ennahda 
eventually made the concession not to push for a reference to shari’a as the or even a basis for 
Tunisian law. Finally, Members of Parliament stipulated this article was immutable and could 
not be amended in future constitutional revisions.   
At the final January 4th vote on this article 146 of the 149 voting MPs voted in favor, 
including all of the Ennahda MPs, signaling a broad consensus on the issue and Ennahda’s 
acceptance that it would not be able to alter this aspect of Tunisianité now or in the future.  In an 
amendment that didn’t pass proposing that the article would reference the Qur’an and Sunna, 
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traditions of Mohammad, as principle sources of legislation the majority on Ennahda members 
either voted against it or abstained despite it better reflecting the party’s initial positions.  In the 
final voting on Article 1 we can see both exact continuity in the wording of the law from the 
Bourguiba era as well as Ennahda’s ultimate decision to acquiesce to this wording and not to 
“reimagine” this law in a new political context, even when a sizeable number of Tunisians, 56% 
according to the previously cited Pew Study (2012), supported shari’a as being a source of 
legislation.  
Even more contentious was Article 6, focusing on the relationship between religion and 
the state and religious freedom, which was passed and then unprecedentedly re-amended twice in 
the final days of debate (see Gullali 2014 for an overview history of the debates surrounding the 
article). The full text of the final version of Article 6 reads:  
The state is the guardian of religion (raa'iya li-ldeen). It guarantees freedom of 
conscience and belief, the free exercise of religious practices and the neutrality of 
mosques and places of worship from all partisan instrumentalization.  The state 
undertakes to disseminate the values of moderation and tolerance and the protection of 
the sacred, and the prohibition of all violations thereof. It undertakes equally to prohibit 
and fight against calls for Takfir and the incitement of violence and hatred (translated by 
Guellali 2014). 
 
After an Islamist MP, unhappy with the initial article, accused a leftist MP of being an 
“enemy of Islam,” NCA members angrily demanded returning to the article and included an 
amendment to the article prohibiting the practice of takfir, naming someone as an apostate.34  In 
response, a coalition of imams and religious associations protested in front of the Assembly and 
demanded the NCA remove the prohibition against takfir and guarantees of “freedom of 
consciousness” from the amendment and to replace them with a prohibition against blasphemy.  
                                                
34 The act of takfir, naming someone as an apostate, has particularly severe ramifications as it can be interpreted as 
permitting and even endorsing their murder.  The association between takfir and violence was particularly salient in 
the debates over Article 6.  
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The NCA returned to Article 6 for a third time, with some Ennahda members proposing an anti-
blasphemy clause to “balance” the amendment.  The fevered debate over the article resulted in 
one member of parliament fainting on the Assembly floor while decrying the article and another 
dying of a heart attack a few hours later, his untimely death ending what promised to be a more 
protracted debate.  Article 6 was finalized without the blasphemy amendment and the entire 
constitution was passed shortly thereafter.   
How has the constitution changed post-revolution? Both Article 6 and its counterpart in 
the 1959 constitution, Article 5, charge the state with protecting freedom of consciousness and 
religious practices.35  However, the 2014 constitution goes further, making the state not just the 
protector of individual citizens’ rights, but of religion itself. As the “guardian of religion,” the 
state is tasked with protecting places of worship from being used for political ends, promoting 
messages of tolerance, preventing religion from being used for violence, and protecting “the 
sacred,” a reference that may remain ambiguous until tested in the courts.  At first glance, the 
2014 constitution vis-à-vis the 1959 constitution appears to greatly expand the role of the state 
with respect to its relationship with religion as both a concept and a practice in Tunisia, and it 
does do so legally.  However, I argue, that this is not a change in the way the state interacts with 
religious issues, but merely a codification of the status quo that existed under both Bourguiba 
and Ben Ali.  In Bourguiba’s conceptualization of Tunisianité, the state, as embodied through 
him, was most certainly the “guardian of religion” and a promoter of the Tunisianité values of 
both moderation and tolerance.  Furthermore, by also examining a portion of Ben Ali’s address 
on the second anniversary of his coup, one can see a clear conceptual lineage between the 
                                                
35 The portion of Article 5 concerning religion reads: “The Republic of Tunisia shall guarantee the inviolability of 
the human person and freedom of conscience, and defends the free practice of religious beliefs provided this does 
not disturb public order” (1959).  
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Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s conceptualization of Tunisianité and Article 6 of the 2014 constitution, 
emphasis added to note points of commonality:  
Ben Ali 1989 (cited in McCarthy 2014) 2014 Constitution, Article 6 
There is no other defender of the religion of 
the Tunisians than the State, the State of all 
Tunisians, which seeks to preserve and 
protect the faith, to manage religious 
affairs, in faithfulness to its sublime 
teachings. 
The state is the guardian of religion.  It 
guarantees freedom of conscience and belief, 
the free exercise of religious practices and the 
neutrality of mosques and places of worship 
from all partisan instrumentalization.  The 
state undertakes to disseminate the values of 
moderation and tolerance and the protection 
of the sacred, and the prohibition of all 
violations thereof. It undertakes equally to 
prohibit and fight against calls for takfir and 
the incitement of violence and hatred. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of state’s relationship to religion, 1989 and 2014.  
 
While Ben Ali’s speech does not mention freedoms of consciousness or religion, the 
1959 constitution does.  What is new and novel about the 2014 constitution is the eleventh-hour 
addition about takfirism and violence, issues which can be traced not only to the increased profile 
of Salafism in Tunisia, in which non-Salafis were frequently accused of being apostates, but also 
the specific, contingent events of MP’s arguments with one another.  
As with Article 1, Article 6 represents a continuity and a reaffirmation of Bourguiba’s 
vision of Tunisianité and a decision on the part of the Constituent National Assembly not to 
reimagine how Tunisia’s laws could differently reflect the Tunisian population, many of whom 
support a reference to shari’a.  However, despite this lack of national reimagining, there are two 
reasons why it has not yet seemed a threat to Tunisia’s democratic transition.  First, while 
Ennahda did not win on its initial position concerning the laws with respect to shari’a and 
blasphemy, it did ultimately agree to them in a democratic process which gives Ennahda some 
ownership in the amendments.  Second, Article 6 is written in such a way that is vague and open 
to interpretation. For example, it is unclear what the exact legal ramifications are of the state 
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being declared the legal “guardian of religion” and “protector of the sacred” and how these 
designations may play out in practice, for example, possibly being used to justify blasphemy 
cases.  
 
V. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I provided an overview of how Tunisianité was at the heart of Bourguiba’s 
national project and how he became the embodiment of it. Despite the potential of the revolution 
as an event to change structures, Tunisianité, as a cultural schema, has proven resilient in many 
areas, including collective memory and the constitution. Bourguiba’s legacy, including 
Tunisianité, has yet to be critically interrogated, especially by the state, and the 2014 
constitutional revisions concerning religion are reflective of the vision of state-religious relations 
advocated by Bourguiba and Ben Ali, though in practice there is much more religious freedom 
for dissenters such as Islamists in post-revolution Tunisia.   
 In particular, the failure to critically reexamine Bourguiba, as a historical figure and as a 
symbol of Tunisianité, was a potential missed opportunity to try to bridge the divide between the 
two largest segments of the Tunisian population, Bourguibists and Islamists, and attempt to avert 
societal tensions over competing visions of the nation. The state, by the time of the 2014 
elections, had avoided taking a position on Bourguiba’s legacy (e.g. textbooks, documentation in 
Museums, including on postage stamps/money, etc.).  However, for those who suffered under 
Bourguiba both the silence and the lack of transitional justice had the potential to be divisive.   
 While this chapter has shown the durability of Tunisianité as an organizing structure in 
Tunisian society, the final discussion on the Constitution does point to an important structural 
change with respect to the role that modes of power play in Sewell’s theory of structural change.  
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Ennahda, through their electoral victories, gained a plurality of parliamentary seats and was able, 
for the first time, to voice opinions on the laws of Tunisia.  While, primarily due to concerns 
over existential threats to Tunisian democracy, they chose not to significantly challenge the 
schema of Tunisianité, they did, by voting on the constitution, particularly Articles 1 & 6, 
alongside their political opposition.  In doing so, Ennahda further helped to institutionalize and 
strengthen Tunisia’s democratic transition by adding its voice of authority and political 
legitimacy to this version of the constitution.  
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CHAPTER 3 Crises of Faith: “Old” Salafism in “New” Tunisia 
 
"I talked to them in the name of the law, they reply in the name of God.  
There are two visions of the world." 36 
- Habib Kazdaghli, Dean of Manouba University’s Faculty of Letters, Arts & Humanities 
on the niqab sit-in  
 
This chapter addresses a third potential means of national reimagining: balancing the 
democratic precepts of pluralism with national specificity.  Linz and Stepan point to the often-
competing logics between nation-states that value homogeneity and democracies that prioritize 
pluralism (1996).  As they describe, nation-states benefit from promoting national symbols, 
languages, education, and religions that increase an individual’s association with the nation, 
while in democracies there is a prioritization of equal rights for all citizens, especially taking into 
account minorities. The tension between nation and democracy is particularly acute for states 
transitioning from authoritarianism regimes, which used nationalism as a form of social control, 
to democracies.   
The previous chapter examined how the concept of Tunisianité was addressed (or not 
addressed) and rearticulated through state mechanisms, such as the commemoration of Habib 
Bourguiba and the relationship between religion and the state in the constitution.  This chapter 
                                                
36 “Tunisian students on hunger strike over right to wear niqab in class.” 
https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/tunisian-students-on-hunger-strike-over-right-to-wear-niqab-in-class-
1.353565 
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looks at disputes over religious beliefs and practice in public life, particular between 
Bourguibists and Salafis.  If the previous chapter emphasized either continuity or rearticulations 
of previous repertoires of Islam and the state, especially as articulated through Tunisianité, then 
this chapter focuses on disjunctures, particularly in daily, public life. It seeks to further explain 
the social dislocation occurring in Tunisia following the revolution and highlights a key 
challenge of democratic transitions: how to accommodate pluralism and also promote national 
unity.  More so than any of the other two forms of reimaging, I argue that the tension over 
pluralism and national identity, the perception “two worlds” that Dean Habib Kazdaghli 
describes in this chapter’s epigraph, nearly drove Tunisia to the brink of democratic backsliding 
in the second half of 2013 following opposition leader Mohammed Brahmi’s death.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, Bourguiba and Ben Ali utilized the concept of 
Tunisianité to help legitimate their regimes. They first used state mechanisms to promote an 
interpretation of national Islam seen as authentic and natural to Tunisia with other interpretations 
and practices being “othered,” which effectively marginalized Islamists. Acts that elsewhere 
might be seen as forms of individual piety, such as wearing the hijab became acts of political 
resistance and rejection of the regime.  Therefore, in the post-revolutionary landscape, Tunisians 
had to grapple with first, how practices, such as wearing the hijab fit into Tunisian national 
identity when it had long been presented as an anathema to it, and second, how to understand and 
accommodate different individual choices, as well as how the state should be involved in this 
pluralistic endeavor.   
At the same time Tunisians were confronted with trying to negotiate a cohesive national 
unity to rectify divisions exacerbated during the dictatorship, they were also confronted with the 
increasing public presence of a small, but vocal minority of Salafists.  Bourguibists were 
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repulsed the most by Salafi practices, though not always distinguishing between Salafis and 
Islamists(s), and Salafists also tended to object to key tenants of liberal democracies, such as 
toleration of differing lifestyles and viewpoints.  Additionally, in its most extreme forms, jihadi-
Salafism rejects the concept of a democratic, nation-state, willing to resort to violence to impose 
a theocratic state.  In this environment Tunisians had to negotiate not only the tensions between 
national identity and pluralism, but also simultaneously navigate an existential threat to the 
Tunisian state and nation.    
This chapter examines how the tension Linz and Stepan highlight was negotiated, and not 
negotiated, particularly in the two years immediately following the revolution.  After providing a 
very brief overview of Salafism in Tunisia, it turns to examine the tension between national unity 
and pluralism in three arenas.  First, it explores the hijab and the niqab as forms of “everyday 
nationhood” through the lens of a dispute over the niqab at Manouba University in Tunis in order 
to highlight the difficulties faced in accommodating competing lifestyles following the 
revolution.  Then, it turns to the sphere of cultural production, looking at both Salafi protests 
against art and also how artists created art to critique Salafism.  In doing so, it points to a lack of 
societal empathy and how Salafis, of all varieties, came to be viewed as an existential national 
threat.  Finally, it discusses violent, jihadi-Salafism and how it has influenced public debates 
about Salafism more broadly in Tunisia.   It concludes by arguing that it was finally Ennahda’s 
rejection of jihadi-Salafism and distancing from Salafism more generally that helped to prevent 
democratic backsliding in 2013 and for Tunisia to move forward with finalizing the constitution 
and holding elections the following year.   
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I. Salafism and Tunisia 
Salafism along with other “legalistic-literalist” fundamentalist movements “claim[s] to 
restore social institutions according to the letter and law of the ancient community” in response 
to perceived social crises (Riesebrodt 2000: 272). For Salafists, their “idealized” reference frame 
is the early Muslim community, specifically the Prophet Mohammed’s generation and the 
subsequent two generations as documented in the Qur’an and hadith literature.  The Arabic term 
salaf literally translates as “predecessors” and contemporary Salafis seek to emulate the 
theological “purity” of these early Muslims in as many spheres of live as possible, ranging from 
sleeping habits to reestablishing the Islamic caliphate.  Salafists reject what they see as 
subsequent centuries of theological and legal interpretation (ijtihad).  Contemporary Salafism 
arose from a nineteenth century scholarly movement within Islam attempting to understand the 
religion vis-à-vis both modernity and European colonialism.  In particular Salafis reject what 
they see as any contestation to the unity of God (tawhid), meaning that they typically condemn 
the worship of saints or celebration of Mohammed’s birthday (al-Mawlid), and, in some cases, 
practice excommunication (takfir) of unbelievers (kuffar) and those they view as apostates 
(Wagemakers 2016).  
As described below, Salafism spans a spectrum ranging from a disapproval of non-Salafi 
practices and lifestyles to outright violent attempts to impose their own interpretations of Islam 
and the world.  Scholars generally understand Salafism to have three primary manifestations – 
quietist, political, and jihadist – distinguished by their method (manhaj) of interacting with 
broader society and politics (Wiktorowicz 2006, Wagemakers 2016 & 2017).  The largest group, 
quietist Salafis, also called scripturalists or purists, avoid political engagement such as 
demonstrating, voting, or debates, believing that political action causes social discord (fitna).  
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Instead they believe that through personal piety, education, and missionary work, rather through 
direct political intervention, society will gradually and organically evolve to accept an Islamic 
state.  In contrast, political Salafists actively engage in politics and public demonstrations to 
bring about social, legal, and political changes conforming to their religious convictions. Finally, 
jihadi-Salafis see a duty to violently expand and protect the lands of Islam (dar al-Islam) from 
both non-Muslims and apostate Muslim, as carried out by al-Qaeda, the Islamic States, and other 
contemporary violent extremist movements. Muslims typically distinguish between two types of 
jihad (“struggle”): the “greater jihad” a personal “struggle” to live a moral, religious life, and the 
“lesser jihad”, a military struggle to defend Islam. The terminology jihadi-Salafi only invokes 
the latter of these two meanings.  (Wagemakers 2016)   
 
Figure 10: Graffiti in Bardo tram station. Tunis, July 2013. 
It reads “The people want Shari’a rule,” a call for a theocratic state, likely painted by a Salafist. Produced from a 
stencil, I saw this graffiti at multiple locations in Tunis. Photo: Elizabeth Young. 
 
Many social commentators, and even some scholars, have presented Salafism as a 
“foreign import” to Tunisia from the Gulf states, which is inaccurate (Marks 2013, Merone 2013, 
Pargeter 2012, Torelli 2017).   The Salafist movement first started to gain followers as a more 
conservative and fundamentalist breakaway from the MTI, Ennahda’s precursor, in the 
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1980s.  Due to Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s control of religious expression, though, Salafism was 
largely hidden from the public sphere and there was little violent jihadi Salafism especially 
compared to the rest of the region (Pargeter 2012).  However, numbers began growing by the 
new millennium.  One potentially credible explanation argues that Salafism grew in the absence 
of conservative Tunisian religious leaders, who had either been imprisoned or forced into exile 
(Ayari 2013).  Lacking Tunisian religious leaders who had not been selected by the dictatorship, 
youth were attracted to Salafism both by the spread of Salafi satellite TV stations from Saudi 
Arabia and due to concerns over the West’s War on Terror, a perceived attack on Islam.   
Following the revolution, Salafists were able to preach in public for the first time and 
actively recruit new members. Three small Salafi political parties formed and competed in the 
2014 elections, though winning a fraction of a percent of the votes and no seats.   Additionally, 
Salafi-jihadist attack on the security forces, particularly along the Algerian border, became 
increasingly prevalent, a phenomenon that I return to at the end of this chapter.  
Before examining how Salafism has impacted discourses over Tunisian national identity, 
it is important to also problematize the term itself. Not all those who practice what scholars 
consider Salafism identify themselves as such, partially due to the term’s recent associations with 
terrorism (Wagemakers 2016).  Additionally, some object to the use of “Salafi” because it 
suggests there are different sects of Islam.  During a conversation, a representative of a Tunisian 
Salafi organization rejected the notion that he was a Salafi, stating that he was a Muslim and 
rejected that there were multiple, legitimate interpretations of Islam. The terms “Salafi” and 
“Salafist” are commonly used in the Tunisian press in ways that would be familiar to scholars of 
Islam, particularly when describing public protests or violent events.  However, the press’ use of 
the term should not be uncritically accepted as fact since the designation frequently involves the 
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journalist interpreting motivations for a particular action37, which may be contrary to how the 
actor would justify his or own actions, just as someone in the United States might object to being 
labelled as “alt-right.” In the Tunisian press “Salafist” is sometimes used in quotation marks, 
indicating an unverified assumption.38  Additionally, some Islamists(s), who may agree with 
Salafists on particular issues but not their broader worldview, may be inaccurately labeled, by 
both the press and scholars, as Salafis.  While problematic, Salafism remains a useful category of 
analysis, both because of its accuracy in reflecting empirical realities and also interrogating when 
and in what contexts the term.   
***** 
Before turning to analyze how Tunisians dealt with the challenges of pluralism, I provide 
a short background of the societal frictions that had grown in Tunisia following the revolution in 
order to better situate the discussion in this chapter. The tension in Tunisia was palpable during 
the summer of 2013.  What had been a general sense of possibility and pride following Ben Ali’s 
departure two years prior, had given way to frustration and increasingly fear for the future.  The 
second parliamentary elections, legally mandated to occur one year after the first, by October 
2012, had been delayed until June 2013.  However, when I arrived in Tunisia at the beginning of 
that month they had been postponed yet again as there was no end in-sight to the drafting of the 
new constitution, a pre-requisite for any election.  Many Tunisians were frustrated not only with 
the government’s slow pace at reforms but also at what many Tunisians saw as a failure to fulfill 
the promises of the revolution to increase their quality life.  
                                                
37 For example, the Tunisian press labeled both of the Bourguiba mausoleum attackers mentioned in the previous 
chapter as “Salafi,” but no additional support for this attribution was given. 
38 Additionally, it is increasingly common to see, particularly in French-language press, the term “takfiriste” (one 
who declares others to be nonbelievers or apostates) used as a synonym for Salafi.  
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Many of the most contentious changes centered around the role of religion and religious 
expression in public life.   For Islamists, the post-revolution period provided freedoms that had 
previously been unimaginable, including the ability to freely practice religion, and, particularly 
for Salafi orientations, to openly criticize the practices of their less conservative compatriots.  
However, there also was a frequent tension with Islamists being able to exercise their newly won 
freedom of expression while balancing it against other’s same freedom of expression and 
practice, particularly when they found the later blasphemous.    
For Bourguibists, many hadn’t encountered religious practices other than Tunisianité to 
any significant degree given state censorship and the imprisonment of dissidents.  The revolution 
however, revealed a side of Tunisia that had been hidden and repressed: there were substantial 
numbers of their fellow citizens – almost half according to the Pew Forum surveys (2012, 2013) 
– who conceptualized Islam and its role in public life in radically different ways from them.   
Suddenly Bourguibists had to justify aspects of their life ranging from dress to cultural 
consumption that they had previously taken for granted as being “Tunisian.” 
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Figure 11: Graffiti in Sfax, January 2014. 
The graffiti reads: “I am not an infidel, I am not an atheist,” highlighting concerns over charges of takfirism 
(apostasy) and blasphemy.  Photo: Elizabeth Young.  
 
Furthermore, there were increasing security concerns as Salafi-jihadist terrorist attacks, 
primarily targeting the police and military, began occurring across the country, particularly on 
the porous Algerian border.  Terrorist attacks had been rare during the dictatorships and those 
that happened had been blamed on Ennahda and used by the dictatorships as another mechanism 
to shore up popular support and to present the government as the only thing separating the 
country from dangerous Islamist terrorists.  Bourguibists blamed the increase in attacks on what 
they saw as Ennahda’s failure to actively pursue terrorists who they also viewed as not so 
different from Ennahda itself.  In the minds of many Tunisians, particularly those with 
Bourguibist views on Islam and the nation, there was little meaningful distinction between 
Salafists and other Islamists(s), such as Ennahda supporters.  
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II.  Veiling and Everyday Nationhood 
While the previous chapter focused on ways in which the Tunisian state has sought to 
define Tunisian national identity, this chapter examines the interaction between top-down and 
bottom-up forms of nationalism (Hobsbawm 1992), specifically veiling. In post-revolution 
Tunisia, there were conservative challenges to everyday life ranging from dress to eating during 
fasting hours of Ramadan.  In their work on everyday nationhood, popular expressions of 
nationhood, Fox & Miller-Idriss layout four ways in which nationhood can be created and 
reproduced in everyday life: conversations, decisions, symbols, and consumption (2008). This 
section focuses on the hijab and the niqab – as both a decision to wear or not wear and as a 
potent symbol of identity in Tunisia – as a form of everyday nationhood (Brubaker, et al. 2006, 
Edensor 2002, Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008).     
Women’s bodies – the spaces they occupy, the clothes they wear, the activities in which 
they participate – have long been the battlegrounds on which societal disagreements have been 
waged on a diverse array of topics, including gender equality, immigration, integration, the role 
of religion in public life, and geopolitics.39 Debates over Muslim women’s dress – the hijab, the 
niqab, and recently the burkini – have been particularly polemic in both majority and non-
majority Muslim countries.  
Keeping with this trend, women were at the forefront of Bourguiba’s nationalist project, 
not as individuals or as a group, but rather as a symbol of Tunisianité. Since Tunisia’s 
independence, Tunisian women have shared far more legal rights with their male co-citizens than 
                                                
39 Prior to and after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan it wasn’t uncommon to hear the action justified, not just as a 
means to fight terrorism, but also as a way to liberate burka-clad women from the Taliban, paying particular 
attention to the trope of liberation through fashion (See for example, Stabile & Kumar 2005). 
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in other Muslim countries.40 Bourguiba took so much pride in his efforts to modernize Tunisian 
society with respect to women’s rights that he self-styled himself “the liberator of women,” and 
he used this “regime feminism” (Charrad 2001) as a partially justification for his authoritarian 
rule. 
Bourguiba particularly used the hijab, which he described as an “odious rag,” as symbol 
of backwardness.  In 1981, he formally banned religious dress, primarily the hijab, in public 
institutions, including primary and secondary schools, later extended to universities. While the 
law was laxly enforced during Bourguiba’s rule, Ben Ali enforced it sometimes ruthlessly, 
including police interrogations of veiled women, forcibly removing veils, and suspending 
students wearing the veil (Woolf 2017).41  
 One of the most immediately visible consequences of the revolution, was a dramatic 
increase in the number of women wearing the hijab. In the absence of state regulation, wearing 
the hijab became a viable choice for Tunisian women, albeit one that had been conditioned by 
more than half-a-century of state socialization through Tunisianité.  In this post-revolution 
atmosphere, the hijab became an expression of everyday nationhood, both as a decision to wear 
or not wear it.  Women, by wearing the hijab could reject Bourguibist constructions of 
Tunisianité, which pitted veiled women as antithetical to Tunisian national identity, and present 
alternative forms of national identity vis-à-vis the hijab.    
                                                
40 However, there are many legal areas, and far more social areas, in which equality has not been achieved.  For 
example, it wasn’t until October 2017 that Muslim, Tunisian women were allowed to marry non-Muslim men even 
though Muslim Tunisian men were free to marry non-Muslim women, a prohibition with roots in Islamic law.   
41 One Tunisian acquaintance recounted to me in the mid-2000s of being barred from her high school by the 
principal for wearing the hijab, climbing over the fence, and sneaking into her classes where her teachers didn’t 
mind.  After the principal discovered this he brought a dog onto the school ground to prevent her from entering the 
school grounds.   
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While the veil was not an uncommon sight in Tunisia, even prior to the revolution,42 the 
niqab was only associated with female visitors from the conservative Gulf states.  In Tunisia, the 
niqab had strong associations with Salafism and, consequently, as being foreign to Tunisia.  
Therefore, the decision to wear the niqab was not only a rejection of Bourguibist Tunisianité, but 
also became a powerful symbol, empowering for Salafis and terrifying for Bourguibists, in the 
post-revolution state.  
Immediately prior to the 2011 elections, a woman wearing the full-face niqab was 
refused entry to a public university due to a ban on the niqab, resulting in a protest between 
supporters and security forces (Murphy 2013). However, it was the niqab incident two months 
later at Manouba University just outside Tunis that received extensive national and international 
press coverage and brought the issue of the niqab to the forefronts of debates over what post-
revolution Tunisia would look like.   
In November 2011, two female Manouba undergraduate students asked to wear the niqab 
during exams and to have a prayer room on campus.  The administration refused, citing concerns 
over pedagogy – arguing that a teacher could not effectively teach someone whose face they 
could not see – and security – a student could impersonate another student during exams.  The 
administration proposed that students could wear the niqab on campus, but not in classrooms or 
during exams, a compromise that would be unacceptable to anyone who considered wearing the 
niqab a religious obligation.43  Afterwards, over fifty young, male and female Salafists, some 
                                                
42 This does not mean, however, that the hijab was absent from Tunisian public life, despite laws against it. In the 
2000s there was an increase in public piety, particularly as evidenced by the number of women wearing headscarves, 
which has been viewed not only as a means of opposition to the dictatorship, but also an expression of Muslim 
rather than Western identities (Woolf 2017).  
43 At Tunis University, the same issue arose with the administration allowing students to take their exams wearing 
the niqab, but only in a separate room with only blind and visually impaired students. In this instance, the 
administration response clearly indicates that pedagogy and security were not the primary issues for the niqab 
policy, but rather having veiled women where they could not be publicly seen.  
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students at other universities, occupied a portion on the administration building, refusing to leave 
until their demands had been met.  
Counter-protests at the Ministry of Education called for the government to intervene and 
eject those participating in the sit-in and to condemn their verbal harassment of faculty and 
administrators.  In the words of Amel Gramel, a Manouba lecturer in Gender and Islamic 
Studies, they blamed Ennahda for “creat[ing]" an environment where these people feel 
comfortable imposing their will on us” (Marks 2012), linking the actions of Ennahda with 
Salafism, a tendency that I point to throughout this chapter.  In response, the university closed 
and students were unable to take their final exams. The protests, which included a hunger strike, 
finally ended after a protestor climbed the university flagpole and replaced the Tunisian flag with 
the black Salafist flag, stirring both national outrage at the action and widespread praise, 
including from the parliament, for a female student who attempted to restore the Tunisian flag.  
While the sit-in ended in the spring of 2012, the controversy remained in the public 
sphere for yet another year as the Dean of Manouba’s University Faculty of Letters, Arts and 
Humanities, Habib Kazdaghli, was charged with assaulting a female protestor who, along with 
another protestor, allegedly broke into and ransacked his offices.  Kazdaghli fought the charges 
and a year later was found innocent.  In a surprise decision, the student whom he was accused of 
assaulting was convicted of breaking into his office.44 
***** 
The previous chapter concluded by discussing Article 6 of the constitution, which 
established the state as “the guardian or religion” and responsible for “guarantee[ing] freedom of 
conscience and belief [and] the free exercise of religious practices,” an explicit mandate for 
                                                
44 “Dean Acquitted of Assaulting Veiled Student.” http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/05/02/dean-acquitted-of-
assaulting-veiled-student/ 
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religious pluralism.  However, as described with the Manouba sit-ins, enacting pluralism, 
especially when it goes against long held practices of Tunisianité is socially divisive.  The 
Manouba case illustrates the extent to which wearing an item of clothing can disrupt large 
portions of not just a university but also a country, resulting in the university shut-down, 
involvement on the part of government legislators, protests, and multiple court cases.   
It also illustrates the inherent tension between the national specificity of Tunisianité and 
democratic freedoms, such as personal freedom of expression. For Amel Gramel, the lecturer 
previously quoted, the women wearing the niqab were “imposing their will on us.” However, for 
one of the female students protesting to wear the niqab in class, the situation is not one of 
imposition, but the opposite.  As she described "every girl has the liberty to wear whatever she 
wants” (in Marks 2012).  
This is not a tension unique to Tunisia and debates and regulations over the niqab have 
occurred in numerous other countries, such as France and Belgium.  Two things make the issue 
particularly divisive in the Tunisian case that are relevant for this dissertation.  First, the niqab 
has become a potent symbol of rejection of Tunisian national identity in the tradition of 
Bourguiba.  In the French case, it is also argued that wearing the niqab is contrary to French 
national identity resting on laïcité.  However, the difference in Tunisia, and what makes the issue 
so explosive, it that both sides, Salafists and Bourguibists, lay claim to authentic, religious 
interpretation over the niqab as either religious duty, choice, or anathema.   
Second, disagreements over acceptable levels of pluralism are more difficult for Tunisia 
as a transitioning democracy because, both at the time of the incident, and continuing today, 
Tunisia is in the process of reforming institutions such as the police and the courts.  As discussed 
later in this chapter and the next, post-revolution Tunisia experienced multiple blasphemy cases. 
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Not only were the legal implications significant, but these cases were highly polarizing.  For 
Islamists, they were examples of the state acting as the “guardian of religion,” protecting Islamic 
morality.  However, for Bourguibists it represented what Bourguiba and Ben Ali had long 
warned against: an encroaching, fundamentalist, theocratic state that was facilitated through 
democratization.  
As I describe in the final part of this chapter, these tensions between Islamists and 
Bourguibist, heightened by a perceived “culture war” over how to deal with pluralism after the 
revolution, was a prime contributing factor to the political stalemate and near backsliding of 
Tunisian democratic institutions that occurred during the second half of 2013.   
 
III. Cultural Production and Protest 
In this section, I expand upon issues of pluralism that were also brought up in the 
Manouba case: namely a failure for Salafists and Bourguibists to see themselves as members of a 
single nation by examining two sites of artistic and cultural production.  The artistic sphere has 
long been a site of political and social contestation. “Aesthetic pleasure” from music, theatre, 
cinema, and the visual arts is a frequent target of fundamentalist religions and governments 
(Bayat 2007a, Otterbeck 2008, Steiner 1995).  In the words of one Iranian cleric, “The most 
dangerous thing that threatens humanity is for men to forget devotion to God, to establish 
cultural centers instead of mosques and charges, and to be driven by film and art rather than 
prayer and supplication” (Bayat 2007: 436-7). Even more polemic is when the art involves 
religious subjects, such as the Danish Jyllands-Posten cartoons of Mohammed or Martin 
Scorsese’s Last Temptation of Christ.   
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In the immediate wake of the Tunisian Revolution, challenges to artistic production were 
some of the most prominent conflicts within Tunisian society, frequently spilling over into 
destruction of property or violence as different factions debated the boundaries between art and 
blasphemy. In this section, I examine two ways in which art has been instrumental in debates 
over Tunisian national identify. First, I explore a Salafi protest over an art exhibition to 
demonstrate a lack of empathy emerging between segments of Tunisian society.  I than turn to an 
example of how art, particularly the play Tsunami, has been created to respond to the increased 
presence of Salafism in Tunisia.  Namely, I show that not only have Salafis been “othered,” but 
also portrayed as existential enemies of Tunisian democracy.   
In June 2012, the Printemps des Arts (Springtime of the Arts) exhibition opened to the 
public in La Marsa, a popular seaside community outside of the capital.45 Given the events of the 
previous year, particularly Ennahda’s election, it is not surprising that many of the pieces 
exhibited interrogated conservative expressions of religion, frequently featuring veiled women, 
bearded men, black-clad “Salafis,” and other religiously suggestive imagery:  
• A life-size boxing ring with punching bags depicting the faces of three women, their hair 
wrapped around them like a hijab each saying, “I am Christian”, “I am Jewish,” or “I am 
Tunisian”;  
• The torsos of two veiled women rising from the floor, surrounded by stones, suggesting 
that they were about to be subjected to a public stoning;   
• A trail of ants emerging from a child’s backpack to spell out “God be praised”;  
• A series posters for the “République Islaïque de Tunisie” playing on the idea of both a 
secular (laïc) and Islamist state.  One poster featured Darth Vader saying, “Don’t vote for 
the Dark Side (a not so “veiled” reference to voting for black-clad Salafists, as well as a 
moral condemnation);  
• A painting of a blindfolded, naked woman, holding a bowl of couscous over her genitals, 
surrounded by menacing black-clad figures.   
 
                                                
45 For a description of the events see “Artworks and Property Vandalized During A Night of Tension in Tunis” 
http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/06/11/artworks-and-property-vandalized-during-a-night-of-tension-in-tunis/  
For photos of some of the artwork see: http://www.lemonde.fr/international/portfolio/2012/06/14/exposition-le-
printemps-des-arts-2012-a-la-marsa-en-tunisie_1718066_3210.html 
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According to reports, instigators charged that the art exhibition was blasphemous, and at 
the close of the exhibition, several allegedly Salafi demonstrators came to complain and were 
turned away by the police.  Later that evening, a larger gathering formed and protestors broke 
into the exhibition space burning and destroying what they deemed offensive pieces. Among the 
graffiti left behind, one read “with the authorization of the Ministry of Culture, God’s prophet is 
humiliated.”  Eighty-six “Salafis” were arrested that evening, some in response to violence 
elsewhere in the Tunis metropolitan area.  
What angered artists and those that sided with the artists as much as the vandalism was 
the government’s response. Ennahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi condemned the destruction of 
property, but also criticized the artists’ “attacks on the beliefs of Tunisians” and the need to 
“protect sacred symbols.”46 Minister of Culture Mehdi Mabrouk condemned the artists’ work 
and two of the artists were charged with violating moral standards, though both cases were 
reversed three months later following public and international protest (Tripp 2016).   
The attack and protest on Printemps des Arts, was not an isolated incident of Salafists 
protesting cultural production. While the Salafi attacks and protest worried many Bourguibist 
Tunisians, even more worrisome was the Ennahda-led government’s decision to either remain 
silent or to side, at least initially, with the Salafists.  These incidents were frequently litigated in 
court, often with charges of blasphemy or disrupting the public order and morality.  While the 
court cases were highly public, in many of them – Manouba University, Persepolis, Printemps 
des Arts and others – the charges were almost always later dropped or convictions overturned 
upon appeal.  
                                                
46 “Tunisia’s embattled artists speak out.” 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/06/2012615111819112421.html 
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There are two important observations from the Salafi protests against artistic production 
that are important for understanding how efforts at pluralism can impact the success of 
democratic transitions.  First, as with the Manouba protest, is a lack of empathy or attempt at 
understanding on the other sides’ position, setting up a zero-sum approach to dealing with 
cultural conflicts.  For the Salafi protestors, the response to art, which they viewed as potentially 
blasphemous was to destroy it rather than to critique it, stifling freedom of speech.47 On the other 
hand, the artists created intentionally provocative pieces – showing veiled women being stoned 
and Salafists as menacing figures – but did not acknowledge that Salafis portrayed in these art 
works may have objections to them, pointing rather to the importance of freedom of expression 
as a justification for any art.48 49  
The tension between freedom of expression and offending cultural or political 
sensitivities is not particular to Tunisia. However, it is potentially disruptive in Tunisia in the 
wake of the revolution, which promised greater individual freedoms and liberties for Tunisian 
citizens.  In this case, neither side acknowledges the legitimacy of the other.  
                                                
47 The same approach occurred in the Persepolis case when they chose to fire bomb the home of the TV station 
owner.  
48 For example, one of the artists, when asked whether any of their works could be seen as blasphemous replies 
“Absolutely not, there were no provocations from the artists” and goes onto suggest that one of the pieces, ants 
spelling out the name of God should be seen as the opposite of blasphemy: “Ants are noble creatures in our religion 
and are even mentioned in the Quran” cited in “Tunisia’s embattled artists speak out.” 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/06/2012615111819112421.html.  
In a similar case, at a 2012 Tunisian fashion show, a designer had models wearing religiously inspired clothing.  
One model wore a gauzy veil, suggestive of religious veils, with her breasts covered only by stickers and a male 
model wearing a niqab, a female clothing article, which he ripped off at the end of the show. However, the designer 
maintained that it was not a political statement, but merely freedom of expression. “On doit s’engager”- Fashion 
Design in the New Tunisia” http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/04/16/on-doit-sengager-fashion-design-in-the-new-
tunisia/ and “Mode Special Fashion Week de Tunis 2012 AHMED TALFIT” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LKYkAo36uYI.   
49 In a similar case, at a 2012 Tunisian fashion show, a designer had models wearing religiously inspired clothing.  
One model wore a gauzy veil, suggestive of religious veils, with her breasts covered only by stickers and a male 
model wearing a niqab, a female clothing article, which he ripped off at the end of the show. However, the designer 
maintained that it was not a political statement, but merely freedom of expression. “On doit s’engager”- Fashion 
Design in the New Tunisia” http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/04/16/on-doit-sengager-fashion-design-in-the-new-
tunisia/ and “Mode Special Fashion Week de Tunis 2012 AHMED TALFIT” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LKYkAo36uYI.   
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Second, and more importantly, the Tunisian state was caught in the middle of these 
cultural debates.  In the view of Salafis, the government, by funding the art exhibition and 
condemning the violent response, was promoting a position they view as blasphemous.  
However, for the artists the government was violating their freedom of expression by charging 
the artists with blasphemy.  The state risks alienating one side or another if it makes a firm 
decision on blasphemy or freedom of expression, and it alienates both if it attempts a middle 
ground, as in the case of Printemps des Arts, highlighting the tenuous process of pluralization.    
 I now turn to how artists responded to the increased, visible and vocal Salafi presence in 
Tunisia.  In doing so I emphasize that there was not just a lack of empathy between different 
sides, but also a feeling, on the part of Bourguibists, that the Salafis represented an existential 
threat to the nation.  
During the summer of 2013, three major TV channels broadcast Ramadan TV shows – 
Yawmiyet Imraa (“Diary of a Woman”), Njoum Ellil (“Stars of the Night”), and Layem (“The 
Days”) – that addressed violent religious extremism or conversion to Salafism.50  Conversion to 
Salafism at this time is becoming an increasingly serious issue as Tunisian Salafists were leaving 
to fight against Bashar al-Assad in Syria.  Airing nightly during the month of Ramadan, after the 
breaking of the fast, Ramadan TV shows, filmed in Tunisian dialect, have some of the highest 
ratings of the year given that nearly the entire country is sitting in front of their TVs, breaking 
their fast, in effect creating an imagined community through the simultaneous practice of 
watching the same TV show (Anderson 1991). 
Concerns over Salafism were also featured prominently the same summer at the staging 
of the play Tsunami at the International Festival of Carthage, a yearly, summertime music and 
                                                
50 “Salafists: Tunisia’s Newest TV Stars.” http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/07/24/religious-characters-a-new-
addition-to-tunisian-ramadan-tv-shows/ 
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theatre festival held in the ruins of the Carthage amphitheater.  The Tunisian playwrights Jalila 
Baccar and Fadhel Jaïbi, married collaborators, authored plays that critiqued not only Islamic 
fundamentalism but also the authoritarian regime of Tunisia, most notably in their “Trilogy of 
Future Memory:” Khamsoun (2006), Amnesia (2010), and Tsunami (2013).  Tsunami was written 
in direct response to the political and societal changes that emerged after the revolution with 
Baccar and Jaïbi highlighting the attacks on art and artists within Tunisia, including Printemps 
des Arts, as a source of inspiration for writing the play (Carlson 2014).  
The titular tsunami is a metaphor for the rise of Islamist fundamentalism in Tunisia 
following the revolution in the near, dystopian future of 2015. In the closing passages, a child 
dreams of Tunisia’s future: “There is Tunisia… / That beautiful pregnant woman / with her 
generous breasts… / slowly, slowly disappearing from the map… / As the immense black wave 
swept over her…”  (264).  Here Tunisia is portrayed as a naked woman who has been covered up 
by “black wave,” an illusion to both the black Salafist flag and the black niqabs worn by Salafi 
women. 
Tsunami follows Hayet, a retired professor, who is a stand-in for Bourguibist religious 
sensibilities: she studiously objects to religious fundamentalism, reads and cherishes her father’s 
Qur’an, and does not hold back on her disdain for the niqab.51 Hayet, played by Baccar herself, 
grew complacent after the revolution and failed to oppose the growing Islamist influence (within 
the play there appears to be no nuanced distinction between Islamist(s) and Salafist).  However, 
she is unwittingly thrust from her quiet life into action, trying unsuccessfully to prevent an 
Islamist terrorist attack.  The play features the assassination of a lawyer trying to prevent the 
attack (a stand-in for the opposition leader Chokri Belïd assassinated earlier that year), and ends 
                                                
51 When a niqab-wearing Salafist chides her to wear one, Hayet rips the woman’s niqab off, defiantly proclaiming 
herself “Daughter and mother of unveiled women / I have lived and will die unveiled” (220). 
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with the Islamist government instituting a state of emergency, suspending all individual 
freedoms and closing universities, museums, theatres, cafes, and sports.   
The play, rather unsubtly, offers a dystopian vison of Tunisia and a sharp critique of 
recent events following the revolution.  Hayet echoes audience member’s frustrations that the 
sacrifices for the revolution resulted in a rise of Salafism: “We have exposed our bodies to 
bullets / for Liberty, Dignity and Justice... / and not over questions of identity… / trafficking in 
faith… / or a return to the darkness of the Middle Ages” (253-4).52   
The play represents an uncompromising critique of the rise of Islamism in post-revolution 
Tunisia.  The Islamist characters of Baccar and Jaïbi’s play are not merely Islamist who wear the 
hijab, or Salafis who burn artwork; they are all violent, anti-democratic Salafi-jihadists. 
Furthermore, the Islamist characters are not nuanced in ideology or practice, each is an 
antagonist, willing to kill anyone, even family members, who get in their way.    
It is this view of all Islamists as existential threats to the Tunisian nation-state that 
reverberated in Tunisia during the summer of 2013 and the play seemed prescient of events to 
come.  In an sad irony, the play was staged at the Carthage International Festival of Carthage on 
July 16, 2013, just nine days before Mohamed Brahmi was assassinated on Republic Day.53  For 
audience members the events of the play they just viewed could be perceived to be playing out in 
real-life before their eyes: the assassination of opposition leaders, an Islamist government 
publicly portraying itself as moderate while actually secretly in league with terrorists, and 
ultimately extinguishing democracy in Tunisia.    
                                                
52 Furthermore, Hayet expresses surprise that the Islamists, who had been tortured and censored under Bourguiba 
and Ben Ali would become suppressive themselves: I was proud of your faith / and admiring of your struggle / 
against the opposition of the past, / in spite of torture, prison, and exile… / Never would I have believed it possible / 
that a day would come / when the oppressed would become / an oppressor in turn / and the victim a torturer” (229). 
53 A Tunisian national holiday commemorating Tunisia transitioning form a monarchy to a Republic on July 25, 
1956.  
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 I began this chapter by suggesting that one form of national reimagining potentially 
influential for a successful democratic transition is negotiating pluralism with national 
specificity.  The Tunisian government, as evidenced by the Manouba niqab sit-ins and the 
Printemps des Arts vandalism and trials, failed first in creating spaces in which pluralistic 
practices could exist non-violently side-by-side; and, second, in fostering a post-revolution 
national identity in which all Tunisians – Islamists and Bourguibist – could feel part of a single 
“imagined community.”  A post-revolution environment in which lack of empathy and distrust 
for one another dominated, culminating in a situation during the summer of July 2013, seeming 
mirroring the dystopian Tsunami, in which one segment of society viewed the other as an 
existential threat to the nation.    
 However, unlike the play, the democratic state did not collapse, even though there was 
the possibility.  The next section examines how Tunisia managed to overcome this threat to 
democracy.  
 
IV. Salafi-Jihadism  
As described earlier in the chapter, due to restrictions by Bourguiba and Ben Ali, 
Salafism in Tunisia remained largely hidden from public view, only emerging occasionally in 
acts of violence, such as the 2002 al-Qaeda suicide bombing of a the Djerba mosque, the most 
important Jewish pilgrimage site in Tunisia, which resulted in indiscriminate government 
crackdowns of Islamists who had no association with Salafism, much less jihadi-Salafism.  
Following the Tunisian Revolution, Islamist who had been radicalized in prison were released 
providing a population ready to engage in terrorism in Tunisia (Torelli 2017) and also elsewhere, 
such as Syria.  The most important Salafi-jihadist organization to emerge in post-revolution 
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Tunisia was Ansar al-Shari’a (“Supporters of Shari’a”), founded by Saif Allah Ben Hassine, a 
Tunisian who had fought in Afghanistan against the United States post-2001.  Hassine, better 
known by his nom de guerre Abu Ayad, was released from Tunisian prison following the 
revolution and founded Ansar al-Sharia al-Shari’a in 2011.   
Despite his jihadi past, Abu Ayad initially promoted Ansar al-Sharia as a non-violent 
organization focused on preaching (da’wa), proselytizing, education, and positioning likeminded 
Imams in Tunisia’s mosques (Torelli 2017).  However, the group quickly found its way into 
controversy.  In September 2012, it led protests at the American Embassy in Tunis in response to 
the perceived American support for the film Innocence of Muslims, which it felt blasphemously 
portrayed the Prophet Mohammed.  The protests turned violent resulting in damage at the 
Embassy, the neighboring American school being burned down, four deaths, and dozens of 
injuries.54  While Ansar al-Shari’a had been involved in other acts of vandalism, it was this 
attack that drew widespread condemnation.  
It also placed the Ennahda-led government in an increasingly difficult position.  Sensitive 
of the dictatorship’s repression on the basis of religious belief, Ennahda initially erred on the side 
of complete inclusion for all strands of Tunisian ideological beliefs, including Salafi beliefs that 
were more conservative than most of their membership.  Ennahda continued to try to be inclusive 
in the face of increasing violence and radicalization from the far right. When a video was made 
public in which Ghannouchi referred to a group of Salafist youth as “my children” it went viral 
and was pointed to as proof of a “double discourse”, a common secular fear of Islamist parties in 
which they advocate publicly for a democracy and in private a theocratic state.55  
                                                
54 This was part of the same wave of protests against Innocence of Muslims that resulted in four deaths at the 
American Embassy in Benghazi, Libya.  
55 “'Secret' video stirs Islamist fears in Tunisia.” http://www.france24.com/en/20121011-tunisia-secret-video-stirs-
salafist-islamist-radicalism-fears-ghannouchi-ennahda.  Ghannouchi explained his comments that he felt Ennahda 
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The fear of a “double discourse” was further spread through multiple instances when the 
government appeared to side with Salafists in blasphemy cases or go “soft” on prosecuting 
Salafist-violence.  One instance, frequently cited to me was a case in which a feminist activist 
who criticized Islam was sentenced to a longer prison sentence than the Ansar al-Shari’a 
members who attacked the American Embassy. This was further exacerbated by the 
assassination of opposition leader Chokri Belaïd in February 2013, an act which many suspected 
Ansar al-Sharia’a to be behind.   
As I described throughout this chapter tensions continued to mount and reached a critical 
moment in July 2013.  An anti-government protest movement, inspired by the July 3rd coup in 
Egypt that overthrew the democratically elected Islamist government, called for the Ennahda-led 
government to step down, accusing it of not only being politically ineffective, but also soft on 
terrorism.  In this heightened tension, the assassination of Mohamed Brahmi on July 25th resulted 
in mass protests calling on Ennahda to resign and opposition leaders boycotting parliament, 
stalling the constitution writing process. At this moment, it seemed like a second democratically 
elected government might be forced to leave power, creating a legitimacy vacuum since Tunisia 
was still without a constitution and without a legal framework in which to hold elections.   
However, Ennahda, seeking to avoid following in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s 
footsteps, declared Ansar al-Shari’a a terrorist group and agreed to step down from government 
leadership roles in favor of a technocratic government once the constitution had been completed.  
The severity of the situation for Tunisia’s democratic transition should not be 
underestimated.  A compromise was finally accepted in December 2013, leaving Tunisia without 
                                                
should act as a positive religious role model for youth that had grown up during the regimes of Ben Ali and 
Bourguiba.  http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2013/05/21/01003-20130521ARTFIG00529-ghannouchi-en-tunisie-
un-tri-se-fera-entre-les-franges-moderees-et-les-autres.php 
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a sitting parliament for nearly five months in a crucial legislative period. In this chapter, I have 
highlighted how, of the three types of national reimaging – re-narrativization, legal reform, and 
pluralization – that it is the latter that proved most challenging to Tunisia’s democratic transition.  
While the Ennahda government would undoubtedly be criticized for not adequately preventing 
terrorism and for controversial legislative decision, it was the cultural tensions between Islamists 
and Bourguibists, it was the ones described in this chapter – blasphemy cases, the niqab sit-in, 
vandalism at the Printemps des Arts event – that led to a point at which Tunisian citizens could 
believe that Ennahda-led government was engaging in a “double discourse” and was acting as a 
covert Manchurian candidate whose ultimate goal was to overthrow the democratic state in favor 
of a theocracy.   
 
V. Conclusion   
This chapter highlights multiple problems post-revolution Tunisia faced in balancing 
democratic pluralism with a shared national identity.  Repeatedly, these involved everyday 
practices such as clothing and cultural consumption, which were simultaneously attacked as 
blasphemous by one side and defended as freedom of expression by the other.  Furthermore, as I 
discuss, there were not visible efforts on the part of the government to try build either empathy or 
shared national identification, a sense of shared national community, leading to continued 
societal divisions. It is in this polarized context that the Tunisian democratic transition almost 
failed, highlighting the importance of transitioning governments not only effectively manage 
societal pluralism, but also actively working to build a shared sense of national identity.   
Tunisia in the summer of 2013 provides two useful observations on understanding 
structural change emerging after the Tunisian Revolution.  First, given that Mohamed Bouazizi’s 
self-immolation had nothing explicitly to do with religion or religious identity, the fact that the 
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revolution and subsequent democratic transition that his death inspired was nearly overturned in 
large part because of differences over religious expression is a testament to the fluidity of 
structural change: one change in the structure disrupting and bringing changes elsewhere, in this 
case specifically over the expression of religion in the public sphere. While the chants of the 
revolution were: “Work, dignity, and freedom,” nowhere was there an explicit appeal to religion.    
Second and more importantly it is an important caution that one should not overestimate 
the “transformative power” of events.  Structures, by definition, are relatively stable over long 
periods of time.  While Sewell’s theory of events proposes a way for structures to undergo rapid 
change, we should also be cognizant of how these structures also push back against change even 
in the face of potentially transformative events. 
Egypt offers a compelling counter-example for structures pushing back against events.  
The revolution in Egypt was perhaps only slightly less expected than Tunisia’s given that Egypt 
allowed opposition parties like the Muslim Brotherhood to compete for and win parliamentary 
seats. Egypt, like Tunisian held elections in which Islamist candidates won a plurality of seats 
and also elected an Islamist president.  However, there was resistance with respect to modes of 
power – the army rejecting the Muslim Brotherhood government.  Additionally, the army’s push 
to return the country to the previous structure, an authoritarian regime, met with virtually no 
resistance from the international community. By the end of 2013, the momentous “event” of the 
Egyptian Revolution had been virtually obliterated and the previous structure of the authoritarian 
regime entrenched even more firmly with the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood killed or 
imprisoned.  
In the summer of 2013, Tunisia was poised to follow after Egypt.  In Tunisia’s case the 
major structural resistance came from changes to cultural schemas: what does it mean to be 
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Tunisian?  What expressions of Islam are authentic or permissible in the public sphere? As 
described in this chapter debates over religious expression pushed Tunisia nearly to the breaking 
point.  Could Tunisians adapt to new schemas that broadened and altered the schema of 
Tunisianité to be more pluralistic and include Tunisians of a multitude of religious orientations 
and expressions from Bourguibists to Islamists?  In this chapter, I highlighted the resistances to 
the change of this structural schema that had shaped Tunisian social and political life since 
independence, especially by Tunisians who under the dictatorships were able to give legitimacy 
to schemas such as Tunisianité, the best example in this chapter being Manouba University, one 
of the universities in Tunisia most aligned with the authoritarian regimes, a reproducer of 
cultural schemas such as Tunisianité and also producers to social elite who are able to give 
legitimacy to cultural schemas.  
 It is only because Ennahda made a number of concessions that the government wasn’t 
forced out of power, leaving a legal vacuum.  In addition to cracking down on Salafi-jihadis and 
agreeing to a technocratic government, Ennahda made two strategic concessions aimed at its own 
survival – distancing itself from Salafism more generally and softening some of its political 
positions with respect to religion.  I discussed one instance of the latter in the previous chapter, 
with Ennahda’s decision to not insist on including shari’a as a source of legislation in the new 
constitution. Additionally, Ennahda abandoned its initial insistence that Salafis also be part of 
“big tent” Tunisianité – a vision that would try to bring absolute pluralistic acceptance to 
Tunisians of all Islamic persuasions.  Instead, Ennahda made a strategic concession to advocate 
for a more limited vision of pluralism that include more mainstream Islamists, including most 
members of Ennahda.  Only by advocating for less radical structural change with respect to the 
cultural schema of Tunisianité was Ennahda able to keep the “event” of the Tunisian Revolution 
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from a potential backsliding from the democratic transition and a possible return to 
authoritarianism.  
In the next chapter, by examining Ennahda’s electoral discourse, I look at both of these 
strategic concessions.  I demonstrate how Ennahda began to downplay itself as an Islamist party, 
a process that culminated in 2016 when it officially declared itself to no longer be a religious 
party, and to distance itself from Salafism. I argue that during the 2014 elections there was an 
increasing convergence and consolidation of discourses on religion and national identity between 
Islamist(s) and Bourguibists with Ennahda more strongly taking up the shared discourse of 
Tunisianité and Salafism being marginalized as not authentically Tunisian.   
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CHAPTER 4 Electing the Nation: Islamists vs. Bourguibists, Malikis vs. Salafis 
 
While the slogans and demonstrations of the 2010 Revolution were framed around issues of 
economic inequality, dignity, and political inclusiveness rather than religious freedom, Islam and 
its role in post-revolutionary society became key issues almost immediately after Ben Ali’s 
departure from Tunisia.  As a cultural movement, Tunisian Islamists appeared as though they had 
the most to gain in a democratizing Tunisia: participation in electoral and party politics for the 
first time; relaxing of restrictions on religious practice and discourse; and, an opening for 
religious interpretations beyond those sanctioned by the state.   
Some of these changes have materialized.  For the first time Ennahda has been able to not 
only compete as a political party in democratic elections, but also to win the majority of seats in 
the parliament and govern, albeit as part of a coalition with non-Islamist parties.  Tunisians have 
unprecedented freedom of religious practice in the modern state, independent of influence from 
empire, colonial power, or dictatorship, which had previously regulated religious life and 
organizations.  The public sphere is unquestionably more diverse with respect to religious 
discourses, practices, and literature.  The state is no longer the sole interpreter of religion for 
Tunisians with the emergence of a “market place” of religious options (Finke and Stark 1992, 
Iannaccone 1992, Fink and Iannaccone 1993).  
However, as I will argue this apparent religious pluralism is more limited than it initially 
appears.  In the Tunisian case, Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation and the subsequent 
protests were the events that lead to Ben Ali’s overthrow function as a Sewellian event, a 
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recognized rupture in society that “that durably transforms previous structures and practices” that 
in normal circumstances only gradually change (1996, 843).  These events were the impetus that 
led to the end of authoritarian rule and the beginning of the democratization process.  Following 
the revolution, Tunisia faced an initially unregulated field of religious groups and discourses that 
had previously been banned and a vociferous public debate over how and if these discourses and 
groups would be integrated into Tunisian laws, institutions, and society.  
In Tunisia, the window for the transformation of political, religious, and social structures 
remained open only briefly and by the 2014 election they had largely solidified.  I use the 2014 
elections, in comparison with 2011 elections and the events of the inter-electoral period to 
demonstrate that by 2014 there had been a “normalization” and convergence of religious 
discourse in the political and, particularly, the electoral sphere, in which the majority of Tunisian 
political actors adopted nearly identical discourses and policies with respect to Islam’s role in 
Tunisian public life.  This discourse has centered around a defense of “Tunisian Islam,” 
portrayed as moderate, modern, and peaceful and represents a form of Bourdieusian symbolic 
capital for politicians and political parties.   
As a result of this rapid convergence the opening of the religious field has been limited 
more than one might expect in a state emerging from decades of religious repression. In 
particular, more conservative Salafi strains of Islam have been marginalized and placed outside 
what is accepted as mainstream, Tunisian Islam. While Salafi discourses and practices were very 
publicly present between the 2011 election and the finalization of the Constitution in 2014, they 
were almost entirely excluded from the 2014 elections themselves, with the exception of key 
moments of tension during the 2014 presidential races.  Furthermore, as Salafism has become 
increasingly associated with a number of violent and religiously motivated assassinations and 
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terror attacks, even the discourse and practices of non-violent Salafists have been marginalized 
and excluded from the Tunisian body politic.   
At the end of the previous chapter, I suggested that post-revolutionary Tunisia struggled 
with many competing views – Bourguibist, Islamist, and Salafi – over what was constitutive of 
Tunisian national identity and that it was only the rise of Salafi violence that presented an 
existential threat that pushed Ennahda to distance itself from Salafism and more closely align 
with a discourse of Tunisian Islam characteristic of Tunisianité, for example their decision to 
acquiesce to not including shari’a as a source of legislation in the Tunisian constitution.  
I argue that in 2014 Bourguibists and Islamists consolidated their national reimaginings 
into a shared, albeit vague, language about Tunisian Islam, in which Salafis were seen as 
oppositional to Tunisian national identity.  In a Sewellian framework, we could understand that 
Bourguibists, the traditional modes of power, gave sanction to a slightly altered cultural schema 
of Tunisianité that was broadened enough to include Islamists such as Ennahda.  I show how this 
consolidation played out in practice by examining the 2011 parliamentary and the 2014 
parliamentary and presidential elections.  By analyzing party platforms and political speeches, I 
demonstrate that while the 2011 elections focused heavily on questions of national identity and 
religious practice, these were almost absent during the 2014 elections.  However, I also point to 
the limits of this convergence and the potential for these debates to reemerge in the future.  
 
I. Elections, Political Campaigns, and National Boundary Making 
Ernest Renan famously likened the existence of a nation to a “daily plebiscite” (1990: 19).  
While his reference wasn’t to actual democratic elections, the metaphor is apt for considering 
how elections relate to expressions of the nation. While not daily, actual elections provide sites 
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par excellence to examine citizens’ views on the nation itself through the issues debated, the 
discourses used, and the symbols invoked.  In Europe, many far right parties such as the United 
Kingdom Independence Party, the French Front National, and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) 
have negatively defined the nation by placing immigration at the forefront of their campaigns, 
both against economic (the “Polish Plumber”) and cultural migrants, as well illustrated by a 2007 
SVP campaign poster depicting a white sheep kicking a black sheep off the Swiss flag.  During 
the American 2016 election, Republican candidates portrayed Muslim citizens as a potential fifth 
column and called for increased surveillance of Muslim-American communities.  The legitimacy 
of candidates to represent the nation may be called into question on whether they can represent 
the nation, as illustrated by claims during the 2008 presidential elections that Barack Obama was 
a Muslim and during the 1960 election that John F. Kennedy’s loyalty to the pope would 
override his loyalty to the American people.  Additionally, issues of language and dress have 
served as markers of national symbolic boundaries (Lamont & Molnár 2002) in debates over the 
hijab in Europe and language politics in Spain and Turkey.   
Through their campaigns, political parties and candidates attempt to tap into public 
concerns and shape public debates to their electoral advantage.56  Because they are not acting as 
representatives of the state government (yet), campaigns discourses can be altered mid-election 
due to popular response.  While some parties target narrow interest groups, most parties are 
“catch all parties” (Koole 1996) in the sense that they view the objective of the election as to 
secure the broadest public support possible and win the election with the most votes. In the 
                                                
56 Political parties occupy a unique role as an intermediate actor between state government and the broader society 
as a whole (Kreisi 1994, Duverger 1959 & 1972), simultaneously existing as internal and external to the state.  
Political parties serve as the main component of the legislative structure, ensuring the link between citizen 
preferences and policies within the state.  However, political parties in many countries are independent from the 
state administration and therefore try to externally influence the state through policy pressures and political 
competition. 
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remainder of this chapter, I examine the policies, discourse, and imagery of Tunisian political 
parties and candidates in the 2011 and 2014 Tunisian elections as a means of exploring how 
Islam is conceptualized as a national issue, particularly who is included and excluded from the 
nation.  I also examine how and why religion was a significant campaign issue in the 20ll 
parliamentary elections, but not in 2014. I begin by illustrating the changing role of religion 
between the 2011 and 2014 parliamentary elections. 
 
II. Islam and Political Discourse Prior to the 2014 Elections  
The 2011 Election Campaign  
Following the revolution, Ennahda leaders, including Ghannouchi, returned from exile 
and the prisons were emptied of political prisoners in a general amnesty.  However, while 
Ennahda supporters welcomed the return and release of its leaders and members, many Tunisians 
saw the events through years of conditioning, namely that Ben Ali and Bourguiba claimed that 
their state was all that had stood in the way of terrorism and the imposition of a theocratic state.  
It was in this context that the role of Ennahda and Islam in Tunisia’s political future became the 
key issue in the 2011 election. It represented the first time that an Islamist party was allowed to 
freely compete in a Tunisian election.57  
The first post-revolutionary elections were scheduled for October 23, 2011 and the quick 
electoral cycle – both with respect to the establishment of new laws and parties – significantly 
affected the campaign period.  The ability of political parties, many of them newly formed, and 
                                                
57 Members of Ennahda were permitted to run as independent candidates during the 1989 parliamentary elections.  
While the official numbers were never published, they were believed to have won approximately 15% of the vote, 
though members claim a much larger percentage, a strong result that prompted Ben Ali to crack down on the party 
and jail thousands of party members.  
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the media, newly freed from state censorship, to report on the electoral campaigns was curtailed, 
giving the advantage to the few political parties that had existed under Ben Ali’s regime and 
Ennahda, which had an enduring organizational structure and national name recognition 
(Murphy 2013, 238).  One newly formed Salafi party attempted, but failed to legally register 
itself to compete in the elections, leaving Ennahda the sole party of any size that portrayed itself 
as Islamist in the elections, resulting in an intense focus not just on the party itself, but the party 
as representative of any Islamic practice that had not been sanctioned during the Bourguiba-Ben 
Ali eras.  In particular, there was widespread speculation on whether Ennahda’s participation 
would pave the way for a theocratic state or at least a rollback of some of the hallmarks of the 
pre-revolution period, especially enshrined legal rights for women and the ostensible secular 
nature of the state in relation to Islamic law.  
While these debates were likely to happen given Ennahda’s inclusion for the first time as 
a legal party in an election, they were amplified by two events that happened immediately prior 
to the elections.  In October, a woman wearing the full-face niqab was refused entry to a public 
university due to a ban on the niqab, resulting in a protest between supporters and security forces 
(Murphy 2013). The niqab and hijab had been banned by Ben Ali, though with varying levels of 
enforcement, as an anathema to women’s rights.58 The incident brought to the forefront questions 
about not only whether public institutions would remain secular, but also the rights of women in 
the new Tunisian state. Additionally, it raised the question of whether “Tunisian Islam,” which, 
as interpreted by Bourguiba and Ben Ali, meant not wearing the hijab much less the niqab, 
would be supplanted by more conservative strands of Salafism seen as importations from the 
                                                
58 Bourguiba had gone far enough to call the hijab “an odious rag” that had no place in modern Tunisian society.   
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Gulf States.  The incident wasn’t isolated, but repeated with even greater intensity two months 
later at Manouba University outside Tunis, as described in the previous chapter.   
The second event, the screening of the animated film Persepolis on Nessma TV 
(discussed in depth by Zeghal 2013 and Murphy 2013) played an even greater role in the pre-
election debate and centered around not only cultural expression but also the influence of 
religious norms on the judiciary system.  On October 7th, Nessma TV, Tunisia’s first independent 
TV station, aired the animated film Persepolis, which follows a young girl’s life in post-
revolutionary Iran, as a warning of the dangers of a religious state. In a brief scene, which 
triggered protests and a protracted legal hearing, the film shows a physical depiction of God 
talking with the young protagonist.59  The film had previously been shown at a film festival in 
Tunisia and its airing was meant not to be provocative in terms of theological stances on 
representations of the divine, but as a statement on the inherent dangers of political Islam.  
However, the airing resulted in protestors, generally described as Salafis attacking both the TV 
station as well as the person and home of the station owner Nabil Karoui.  Karoui was later tried 
and fined for an "offence to good morals" in showing the film as well as jeopardizing the “public 
order”.  
The physical and verbal attacks on Karoui and Nessma became key events in the lead-up 
to election and Ennahda quickly issued a public statement in which it condemned the airing of 
Persepolis as “a repulsive attack on the divine,” called for public order while supporting the 
protests against Nessma, and simultaneously accused Nessma of breaking the electoral law by 
“calling for hatred on the basis of religion.”60 Anti-Persepolis demonstrations across the country 
                                                
59 Islamic tradition prohibits the depiction of God, Mohammed, and, in general, other human beings or animals.   
60 Al-Hiwar 10/9/11). 
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in Bizerte, Sid Bouzid, and Tunis occurred after Friday prayer prompting another nation-wide 
counter protests with the slogan “liberty is a sacred expression.”61   
Despite this charged climate that focused on suspicions of Ennahda’s political intentions, 
the party won a plurality of the popular vote, which resulted in a majority of the parliamentary 
seats (89 of 217 seats), marking the transition from a banned organization to the largest party in 
government.  
 
Inter-Election Period Leading Up to the 2014 Elections 
While Ennahda chose to form a coalition government with two other moderate, non-
Islamist parties, Congrès pour la République (CPR) and Ettakatol, suspicion still hung over the 
party from those who did not vote for it and who had been taught during the dictatorship that it 
was a terrorist organization.  Opponents continued to argue that the party would use its role in 
the constitutional writing process to impose Islamic law upon the country and reverse the liberal 
personal status code that enshrines numerous rights for women, a pillar of Bourguiba’s legacy.  
These suspicions were further fueled by several controversial acts on Ennahda’s behalf, 
including the appointment of a mufti, the official state religious leader, who had supported 
polygamy, currently outlawed, and banning eating or drinking in public during the fasting month 
of Ramadan. 
For several months, the Ministry of Religious Affairs worked to replace many Imams, 
both those appointed by Ben Ali and Salafis who had gained control of mosques following the 
revolution. There were a number of public confrontations on the role of Islam in public life 
                                                
61 “Tear Gas in Kasbah as Protests Over ‘Persepolis’ Persist.” http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/10/14/tear-gas-in-
kasbah-as-protests-over-persepolis-persist/ and “A3ta9ni Spreading All Over Tunisia” http://www.tunisia-
live.net/2011/10/19/a3ta9ni-spreading-all-over-tunisia/. 
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including what could be shown on television and whether the previously banned niqab could be 
worn in the classroom.  In particular, the debates focused on how Salafism, frequently 
undistinguished from the more moderate Islam practiced by the majority of the Ennahda 
leadership, threatened the Tunisian way of life.  
As described in the previous chapter, by the summer of 2013, many Tunisians had lost 
confidence in the “Troika-government,” a coalition of Ennahda and two secular parties, due to 
increasing economic issues, the protracted constitutional drafting period, and a belief that 
Ennahda was too soft on terrorism and the activities of the Salafi organization Ansar al-Shari’a, 
which resulted in attacks on Tunisian security forces and the assassination of leftist political 
leader Chokri Belaïd the previous February. The Tamrod protest movement and coup in Egypt 
sparked organized demonstrations in Tunisia demanding that the government step-down.  In this 
already charged atmosphere, the assassination of MP Mohammed Brahmi on July 25th, allegedly 
by Ansar al-Shari’a, resulted in public demonstrations against the Troika-government, a 
parliamentary walk-out, and a five-month political deadlock.  Only with the Troika’s agreement 
to step down from ministry positions, but not from elected parliamentary seats, was Tunisia able 
to finalize the constitution and pass the electoral law to pave the way for presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 2014.  
In January 2014, two years after beginning the post-revolution constitutional drafting 
process, Tunisia’s legislative body, the National Constituent Assembly (NCA), met to cast the 
final votes on constitution article by article.  It was agreed that Islam would be mentioned in 
Article 1 as the religion of Tunisia, but within the context of a secular state.  Additionally, as a 
previously made concession Ennahda did not push for a reference to shari’a as the or even a 
basis for Tunisian law, as is common in many Muslim-majority constitutions.  And, as described, 
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in Chapter 1, MPs passed Article 6 enabling them to vote on and enact the new constitution, 
which helped to legally pave the way for elections later in 2014.  
Despite all of the contentious politics of the previous two years – the regulation of 
mosques, debates on the niqab, two political assassinations, the near collapse of the government, 
and the constitution drafting – Islam began to take an apparent back seat. 
 
III. Convergence of Discourse in the 2014 Parliamentary Elections 
As described in the previous chapter, religious and national tensions grew after the 
election as Salafism become increasingly prominent, culminating in the summer 2013 political 
crisis. Early on the 2014 parliamentary elections seemed as though they would be a referendum 
on the validity of Islamist politics in Tunisian society, particularly due to the creation of Nidaa 
Tounes (Call of Tunisia) by Béji Caïd Essebsi, a former minister and government official during 
the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, as well as Tunisia’s interim Prime Minister for the eight 
months prior to the 2011 elections. 
Essebsi held numerous roles during Bourguiba’s regime including Interior Minister, 
Defense Minister, and Foreign Affairs Minister. Following Ben Ali’s 1987 coup, Essebsi was an 
Ambassador and President of the Chamber of Deputies before retiring from politics in 1991. His 
participation in the Ben Ali regime was widely criticized by opponents and would have 
prevented him from competing in the 2014 elections had the Exclusion law, which barred any 
members of upper-level positions in the Ben Ali regime from standing in office, been passed 
Nidaa Tounes was officially registered in June 2012, though planned immediately 
following Ennahda’s eight months prior, the party was created in direct response to Ennahda’s 
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electoral success and from the beginning positioned itself as the most viable challenger in the 
2014 elections.   
While Nidaa Tounes criticized Ennahda for its lack of political experience and failures to 
improve the economy, differing views of Islam and its role in Tunisia were a central cleavage.  
At the party’s official launch Essebsi declared, in reference to Ennahda, that “the Tunisian 
people, Muslims, don’t need a government that acts like a guardian and delivers “sermons from 
mosques.”62  In October 2013, Essebsi unequivocally distanced Ennahda from the Tunisian 
nation: “Nidaa Tounes’s Islam is not that of the Ennahda movement.  Our Islam is Tunisian” 
which Essebsi further described, invoking the tradition of Tunisianité as “a moderate Islam 
founded on a reformist approach” that “consecrates the values of tolerance, coexistence and 
wisdom and prohibits hate and violence.”63  In a previous interview commenting on the rise of 
terrorism in Tunisia, Essebsi went so far as to declare that “effectively, Nahdhaouis [Ennahda 
supporters] are from the same family as the Salafists. It’s just a difference of degrees.”64  In these 
two statements, Essebsi clearly “others” Ennahda as no practicing Tunisian Islam and aligns 
them with Salafism, frequently characterized in Tunisian society as being a foreign import from 
the Gulf states (Pargeter 2012, 83-4).   
Given both Nidaa Tounes’s explicit founding in opposition to Ennahda and Essebsi’s 
ongoing condemnation of Ennahda on a religious basis, spectators could expect that the party’s 
electoral rhetoric would focus on the role of religion and, immediately prior to the October 1st 
                                                
62 Béji Caïd Essebsi: Pourquoi fait-il aussi peur ? Business News.  June 19, 2012.  
 http://www.businessnews.com.tn/impression/519/31802/ 
63 Tunisie: laïc, séculier, anti-islamiste... comment qualifier Nidaa Tounès?  France24.  October 28, 2014.  
 http://www.france24.com/fr/20141028-legislatives-tunisie-nidaa-tounes-laique-seculier-anti-islamiste-liberal-
ennahda 
64 “BCE: Les Nahdhaouis sont de la même famille que les Salafistes. Business News.  June 21, 2013. 
http://www.businessnews.com.tn/impression/534/38864/ 
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start of the campaign season, it seemed as though Nidaa Tounes would make religion one of their 
key campaign platforms.   
At Nida Tounes’s press conference to announce the launch of their parliamentary 
platform, journalists and other attendees were given the published proceedings of two 
conferences on religion it had hosted with a German political organization to read as they waited 
for the press conference to begin.  These conference papers included pieces discussing the 
history of Islam in Tunisia and critiques of Wahhabism.  
Additionally, Nidaa Tounes was the only major political party to issues a separate 
“religious platform” in addition to a more general electoral platform.  In this twenty-page 
document, Nidaa Tounes critiqued the Troika’s actions, particularly the relationship between 
Ennahda and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and put forward its own platform. In its 
foreword, then presidential candidate Béji Caïd Essebsi drew a distinction between two opposing 
views on Islam. The first, represented by Nidaa Tounes, is “an authentic, national view based on 
ijtihad, renewal, and reform” is contrasted with a second view of Islam “based on tradition, 
inertia, violence, and terrorism” (Nidaa Tounes 2014, 3) which the campaign associated with 
Salafi jihadism that Ennahda failed to stem.   
As a result of both Nidaa Tounes’ pre-electoral statements and the pre-campaign material 
they had distributed, attendees of the press conference may have been expecting religion to play 
a significant role. However, it was not until nearly eighty-minutes into a ninety-minute 
presentation that religion was mentioned for the first time, during a series of sometimes rambling 
remarks made by Essebsi referencing Tunisia’s Islamic character, but making no direct 
references or challenges to Ennahda. 
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This trend, in deemphasizing religion as a central campaign platform in the 2014 
elections, is not unique to Nidaa Tounes.  In the next section, I provide evidence of a substantial 
shift in how Tunisian national identity is discussed in a number of major political party platforms 
and also explain why Islam was not a significant issue in the 2014 elections while it had 
previously been expected to be.  
 
Comparing 2011 and 2014 Political Party Election Platforms 
Directly comparing the two political campaigns is difficult due to the number and 
complexity of the electoral systems in Tunisia. The 217-member Tunisian Assembly of the 
Representatives of the People, the national legislative body, is elected through a multi-
constituency, ranked, closed-list, proportional representative system.65  
In practice, this system has resulted in a plethora of options for Tunisian voters. In 2011, 
there were 1,519 lists approved by the Tunisian electoral authority (830 political party lists, 655 
independent lists, and 34 coalition lists).  Only five parties had lists in all 33 of the electoral 
constituencies (Ennahda, Ettakatol, PDP, CPR, and PDM).66  In 2014, there were a comparable 
number of lists (1,327), with six parties competing nation-wide (Ennahda, CPR, the Popular 
Front, Al Joumhouri, Nidaa Tounes, and UPL).67  
                                                
65 In each of the country’s 33 electoral constituencies (27 in Tunisia and six overseas), voters can select a single pre-
determined list of candidates (up to the number of parliamentary seats allocated to the constituency).  This list might 
be composed of candidates from a single political party, candidates from multiple political parties creating a 
coalition list, or a list of independent candidates with no formal political affiliation.  The seats are then divided 
proportionally among the lists based on vote totals. For example, in a 10-seat constituency, if List A received 40% 
of the total votes then the top four candidates from their list would be elected, List B with 20% would receive 2 
seats, and so on with no minimum electoral threshold. 
66 Pg.8-9. UNDP. 2014. Promoting Gender Equality in Electoral Assistance: Lessons Learned in Comparative 
Perspective, Country Report for Tunisia.  
67 Of these 1,327 lists, 737 were political party lists, 334 independent lists, 159 coalition lists, and 97 lists that only 
competed overseas. There was an average of40 lists per electoral district with a maximum of 69 and a minimum of 
27. Pg. 27-28.  Final Report on the 2014 Legislative and Presidential Elections in Tunisia. National Democratic 
Institute.  2014.  
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This means that voters were exposed to widely varying campaigns based on their 
electoral constituency of residence, with some parties and coalitions competing only in a single 
electoral constituency. Even for national parties, the central party leadership varied in the amount 
of direct influence they held over constituency-level party offices.  Furthermore, the party 
landscape of Tunisia changed in between the two electoral periods.  In 2011, 19 parties and eight 
independent lists secured parliamentary seats and in 2014, 15 parties and three independent lists 
won seats. However, the exact composition of these parties has changed with political parties 
being created, rebranded, merged (and unmerged), and suspended and elected parliamentarians 
switching parties between elections.   
Unlike stable party systems with strong national leaderships, it is difficult to directly 
compare the electoral campaigns both due to the variations at the constituent level and the flux in 
the national party landscape from 2011 to 2014.  Of all the parties elected both in elections, 
Ennahda was the only party both to not undergo any party transitions (e.g. experience breakaway 
parties, participate in multi-party coalitions, etc.) and not to have any of its members defect to 
other parties.  
While it isn’t possible to conduct a one-to-one analysis of the two elections, there are 
important conclusions that can be drawn by comparing the electoral platforms issued during 
these elections, both by examining the general content in a single election and comparing the 
changes in single party platforms between the two elections, which I do below.   Major political 
parties nearly universally issued political party platforms.  For some, this was a bullet-pointed 
list of platform items on their website of Facebook pages.68 
                                                
68 Facebook played a large role in the electoral campaign. Facebook enabled parties with less technical capacity to 
quickly reach constituents without investing resources in creating a formal website.  Additionally, Facebook was a 
more constituent friendly medium to communicate with constituents than webpages, as the platform could be easily 
accessed by mobile phone.  
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Party platforms in and of themselves should not be reified.  The platforms are not an 
exact set of policies that every member of the party supports or pursues. They vary significantly 
both in how they are formulated and how important they are in practice.    Furthermore, few 
constituents are likely to every read the documents themselves.  However, political platforms, 
like constitutional preambles, offer a symbolic space in which define and present a party’s vision 
not only of itself but also of an idealized nation (Zubrzycki 2001).  In this way, party platforms 
occupy a liminal space between concrete policies that may be pursed in the future and a 
performative space, providing fruit for understanding how debates over national identity.    
In this section I examine the 2011 and 2014 political party platforms three parties: 
• Ettakatol: Leftist, secular: 2011: 20 seats, 2014: 0 seats 
• Congrès pour la République (CPR) : Social democrat, secular 2011: 29 seats, 
2014: 4 seats 
• Ennahda: Islamist(s), 2011: 89 seats, 2014: 69 seats 
From examining the political party platforms, there are three observations that can be 
drawn. First, the party platform discourse during the 2011 elections generally focused on 
concerns over the role of Islam in the future of Tunisia, specifically the nature of Islam in 
Tunisia and the state’s involvement. Second, in comparison, the discourse of parties during the 
2014 elections focused mostly on generic statements concerning Tunisia’s “Arab and Islamic” 
identity, with other references to religion mostly focused on reducing religiously motivated 
terrorism.  I illustrate these points with examples from several political party platforms.69 Third, 
religion not only occupied a less central role in the 2014 elections, but the discourse between 
                                                
69 In all instances, bolded text is my emphasis and not part of the original text. 
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parties converged with few significant differences that are identifiable for a particular political 
party.  
For many parties in 2011, addressing the issues Tunisian national identity was a key part 
of their electoral platforms.  Many reaffirm in their platforms of the Article One of the Tunisian 
constitution: “Tunisia is a free, independent, sovereign state; its religion is Islam, its language is 
Arabic, and its system is republican.”  This served as a basic identity statement.  
 
Ettakatol: In its 2011 platform, Ettakatol issues 100 campaign position.  The very first of these 
is the issue of Tunisian identity, reiterating Article 1 from the Constitution verbatim.   However, 
it also expands upon this basic definition, adding that “the identity of the Tunisian people is 
rooted in their Arab-Muslim values and enriched by its different civilization; it is 
fundamentally modern and open to the cultures of the world” (5), stressing a view of 
Tunisian Islam as modern and moderate. 
Ettakatol also expresses a concern over mosque-state issues, highlighting that “the 
Tunisian Republic separates the political field and the religious field and is open to universal 
values” (4).  Furthermore, “the state watches over the preservation of religious sites and assures 
the neutrality in order to avoid the instrumentalization of the political in the religious field and 
religion in the political field” (7), though Ettakatol also adds that another function of the state is 
to “preserve the identity of the Tunisian people and guarantee the freedom of belief” (7).  
However, by 2014, Ettakatol mentions religion a single time in its entire program and 
then only in its fiftieth and final point on fighting extremism.  Ettakatol proposes that Islamic 
thought taught in schools be revamped in order to focus “on the thinkers and philosophers 
advocating tolerance and openness all while emphasizing the contribution of the Tunisian 
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Islamic school, specifically on the values of “openness and tolerance.” Furthermore, it 
advocates increased support for families dealing with radicalization (30).  
***** 
The Congress for the Republic (CPR), In 2011, (CPR), called for “radical and complete 
rewriting of the social and political contract” in the constitution, specifically concerning identity, 
rights and liberties, and the political system.  First and foremost, CPR asserts that it must 
“reaffirm the Arab-Muslim identity of the Tunisian people who remain open to other 
civilizations.”  The document goes further in addressing the importance of this identity, stating 
that the party is “conscious of the impact of the question of identity on strategic choices which 
lead to the consolidation and preservation of this identity in accordance with historic roots 
and collective memory,” for example the importance of Arabic as a national language and unity 
with other Arab nations, in addition to the need to create “a culture capable of stimulating the 
creativity rooted in its Arab-Muslim context” (2011:8, 18).  
 However, by 2014 the emphasis on the fundamental nature of identity had weakened 
with a note at the beginning of the platform that the party’s positions stem from Tunisia’s 
“Arab-Islamic history and [its] human history” (2015, 3), with no further references to Islam.  
***** 
Ennahda: Being an Islamist party one would expect to find religious references in its platform, 
however, there are striking differences between how Islam is addressed in the two platforms.  
In 2011, Ennahda focused on the importance of Islam both with respect to national 
identity and its platform.  Like other political parties it reiterates Article 1 of the Constitution. 
Ennahda directly links itself to the Islamic aspect of Tunisia’s national identity: “Ennahda’s 
programmes are firmly rooted in national identity, mainly in Islam’s values, objectives, and 
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civilizational heritage and in our national experience and that of mankind” (12).  It further 
emphasized the distinctly Tunisian aspect of its ideology: the “Ennahda Movement considers 
itself an extension of the reform school elaborated in our country in the nineteenth century 
aiming at political, social and cultural reform and opposing colonialism and subservience. In this 
context, the Movement considers that Islamic thought is in need of constant innovation so that 
it can keep up with progress and contribute to it, stemming from its belief that Islam accepts 
anything that is beneficial and encourages it such as the international conventions on human 
rights, and which are generally compatible with Islamic values and objectives” (10). It 
emphasizes Tunisia as an important home of North African Islam “with Kairouan as its centre, 
played a significant role in staging Islamic expansion throughout the region and the Zeitouna 
mosque made significant contributions to Islamic sciences and knowledge, the propagation of 
Arabic language, and the shaping of the reform movement” but also a blending of “Arab, 
Islamic, Mediterranean, and African” identities (8). 
Unsurprisingly, for an Islamist party, Ennahda emphasizes the role Islam plays in the 
development of its program, however it does so in a very careful manner that distinguishes it 
from other political parties.  In their analysis of 48 Islamist party platforms, Kurzman and Naqvi 
(2010) find that half call for the implementation of shari’a in some form.   Ennahda never 
mentions the word shari’a in its platform, instead it merely mentions Islam [as] a supreme 
point of reference” and its “confidence in the validity of Islam and its heritage as a value and 
cultural reference” in its work (2, 3).  However, in both instances Ennahda also qualifies its 
vision by emphasizing the importance of ijtihad, or independent interpretation.  It also adds that 
its project is for “reform and modernisation through ijtihad, tajdid (renewal), and the 
activation of dialogue with the contemporary concerns, sciences, and achievements of the 
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modern age” (2).  Through this language Ennahda is attempting to separate itself from public 
perceptions that an Islamist(s) party will implement a rigid and archaic vision of shari’a law that 
many Tunisians would view as incompatible with their view of Tunisia as modern and 
pluralistic.   
With respect to platforms that specifically concern or reference religion, Ennahda 
mentions implementing zakat and waqaff funds, Islamic financing for banks, increasing Islamic 
tourism in Tunisia, “bringing up children with Arab and Islamic values and characters (70), and 
Islam as a source of its protection of women’s rights and equality, a nod to the importance of 
women’s rights in Tunisianité.  
In short, references to Islam, both with respect to identity and programming, runs 
throughout the document.  Throughout the 2011 platform, the terms “Islam” or “Muslim” were 
included 34 times.  However, there is a noticeable shift in the 2014 platform, where these terms 
were mentioned only 17 times, with 10 of these concerning Islamic banking.   
In the 2011 platform, Ennahda mentions its “awareness of, and confidence in, the validity 
of Islam and its heritage” for its political project in the opening paragraph of the platform.  
Ennahda repeats the same assertion in the 2014 platform but not until the third section of its 
platform, the eleventh page.  Gone entirely is the 2011 reference to Islam as “a supreme point of 
reference.” 
Ennahda does mention Islam in the opening page of the 2014 platform, but in a very 
different manner from 2011.  Instead of emphasizing Ennahda’s relationship to Islam, it 
highlights how Tunisia has consensually, incorporated Islam in the post-authoritarian state:  
“Tunisia has succeeded in uniting all Tunisians around a great and widely acclaimed 
consensual constitution that combined the principles of Islam and the essence of modernity 
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and laid the foundations for the rule of law and respect for individual and public freedoms and 
human rights” (5), in effect asserting to readers Ennahda’s accomplishments and its ability to 
compromise with non-Islamist parties.  
Finally, while not part of the platform text, Ennahda’s 2014 platform cover includes a 
photo (there was no cover photo for the 2011 platform) the of Tunisians from all backgrounds 
including those wearing religious dress and non-religious dress, as well as veiled and unveiled 
women. Such a decision shows a strategic choice to project Ennahda as a representative of the 
entire nation no matter how one chooses to express their religion.    
 
 
Figure 12: Front cover of the 2014 Ennahda campaign platform.  
Photo: Ennahda 
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Why do we see the three primary observations that I highlighted at the start of this section?  
a) Party platform discourse during the 2011 elections generally focused on concerns over 
the role of Islam in the future of Tunisia, specifically the nature of Islam in Tunisia and 
the state’s involvement.  
b) The discourse of parties during the 2014 elections focused mostly on generic statements 
concerning Tunisia’s “Arab and Islamic” identity, with other references to religion 
mostly focused on reducing religiously motivated terrorism. 
c) Religion not only occupied a less central role in the 2014 elections, but the discourse 
between parties converged with few significant differences that are identifiable for a 
particular political party.  
 
There are two key contextual reasons. First, the 2011 election came at a moment of 
extreme change, and the first test of democratic structural change in Tunisia. As described in 
previous chapters, there were deep divisions between Bourguibists and Islamists over what their 
visions for Tunisia’s future entailed.  On the one hand, Ennahda was able to fairly compete in 
elections for the first time and their platform mirrored the religious values and sensibilities of its 
voters.  Ennahda through their platform was also demonstrating that if elected it would include a 
vision of national identity that Islamists also recognized themselves in unlike during the 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali eras.  In contrast, many Bourguibists were scared that, if elected, 
Ennahda might enact sweeping religiously conservative laws or even refuse to give up power.  In 
their platforms Ettakatol and CPR go to pains to emphasize that they wanted to conserve the 
religious identity that they saw as authentically Tunisian, one open to other faiths and values.  
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All of these were debates that did emerge during the process of writing the constitution, concerns 
over Salafism, and the political crisis during the summer and fall of 2013. 
However, the finalization of the constitution in January 2014, described in Chapter 2, 
resolved many of these key concerns expressed in the 2011 platforms: the legal future of the state 
had been settled.  Additionally, with Ennahda taking a harder stance on Salafi-jihadists, as 
described in Chapter 3, the importance of religion as a campaign platform became less important 
than other issues, such as the economy and security.  
Second, Ennahda moderated its platform stance to resemble other parties.  A year prior, it 
was almost forced from power, so political moderation was in its interest if it was to retain a 
plurality of seats. Ennahda’s 2014 campaign focused on portraying the party as a responsible, 
consensus-oriented actor that shepherded the country through a difficult period of institutional 
change. Unsurprisingly in the wake of both political tensions in Tunisia and the banning of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Ennahda focused on presenting itself as a mainstream political 
party rather than as an Islamist political party.  In addition to this mainstreaming, the party 
affirmed both before and after the election its willingness to continue working with other parties, 
including Nidaa Tounes.70  At the end of the election Ennahda won 69 seats (27.8% of the 
popular vote) and Nidaa Tounes won 89 seats (37.6% of the vote) respectively in the 217-seat 
parliament and ended up forming a government together.  The next closest party, was the self-
proclaimed “non-ideological” UPL with 16 seats 4% of the popular vote. CPR finished with 4 
seats (down from 29 – 2.14%) and Ettakatol lost all twenty of its seats, outcomes which were 
seen to be referendum on the two parties’ performance as governing partners with Ennahda in 
the Troika government (2011-2014).  
                                                
70 In 2016, Ennahda formally declared that it no longer was a religious party.  
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In this section I have pointed to how political parties, representing both Bourguibist and 
Islamist orientations have increasingly used common language and themes in their political 
platforms.  I argue that this was due first to religion being a less controversial issues as a result of 
the constitution being finalized, but secondly a strategic decision on Ennahda’s part to embrace a 
discourse of Tunisianité in order to distance itself from previous associations with Salafis and a 
“double discourse.” Through both of these events, Bourguibists and Islamists have come closer 
to common discourse on Tunisian identity, one that, in the language of their collective electoral 
platforms is modern, open, and tolerant. 
 
IV. Limits of Convergence: The 2014 Presidential Election, Second Round 
By the start of the Presidential campaign on November 2nd, it seemed as though the 
tensest political competition between Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes was over. Ennahda had 
conceded the parliamentary elections and all indicators pointed to a peaceful and democratic 
transition of power.  Furthermore, Ennahda was not running a candidate nor had it endorsed any 
of the other twenty-seven candidates.   
However, issues around national identify and religion emerged at points of tension as 
evidenced during the presidential campaigns of November and December, particularly as Nidaa 
Tounes’ leader Essebsi (with 39.46% of the first-round vote) and incumbent President Moncef 
Marzouki (33.43%) passed to the second round.  I highlight two instances to show that despite 
the seeming consolidation of discourse that occurred in the parliamentary elections that there still 
remain deep societal divisions between Bourguibists and Islamists that emerge at moments of 
tensions, such as the presidential campaign for which leadership of the state was at stake.  
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In the previous chapter I argued that it was the rise of jihadi, salafi violence that 
ultimately helped Bourguibists and Islamists to move past their many differences by defining 
Salafis as a national “other” who had to be contained at any cost. 
First, during the presidential race, Essebsi’s campaign released a highly produced video 
using over a dozen actors and explosives.71  The video opens with ISIS fighters in Syria engaged 
in a tense and graphic firefight with cars burning around them.  One young fighter with a long 
beard is hit in the crossfire and then again in the back.  He falls to his knees as the fighting 
continues around him and dies.  A comrade reaches his body and picks up the young man’s 
Tunisian passport, which has fallen to the earth beside this gun.  
The video then cuts to a Tunisian woman answering the phone, presumably to learn of 
her son’s death in Syria.  She turns to a photo by the phone of her deceased son, dressed in street 
clothes and without a beard and her other son sitting in the background who embraces her as she 
cries.  Both are dressed in non-religious garments suggesting that the deceased son was 
radicalized outside of the family.  
The video cuts again, this time to Election Day with the mother and son solemnly 
standing in-line to vote.  Once the mother receives her ballot, she is shown very deliberately 
marking her ballot paper for Essebsi and placing it in the ballot box and the film closing with the 
slogan “Our destiny is in our hands.” 
There are two important things to note in understanding how this video fits into the 
Tunisian landscape.  While security and preventing terrorism in Tunisia was a key campaign 
issue, this video does not focus on threats in Tunisia and never raises the issue of threats at home. 
However, it does stress the danger of increased conservative, religiosity as a pathway to 
                                                
71 “Our Destiny is in our hands.” https://www.facebook.com/TunisTribune/videos/10153371440207926/ 
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terrorism and its potential to rip families apart.  The deceased fighter is shown to previously not 
practices Salafism, but to have been “converted,” growing out his beard, changing his clothing, 
and travelling to Syria to fight.   
In this video Salafis are a campaign tool, acting as an enemy and national “other.” 
Essebsi’s video suggests, not so much that he can protect Tunisia from terrorism – the fighting is 
happening and Syria and there is not a suggestion that it will come to Tunisia – but rather that he 
can protect families and present jihadi-Salafi radicalization from happening in the first place. He 
can stop the pain that the mother and brother feel because their son not only left Tunisia 
geographically, but because he also symbolically left Tunisia by abandoning Tunisianité for 
Salafi-jihadism.  
Second, discussion on religion and identity were nearly absent during the first-round of 
the presidential elections, in which Ennahda had decided not to field a candidate.  However, in a 
radio interview immediately following the first presidential round, Essebsi accused his 
competitor in the run-off, then-incumbent President Moncef Marzouki, of only making it to the 
second-round due to the support of “Islamists, Salafi jihadists, and those prone to violence”, a 
pointed criticism that Marzouki’s second place finish was a result of Ennahda supporters 
choosing to support him in the absence of an Islamist candidate.72 Essebsi’s comments sparked a 
wave of protests and rioting in southern Tunisia, where Marzouki and Ennahda both had their 
largest bases of support.  While Marzouki undoubtedly benefited from the support of the 
Ennahda constituency, as evidenced by attendees at his campaign rally and the overlap of 
Ennahda-Marzouki supporters on social media, Essebsi’s comment portrayed one set of voters as 
                                                
72 There is some truth to the Islamist aspect of this comment.  Many Ennahda supporters did vote for Marzouki as 
their presidential candidate because he had worked with Ennahda as part of the Troika Government and they saw 
him as a means of preventing Essebsi, who they saw as part of the Bourguiba and Ben Ali era, from winning the 
presidency.  
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desirable and another “Islamists, Salafi jihadists, and those prone to violence” as being outside of 
the acceptable body politic, a potential fifth column prepared to challenge Tunisian Islam and 
society.  Through his comment one can see how Essebsi attempts to portray Ennahda as 
illegitimately Tunisian by associating it in the same breath with Salafists and violent extremists.   
Essebsi’s comments reveal an underlying tension over competing views of society that is 
unlikely to diminish in the immediate future.  However, there are several signs that it is 
becoming a less important or explosive issue than it was in the period leading up to the 2014 
elections.  First, as mentioned previously, we can see this first in the broad convergence of 
discourse that parties used surrounding the issue with both Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes largely 
echoing each other on the centrality of a moderate, reformist, national Tunisian Islam to counter 
violent extremism.  Rather than being monopolized by Islamists alone, this discourse is being 
normalized by major political actors who have shifted their attention to more immediately 
pressing public issues such as the improving economy and national security.  
 
V. Conclusion 
In the previous chapters I highlighted how the failure to undergo certain forms of national 
reimagining, namely renarrativization and pluralization, paved the way for the summer of 2013 
crisis in which Tunisia’s democratic transition was at stake.  Given the tensions surrounding 
religion, it seemed as though religion would be an extremely important role in the 2014 
elections, particularly given an increase association of Ennahda with salafi-jihadists and the 
accusation of a double discourse, as well as the creation of the Bourguibist Nida Tounes party to 
counter them.  However, as I discussed in this chapter, religious tension eased for two reasons.  
First, while the Tunisian constitution reflected continuity in how Bourguiba and Ben Ali had 
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articulated Tunisianité vis-à-vis the relationship between religion and the state, Ennahda, largely 
due to its politically precarious situation, decided in the end not to press a challenge to reimagine 
the constitution, and in doing so enabled it to be completed, leading to an easing of political and 
societal tensions, and, paving the way for the 2014 elections. Second, Ennahda moderated many 
of its positions to more closely match those of Bourguibist parties. Rather than a more expansive 
structural change, a broadening of the cultural schema of Tunisianité that would also include 
Salafis, Ennahda accepted a more limited transformation in order to remain a political player and 
also to prevent the democratic gains from being lost entirely.  However, the fact that both 
Ennahda and Bourguibist parties, such as Nidaa Tounes, embraced this same cultural schema, as 
evidenced through their political platforms and parliamentary electoral campaigns, gave it 
enough legitimacy to be accepted and increasingly solidified as part of a new cultural structure in 
Tunisia.  
In this chapter, by discussing the political platforms of the 2011 and 2014, I showed a 
general consolidation of discourses on Tunisian national identity, utilizing the discursive 
language surrounding Tunisianité: modernity, openness, and tolerance – even if these principles 
do not appear always in practice.  It also highlights the continuing power of Tunisianité as a form 
of political and electoral capital with all major political parties, even Ennahda, emphasizing it.   
 However, this convergence over expressions of national identity comes at the cost of excluding 
quietist and political Salafis from a national identity that embraces a language of openness, 
modernity, and tolerance.  
As shown, political consolidation was a long process and largely due to Ennahda’s 
strategic decisions to transform its positions and to more closely resemble other political parties, 
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including no longer considering itself an Islamist party.  However, having made its way through 
two electoral cycles, the durability of Tunisia’s democratic transition is becoming more assured.   
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CHAPTER 5 Conclusion: From Salafis to Selfies 
 
I. Electoral Post-Script 
On December 31, 2014, Béji Caïd Essebsi was sworn in as Tunisia’s first democratically-
elected president.73  For his supporters, they hoped this would represent a transition from the 
sometimes chaotic Ennahda-led Troika administration, a strengthening economy, a return to law 
and security, and also a return to the “dignity of the state,” a euphemism for the era of 
Bourguiba, both with respect to public order and the image of the President himself as a modern 
and capable statesman.74   
Hopes of a quiet transition were quickly dashed.  On March 18, 2015, two terrorists 
attacked the Bardo Museum in Tunis, the former palace of the Tunisian monarch that sits 
immediately adjacent to the Tunisian Parliament.75  In total, twenty-two individuals, primarily 
European tourists, were killed, and scores were injured, plunging Tunisia into a heightened 
security state and further damaging the already weakened tourism industry, upon which Tunisian 
economy depended.   
The attack, the worst since the 2002 Djerba synagogue attack, left Tunisians in shock 
about the security of the country and immediately there was an increase in security presence 
                                                
73 Moncef Marzouki, the first president after the Revolution, had been elected by the new members of the 
Constituent National Assembly in December 2011.  
74 Essebsi supporters maintained that their candidate looked like a statesman, whereas the previous president Moncef 
Marzouki was well known for wearing suits without ties.  
75 ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, although the Tunisian government blamed an al-Qaeda affiliate.  
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from traffic circles to grocery stores.  Simultaneously another transformation occurred: a public 
outpouring of support for the Tunisian security apparatus.  
At Tunisia’s Independence Day celebrations on March 20th, just two days after the attack, 
there was a public demonstration of sentiment that would have been unimaginable a few years 
prior.  On Avenue Bourguiba in Tunis, there were dance troupes, musical performances, and 
photographic displays of Tunisian history for the holiday.  Additionally, there was a heavy 
security presence all along the festival area, with officers wearing black balaclavas and carrying 
machine guns, a much more armed and intimidating presence than at previous events.  However, 
there was an also a new feature: Tunisian citizens waiting in line to take photographs with the 
security officers.  
Not only had this not happened at previous national holidays I attended, but it was a 
significant break with Tunisia’s past.  These same security officers had sparked fear in the hearts 
of many Tunisians, particularly Islamists and others in the opposition.  These were the security 
officers responsible for arresting, detaining, and torturing political opponents during the 
dictatorship.    
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Figure 13: Tunisians taking photographs with Tunisian security forces.  March 20, 2015.  
Note the mother in the bottom left-hand corner wearing a hijab.  Photo: Elizabeth Young.  
 
However, on March 20th, I witnessed lines of Tunisians at every group of security 
officers, waving flags, and taking photos.  Most notably, there were multiple Tunisian Islamists 
that also participated in this act of national pride and appreciation for the security apparatus.  In 
the photograph above (Figure 12), three children waving Tunisian flags stand next to a masked 
Tunisian police officer.  In the bottom corner, a veiled woman, possibly a female relative, snaps 
a photograph of them.  While we can’t know for certain her current or past political affiliations, 
because she wears the hijab, she would likely have been harassed by these same police officers 
and security forces.  And, if her family were members of Ennahda, her relatives could have been 
harassed or even tortured as well.   
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Such public outpourings of both national pride and support, are further evidence of the 
impact of national, external threats such as terrorism on consolidating expressions of national 
identity, such as the association of the security forces with the nation that occurred at the 
Independence Day celebrations. However, unlike the terrorist attacks during the summer of 2013 
these were unifying rather than dividing, at least at the Tunis Independence Day celebrations.     
I explore one final expression of nationalism that stands in contrast to the 2011 to 2014 
period examined in the body of this dissertation, before explaining the significance of these two 
events with respect to theorizing the structural transformation that Tunisia underwent after the 
revolution.  
 
Bourguiba Rides Again  
The post 2014-period also saw one of, if not the first state embrace of Bourguiba, unlike 
its silence, discussed in Chapter 2. On June 1, 2016, Tunisian President Béji Caïd Essebsi 
publicly unveiled a statue in downtown Tunis to a small crowd, as well as a small group of 
protestors. While not an unusual occurrence for a head of state, the ceremony was notable with 
respect to the subject, the timing, the location, and also as a symbol of Tunisia’s democratic 
transition.   
Resting on a marble base over ten meters from the ground, Habib Bourguiba sits on a 
prancing horse, his hand raised. Equestrian statues are not a common choice for twentieth-
century heads of state, and this one, with both the movement of the horse and Bourguiba’s hand 
raised as if greeting the public, evokes a triumphant parade through the city.76  
                                                
76 The statue is also somewhat unusual in Tunisia.  Islamic tradition is generally understood to prohibit artistic 
depictions of God and Mohammed and, by extension, human beings or animals. Consequently, Bourguiba’s decision 
to install statues of himself around the country could be seen as a form of idolatry.   There are other human statues in 
Tunisia (e.g. historian Ibn Khaldun, nationalist Mohammed Daghbaji.) but these are not common forms of public art 
and none are as large as the Tunis statue of Bourguiba.  Ben Ali, after removing Bourguiba’s statues, also engaged 
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Figure 14: Statue of Habib Bourguiba at Place du 14 Janvier 2011.   
The obelisk clock tower built by Ben Ali stands in the background.  Photo: Tunisie Numerique 
(https://www.tunisienumerique.com/retour-de-la-statue-equestre-de-bourguiba-pourquoi-lhorloge-a-conserve-sa-
place/) 
 
Indeed, the statue’s instillation is a victory for the memory of Habib Bourguiba.  During 
Bourguiba’s rule the statue stood a few meters away at the center of a roundabout, Place 
d’Afrique, in the eponymous Avenue Bourguiba, the physical and symbolic heart of the 
contemporary city.  However, when Ben Ali deposed Bourguiba in 1987, he quickly removed the 
statue;77 renamed the roundabout Place du 7 Novembre, 1987 in honor of the day he came to 
power; and erected a clock tower, “the alarmclock,” with an oversized number “7” on its face, 
removing the “6” entirely in order to make room, in honor of November 7th (Chomiak 2013).78  
Ben Ali’s clock tower, symbolizing a new era of modern Tunisia, had both physically and 
                                                
in a program of public art work, but instead of installing statues of himself he opted for statues of the number “7”, 
the symbol of his rule, in honor of November 7, 1987 when he deposed Bourguiba to become president (Chomiak 
2013).     
77 Along with numerous other statues throughout the country.  
78 The original clock tower was later removed and replaced with a large, more modern “obelisk”, with a clock at its 
top, which still stands in downtown Tunis.  
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symbolically replaced the equestrian statue of Bourguiba and his era.  While Ben Ali would not 
use his own facial likeness as Bourguiba had, he would stamp symbols of his regime through 
Tunisia in the forms of the clock tower and statues of the number 7 which could be found across 
Tunisian towns.  
Bourguiba’s statue remained nearly forgotten in La Goulette, a suburb of the capital, for 
thirty years.  However, Essebsi made a campaign promise to return the statue to its original 
location and, despite criticisms of the cost to the taxpayer to move it, he finally did so on June 
1st, the anniversary of the day in 1955 when Bourguiba returned to Tunisia from exile and 
imprisonment in France, and, as the statue depicts, rode triumphantly through Tunis’s streets. 
The statue’s symbolic return from “exile” in La Goulette was not lost on commentators who 
made specific note of the fact that the day of the statue’s unveiling was also the date of 
Bourguiba’s 1955 return to Tunisia.79  
However, this is not just a cycle of one dictator’s monuments replacing another’s.  
Following Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in December 2010, protests calling for Ben 
Ali’s resignation spread around the country.  In Tunis, Avenue Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s clock 
tower were the primary sites of these protests both due to the location’s symbolic significance at 
the center of downtown and also its location next to the Ministry of the Interior where some of 
the worst human rights abuses of Ben Ali’s regime occurred. Following Ben Ali’s departure 
from Tunisia, the square was renamed yet again as Place du 14 Janvier 2011 in honor of the day 
he stepped down from power.  
                                                
79 June 1st is also the date the first Tunisian constitution was adopted in 1959.  However, commentators focus only 
on the date’s significance with respect to Bourguiba’s return from exile.  I have yet to see news coverage mentioning 
the anniversary of the constitution.  For example, see: “La statue équestre de Bourguiba réinstallée au centre de 
Tunis” (6/1/17) https://africanmanager.com/51_la-statue-equestre-de-bourguiba-reinstallee-au-centre-de-tunis/ and 
“Bourguiba, de La Goulette à Tunis, comme le 1er juin 1955 » (5/23/17) http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/19674-
bourguiba-de-la-goulette-a-tunis-comme-le-1er-juin-1955-album-photo.  
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The clock tower has become part of the post-revolutionary “national aesthetic” 
(Zubrzycki 2006), appearing in artwork as a visible symbol not just of the 2010 Revolution, but 
also of the Arab Spring itself, as shown in the image below of protesting youth representing the 
Arab Spring in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia.  
 
Figure 15: Photo of Arab Spring protestors in the Ennahda Party Monastir headquarters.   
Protestors represent (from left to right) Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia with the Tunis clock tower in the background.  
The Tunisian protestor wears a hoodie with the Facebook logo, a nod to the importance of social media in helping to 
organize activism during the protests.  Artist unknown. July 2014.  Photo: Elizabeth Young.   
 
As a result, the statue has not just reclaimed the space where it previously stood, but 
Bourguiba, as a dictator, physically occupies the symbolic heart of both the Tunisian Revolution 
and the entire Arab Spring. Essebsi, an extreme Bourguiba devote, 80  also made more difficult, if 
not impossible, a proposed monument to the revolution on the same site (Coslett 2017).   
                                                
80 As described elsewhere, Essebsi has taken great pains to associate himself with Bourguiba and Bourguiba’s 
legacy. He permanently enshrined this association, by including a carving on the granite base of the Avenue 
Bourguiba statue indicating that he was responsible for restoring the statue to its original location on June 1, 2016.   
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The resurrection of Bourguiba’s statue in Tunis has also occurred alongside similar 
statues in Sousse and Monastir and point to the potential difficulties of commemorating a 
dictator in a democratizing state where the two eras compete in the post-revolutionary landscape 
both for physical space and also for places in the national consciousness.   
 
***** 
II. National Reimagining and National Consolidation 
In this dissertation, I examined how Islam is constitutive of Tunisian national identity, 
Tunisianité, and how the post-revolutionary process of democratization has affected and been 
affected by this relationship in order to understand the how the Bouazizi’s death and the 
revolution could affect structures in Tunisian society.  In doing so, I examined moments of 
contention and the interactions of a variety of groups advocating different visions of national 
identity – Bourguibists, Islamist(s), and Salafists – both within and without formal state 
structures.  
As described in the body of the dissertation, this struggle over Tunisian national identity 
and who would define it threatened the democratic transition.  In examining the relationship 
between nationalism and Islam during Tunisia’s democratic transition, this dissertation’s primary 
goal was to explore how cultural factors, primarily those concerning nationhood and national 
identity, influence and are influenced by the democratization process, particularly with respect to 
its consolidation and ultimate durability.   
Having examined these issues, I return to the question posed the beginning of the 
dissertation related to Sewell’s theory of events: what enables a structural transformation to be 
durable, in this case the democratic transition?  In the first chapter, I outlined various theories as 
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to why democratic transitions occur and why some, but not all, succeed.  Nearly all of these 
theories revolved around macro-level, structural factors such as the economy or geo-political 
relations.  These factors certainly have an influence.  For example, in Egypt, the existence of a 
strong, independent military was instrumental in stepping in to remove the Muslim Brotherhood 
from power and to return the country to an authoritarian regime. 
However, these macro-level factors do not capture the cultural transformations that occur 
alongside the political transformation, which I examined throughout this work: the wording of 
new laws; commemorations of the past; debates over what it means to be Tunisian.  As I 
demonstrated, particularly debates over Islam and national identity in the summer of 2013 had 
the potential to be nearly as influential as the presence of the Egyptian army with respect to the 
success or failure of the democratic transition.  
Additionally, such macro-level analysis does not allow us to understand the societal 
transformation that I described in the case of the “selfies” with the police security services.  In a 
space of less than five years, how did the security services go from being feared and reviled by 
Islamists to being embraced and held up as symbols of the country with children of Islamist 
taking photos with them on Tunisia’s Independence Day celebrations? 
Nationalism and national identity are poorly captured in these types of analysis as they 
cannot be easily, or at least in a credible manner operationalized into a standard variable that can 
be used across countries.  Instead, instances such as this call from a more interpretive analysis to 
understand national identity within a particular national context and its relationship to the 
democratization process. I conclude this dissertation by proposing the outlines of a theory of the 
role that national identity, specifically through “national reimaging” and “national 
consolidation,” plays in the structural durability of democratization based on the examination of 
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the Tunisian case.  To evaluate its theoretical usefulness, it must be tested with other cases of 
democratic transitions.  
I view this model as complimentary to Sewell’s theory of events and structural 
transformation, but one which pays particular attention to national identity during democratic 
transitions.  Mohamed Bouazizi’s death and the subsequent Tunisian Revolution were clearly, to 
both scholars and observers, events that would impact both Tunisia and the broader Middle East 
and North Africa region.  I have highlighted the contingency of such events to be truly 
transformative in structural change by comparing the current success of Tunisia to the relapse of 
authoritarianism that took place in Egypt.  In particular, I deconstruct aspects of national identity 
– collective memory; laws; acceptance of pluralism – which have the potential to impact 
structural change.  By deconstructing articulations of national identity, cultural schemas, I am 
able to better identify which specific aspects have changed and which have demonstrated 
resilience and their relationship to the overall structural change.  For example, in the case of 
Tunisia I showed that of these three national reimaginings, only pluralization changed in a 
meaningful, but limited way, allowing for the inclusion of non-Salafi Islamists. Additionally, I 
build on Sewell by pointing to the importance and mechanism of national “consolidation” – the 
embrace of articulations of national identity – both continuity and changes, which is important to 
the durability of structural changes.  
Why do some democratic transitions succeed while others fail?  From the evidence 
presented on the Tunisian case, I suggest that two factors should be systematically examined: a) 
if and how democratizing states and societies address questions of national identity and 
belonging (national reimagining); and, b) the degree to which there is broad societal consensus 
concerning these issues (national consolidation).  I do not suggest that national identity is the 
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sole or primary factor in whether a state successfully transitions into a democracy, but one that 
acts in conjunction with other factors.  For example, a state that has worked to consolidate its 
national identity during its democratic transition may be able to weather an economic or political 
crisis that a state with competing views may not be able to. As I argue elsewhere (2010), the 
failure to produce a cohesive national identity after the 1990 unification and democratization of 
Yemen, coupled with an economic crisis, was one of the factors that led to civil war and the 
reestablishment of an authoritarian regime.  However, in contrast, a state that has a robust 
economy or a strong civil society may be able to democratically transition without engaging in 
national reimagining or with a low level of national consolidation.  Rather than assert the 
primacy of any single factor, we should seek to understand how they each function to aid or 
impinge democratization. 
 
Figure 16: Graffiti in Tunis listing the Arab Spring protests.   
This image lists the countries and dates where Arab Spring protests occurred, in order: Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, 
Bahrain, Libya, and Syria.  Viewing this image in April 2015 it begs the question: Why did the democratic transition 
in Tunisia succeed while the others failed.  Photo: Elizabeth Young. 
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In order to theorize the role of national reimagining on the outcome of democratic 
transitions, I focused on three potential areas, which I addressed in this dissertation: national re-
narrativization, changes in laws and state institutions, and balancing pluralism with national 
identity.  
The first area “national reimagining” that I theorize as being potentially integral to the 
democratization process is the often newly gained opportunity for historical revisionism to 
address past events that have been censored and historical traumas, or integrate the democratic 
transition into the national narrative. In the Tunisian case, no significant attempts, had been made 
by the time of the 2014 elections, particularly on the part of the state to examine Bourguiba and 
his legacy, for example through textbooks.  Nor by that point had the state instituted processes, 
such as truth and reconciliation committees to address crimes committed during the 
dictatorships.  In and of itself, the absence of attempts to comprehensively or systematically 
address the past did not seem to directly undermine Tunisia’s democratic transition.  However, in 
other cases, depending on the severity of past societal divisions, for example a civil war, a lack 
of re-narrativization could be critical element in a successful democratic transition. 
In the Tunisian case, the lack of re-narrativization did not create social cleavages, 
however, efforts at re-narrativization and understanding a shared past could have helped to 
alleviate the distrust, lack of empathy, and fear between Bourguibists and Islamists that nearly 
derailed the democratic process in Tunisia, particularly in the summer of 2013.  Therefore, 
attention should be paid in other cases as to how re-narrativization could aid democratic 
transitions through a stronger basis for a shared national identity or national cohesion.  
Second, I turned to look at how laws and political institutions could be reimagined in 
order to reflect new or pluralized understandings of nation and national identity. These could 
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include primarily symbolic acts, such as the writing of constitutional preambles (Zubrzycki 
2006), as well as non-symbolic reforms such as changes to citizenship laws or protections to 
freedom of religion & speech.  
In the Tunisian case, I illustrated the divisiveness over how Islam should be addressed in 
the Tunisian constitution and argued that, while even though Article 6 appeared to be a drastic 
change to the relationship between the state and religion, it actually was a legal codification of 
the principles of Tunisianité that governed during the Bourguiba and Ben Ali eras, and 
represented continuity. However, as I discussed, Ennahda’s strategic decision to accept and vote 
for both Article 1, which it had previously opposed, and Article 6, allowed it to become an active 
participant and owner in the constitution.  It also, as discussed in Chapter 4, seems to have 
allowed for divisive issues over national identity to be less contentious, and to not dominate the 
2014 electoral platforms. This points to how even continuity in laws and institutions can be 
positive factors in democratic consolidation merely by the act of multiple parties or stakeholders 
participating in the democratic process.  However, this may be context specific depending on the 
particular nature of the laws and institutions.  
The third form of national reimagining I pointed to is how the democratic precepts of 
pluralism are balanced with national specificity.  In the Tunisian case, the state’s inability to 
adequately protect religious pluralism, including freedom of expression, while simultaneously 
expanding conceptions of national identity to include all Tunisians was significant and these 
tensions were heightened even by everyday practices, such as wearing the niqab as well as 
violent attacks on freedom of expression.  This contributed not only to a lack of empathy and 
sense of shared national identity, but even more significantly, Bourguibists viewing Salafis as a 
national, existential threat.  While Tunisia faced many challenges during the democratic 
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transition, including economic and security challenges, it was a failure to adequately manage the 
competing demands of pluralism and shared national identity that nearly led to a democratic 
backsliding in the summer of 2013.   
However, despite these challenges, Tunisia was able to undergo a degree of national 
consolidation in which it moved beyond the 2013 crisis and was able to further consolidate its 
democratic transition by completing the constitution and holding the 2014 elections.  How then 
do we account for Tunisia’s continued democratic consolidation despite these challenges to both 
to a shared national identity and progress in finalizing the constitution? Democratization, 
frequently moving in parallel to increased pluralism, presents an opportunity for contestation 
over who comprises the nation and who has legitimacy to act in its interest.  Therefore, one must 
also examine national consolidation, the degree to which there is a broad societal agreement on 
who and what are constituent of the nation, throughout the democratization process.   
  In Tunisian case, I argued that a key factor in preventing democratic breakdown or 
backsliding in Tunisia was the presence of violent, jihadi Salafis who threatened not only the 
current order, but also provided an existential challenge to the Tunisian state itself.  In the face of 
a mounting crisis, Ennahda made a strategic decision to acquiesce on certain points: outlawing 
Ansar al-Sharia, relinquishing power won through elections, and finally not only acquiescing, 
but voting for constitutional amendments that had previously been objectionable.  It was only 
after Ennahda made these concessions the Tunisia’s democratic transition stabilized.  
Additionally, as demonstrated through the 2014 electoral platforms, all of the major parties, 
including Ennahda had adopted a language of Tunisianité, suggesting a national consolidation on 
certain issues of religion and national identity.  
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However, given economic paralysis, the continued threat of terrorism, and the failure to 
address past grievances, this process of national consolidation threatens to fray and threaten 
democratic consolidation, which can be seen with a renewed protests and demonstrations in 
Tunisia.  Second, while some pluralization of national membership occurred, non-violent Salafis 
were excluded alongside violent, jihadi Salafis, a move that stands to lead to further isolation and 
radicalization.   As a result, the Tunisian case helps illustrate how national reimagining and 
consolidation can potentially facilitate and hinder democratic consolidation.  
In using this model of national reimaging and national consolidation in other cases it is 
important to acknowledge the significance of contextual factors, such as, in the Tunisian case the 
threat of terrorism.  However, it provides a potential model to begin to systematize our 
understanding of the role that culture and national identity play in democratic transitions and 
democratic consolidation. 
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APPENDIX 1: Timeline of Major Events in Contemporary Tunisian History 
 
 
1881    French troops take control of Tunisian affairs. 
 
1883    Tunisia becomes a French protectorate.  
 
1933 Anti-French cemetery protests begin.  
 
March 2, 1934 Habib Bourguiba founds Neo-Destour, a nationalist political party, which 
would subsequently lead the Tunisian independence movement.   
 
June 1, 1955  Bourguiba returns to Tunisia from exile.  
 
March 20, 1956 Tunisia gains independence from France. 
 
1956   Personal Status Code is promulgated increasing women’s rights.  
 
July 25, 1957  Tunisia becomes a republic.  
 
1981  Rachid Ghannouchi co-founds the Islamic Tendency Movement, precursor 
to Ennahda.  
 
1981   First multi-party parliamentary elections (not-free-and-fair). 
 
1987 Rachid Ghannouchi is accused of inciting unrest and is sentenced to ten 
years in prison, which leads to Ben Ali’s coup.   
 
November 7, 1987 “Medical coup” deposes Bourguiba and brings Ben Ali into power. 
 
1989  Ennahda competes in parliamentary elections, winning an estimated 15%.  
Ben Ali jails many Ennahda supporters and Ghannouchi goes into exile.  
 
1992 Ennahda is officially banned.  
 
1999   First multi-party presidential elections (not-free-and-fair).   
 
April 6, 2000  Habib Bourguiba dies in Monastir.  
 
April 11, 2002  Djerba synagogue bombing by al-Qaeda, killing 21. 
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December 17, 2010 Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation, start of the Tunisian Revolution. 
 
December 25, 2010 Protests against the government spread to many parts of the country.  
 
January 14, 2011 Ben Ali flees Tunisia.  Start of the democratic transition.  
 
October 9, 2011 Protests over the TV broadcast of the animated film “Persepolis” for 
depicting God.  Five days later the station owners house is fire bombed.  
 
October 23, 2011 First democratic parliamentary elections (Tunisian Constituent Assembly).  
Ennahda wins a plurality. 
 
December 2011 Moncef Marzouki selected as President. 
 
January 2012 Niqab protests at Manouba University.  
 
June 11-12, 2012 Printemps des Arts exhibition.  Attack on exhibition by Salafis. 
 
September 14, 2012 Attack on US Embassy ostensibly over the film “Innocence of Muslims.” 
 
August 2012 Protest in Tunis against Ennahda proposal to include a constitutional 
clause declaring women are “complementary to men.” 
 
February 6, 2013 Opposition leader Chokri Belïd is assassinated by jihadists. 
 
July 25, 2013 Opposition leader Mohamed Brahmi is assassinated by jihadists. His death 
sparks a repeated series of protests throughout the late summer and fall.  
 
August 23, 2013 Opposition leaders call for Ennahda and the Troika government to step 
down before they participate in negotiations leading to a political 
stalemate and crisis.  
 
August 27, 2013 Ennahda Prime Minister Ali Larayedh declares Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist 
organization.  
 
January 27, 2014 Tunisian constitution is passed.  
 
July 17, 2014 Seventeen soldiers are killed in a terrorist attack in the Chambi Mountains 
along the Algerian border. 
 
October 26, 2014 Second parliamentary elections (Assembly of the Representatives of the 
People).  Nida Tounes wins a plurality.   
 
November 23, 2014 First round of Tunisia’s first presidential election.  Essebsi (39%) and 
Marzouki (33%) move onto a run-off.  
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December 21, 2014 Second round of presidential election.  Essebsi wins (55.7%). 
 
March 18, 2015 Seventeen foreign tourists and four Tunisians are killed during an Islamic 
State terrorist attack at the Bardo Museum in Tunis.  
 
June 26, 2015 Islamic State terrorist attack kills 39 and wounds 40 at a beach resort in 
Sousse.  
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APPENDIX 2: Tunis Exchange Political Seminar Talks 
 
 
In June-July 2014 and January 2014, six weeks in total, I participated in a political 
speaker series, the Tunis Exchange, which incorporated presentations from representatives across 
Tunisian society (politics, social justice, business, media, etc.) followed by a free-ranging Q&A 
discussion between the speaker and participants on relevant current events.  This resulted in 
approximately one to one-and-a-half hours of dialogue with each of the speakers. The Tunis 
Exchange was conducted under the Chatham House Rule meaning that specific information 
cannot be attributed information to certain individuals, although participants did consent for their 
names to be publically listed as participating speakers on the Tunis Exchange’s website.  
Because of this limitation, I do not include or analyze information from these talks.  However, 
these discussions, covering topics ranging from economic marginalization to religious education, 
deeply influenced my contextual knowledge of Tunisia and the ways in which I understood and 
approached my research.    
 
Political parties and elected government: 
• Taieb Bakkouche (Nidaa Tounes), Tunis, January 17, 2014 
 
• Lotfi Al-Beida (Ennahda Local Headquarters Sfax), Sfax, January 14, 2014 
 
• Mohamed Belkhoujra (Founder Salafist Reform Front), Tunis, June 27, 2013 and January 
10, 2014 
 
• Zied Boumakhla (Leader of Ennahda Student Movement), Tunis, July 1, 2013 
 
• Meriam Bourguiba (Republican Party and Habib Bourguiba’s granddaughter), Tunis, 
July 8, 2014 
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• Najib Chebbi (Leader of Republican Party), Tunis, July 3, 2014 
 
•  Imed Daimi (Congress for the Republic Party), Tunis, January 16, 2014 
 
• Hamida Ennaifer (Ennahda Party), Tunis, January 9, 204 
 
• Mohamed Salah Ennasri (Director of the Competitive Pole of Gafsa), Gafsa, June 23, 
2014 
 
• Noomane Fehri (Republican Party), Tunis, June 28, 2013 and January 17, 2014 
 
• Walid Haddouk (Congress for the Republic Party), June 25, 2013 
 
• Hama Hammami (Head of Tunisian Workers' Communist Party and 2014 Presidential 
Candidate), Tunis, June 27, 2013 and January 10, 2014 
 
• Abdel Wahhab el-Hani, (Al-Majid Party), Tunis, January 17, 2014 
 
• Lubna Jeribi (MP Ettakatol Party), Tunis, June 26, 2013 
 
• Fatihi Jerbi (Deputy Leader Wafa Party), Tunis, January 10, 2013 
 
• Maya Jeribi (Republican Party), Tunis, January 8, 2014 
 
• Ommezzine Khalifa (Ettakatol and Senior advisor, Minister of Finance), Tunis, June 11, 
2013 
 
• Rashi Khambi (City government of Siliana), Siliana, July 6, 2013 
 
• Mehrzia Labidi (First Vice-President of the Constituent Assembly and member of 
Ennahda Party), Tunis, June 24, 2014 and January 8, 2014 
 
• Zied Laadhari (Ennahda Party), Tunis, July 5, 2013 
 
• Mabrouka Mbarek (Congress for the Republic Party MP), Tunis, July 4, 2013 
 
• Abdelfateh Mourou (co-founder of Ennahda Party and First Vice-President), Monastir, 
July 7, 2013 
 
• Osama el-Saghrir (Ennahda MP for Italy), Tunis, January 8, 2014  
 
• Omar Shabou (Movement of Free Constitutionalists), Monastir, July 7, 2013 
 
• Suad Shabani (Member of Ennahda Student Movement Committee), Tunis, January 16, 
2014 
 138 
• Haythem Slimani (Ennahda Office in Gafsa), Gafsa, January 12, 2014 
 
• Mohamad Sironi (Salafist Reform Front), Tunis, January 10, 2014 
 
• Amara Tijani Governor of Sidi Bouzid) Sidi Bouzid, June 22, 2013 
 
 
National and regional government ministries and agencies:  
• Rafaa’ ben Achour (Nidaa Tounes and advisor during transitional government, former 
Ambassador to Morocco), Tunis, June 27, 2014 
 
• Slim Amamou (Former Minister of Information), Tunis, June 19, 2013 
 
• Amour Boubakri (Independent Higher Board for Elections, ISIE), Tunis, July 1, 2013 
 
• Samir Dilou (Cabinet Minister of Human Rights and Ennahda member), Tunis, July 4, 
2013 
 
• Sadiq al-Fawi (Adviser, Moderation in Religious Discourse, Ministry of Religious 
Affairs), Tunis, January 20, 2014 
 
• Ridha Ferchiou (Tunis Dauphine University and former Minister of Education and 
Minister of Statistics and Planning), Tunis, July 9, 2013 
 
• Kalthoum Kenou (Head of Tunisian Judges Syndicate and 2014 presidential candidate), 
July 4, 2013 
 
• Ommezzine Khalifa (Senior Advisor, Minister of Finance and Ettakatol member), 
Tunis, January 17, 2014 
 
• Noureddine al-Khademi (Minister of Religious Affairs), Tunis, January 20, 2014 
 
• Kamel Labidi, National Independent Authority for Information & Communication), 
Tunis, June 19, 2013 
 
• Akremi Med Lazhe (Nida Tounes), Tunis, January 14, 2014 
 
• Abu Yaareb Marzouki (Former Advisor, Office of the Prime Minister), Tunis, June 28, 
2013. 
 
 
Domestic Civil Society Organizations:  
• Ibtihel Abdellatif (Founder of Tunisian Women, representing former female political 
prisoners), Tunis, June 25, 2013 and January 14, 2014 
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• Samir Annebi (National Committee to Investigate Corruption and Wrongdoings), Tunis, 
July 4, 2013 
 
• Ahlem Belhajj (Femme Democrat), Tunis, January 15, 2014. 
 
• Faisal Bilmabrouk (Leagues to Protect the Revolution in Kabaria), Tunis, January 9, 
2014 
 
• Fahem Boukaddous, Tunisian Association Against Torture/Co-founder of the Tunisian 
Committee for the Protection of Journalists), Gafsa, June 23, 2013 
 
• Amel Bouchamaoui (Executive Director Tunisian American Chamber), Tunis, January 
15, 2014 
 
• Intissar Ghannouchi (Jasmine Foundation, Ennahda member, and Rachid Ghannouchi’s 
daughter), Tunis, January 9, 2014 
 
• Adnen Haji (Leader Redayef Tunisian General Labour Union, Teacher’s Union, UGTT 
and activist in Redayef Protests), Redayef, June 23, 2013 and January 12, 2014 
 
• Abdel Wahhab el-Hani (Islamic Trade Union), Tunis, June 20, 2013 
 
• Ahmed Hamza (Women Enterprise for Sustainability), Kairouan, January 11, 2014 
 
• Mohamed Taher Khlifi (Association of Action Citoyenne), Sidi Bouzid, June 22, 2013 
 
• Sliman Rouissi (Member of the UGTT regional Sidi Bouzid office), Sidi Bouzid, June 
22, 2013 
 
• Abdelkadar Sassouki (Leagues to Protect the Revolution in Kabaria), Tunis, January 9, 
2014 
 
• Rabah Warda (Sfax Tunisian General Labour Union, UGTT), Sfax, January 13, 2014 
 
 
International NGOs: 
• Michael Ayari (International Crisis Group), Tunis, June 20, 2013 
 
• Abdelbasset Belhsan (Arab Institute of Human Rights), Tunis, July 5, 2013 
 
• Wim Borresmans (Senior Program Officer for Political Parties, National Democratic 
Institute), Tunis, January 6, 2014 
 
• Rim el-Ganri (International Center for Transitional Justice), Tunis, January 6, 2014 
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• Amna Guellali (Human Rights Watch), Tunis, January 6, 2014 
 
• Nicolas Kaczorowski (International Foundation for Electoral Systems), Tunis, January 6, 
2014 
 
• Stephen C. Kochuba (US Embassy in Tunisia), Tunis, January 15, 2014  
 
• Nicole Roswell (Country Director, National Democratic Institute), Tunis, June 13, 2014 
 
• Oussama Turki (Deputy Director, IFES), Tunis July 10, 2013 
 
• Jacob Walles (US Ambassador to Tunisia, US Embassy), Tunis, January 15, 2014 
 
 
Universities, research centers, and think tanks: 
• Alaya Allani (Professor, Manouba University), Tunis, July 2, 2013 
 
• Laryssa Chomiak (Director, Centre d'Etudes Maghrébines à Tunis), Tunis, January 5, 
2014 
 
• Isabelle Feuerstoss (Paris University), Tunis, June 18, 2013 
 
• Jérôme Heurtaux (University of Paris-Dauphine), Tunis, January 15, 2014 
 
• Najib Jridi (Westminster Foundation for Democracy), Tunis, January 16, 2014 
 
• Tarek Kahlaoui (Tunisian Institute for Strategic Studies), Tunis, June 18, 2013 and 
January 7, 2014 
 
• Habib Kazdaghli (Dean, Manouba University), Tunis, June 20, 2013 and January 7, 2014 
 
• Monica Marks (Researcher, Oxford University), Tunis, June 17, 2013 and January 5, 
2014 
 
• Radwan Masmoudi (Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy), Tunis, June 20, 2013 
and January 16, 2014 
 
• Rory McCarthy (Researcher, Oxford University), Sousse, January 13, 2014 
 
• Fabio Merone (Researcher, Ghent University), Tunis, July 9, 2013 and January 8, 2014 
 
• Robert P. Parks (Director, Centre d’Etudes Maghrebines en Algerie), Tunis, July 8, 2013 
and January 5, 2014 
 
• Deborah Perez (Ecole Normale Superior), Tunis, July 10, 2013  
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• Hamadi Redissi (Tunisian Observatory for a Democratic Transition), Tunis, June 18, 
2013 and January 5, 2014 
 
• Hatem Sebei (University of Tunis), Tunis, January 7, 2014 
 
• Omeyya Seddik (HD Centre), Tunis, June 19, 2013 
 
 
Independent actors:  
• Yassine Ayari (Blogger and human rights activist), Tunis, January 4, 2014 
 
• Adel Elmi (Moderate Association for Awareness and Reform, Salafi association), Tunis, 
June 27, 2013 
 
• Sami Ben Gharbia (Journalist, Naawat), Tunis, January 16, 2014 
 
• Taieb Ghozi (Imam of Okba Mosque in Kairouan), Kairouan, June 23, 2014 and January 
11, 2014 
 
• Mariem Kada (Producer Nessma News), Tunis, July 2, 2013 
 
• Omar Mesteri (Human rights activist and Kalimat Radio Editor-in-Chief), Tunis, June 26, 
2013 and January 16, 2014 
 
• Mohamed Rammeh (Blogger and radio activist), Kairouan, January 11, 2014.   
 
• Youssef Seddik (Philosopher), Tunis, June 26, 2013 
 
• Ichraf Smaoui (Director of Programs, Nessma News), Tunis, July 2, 2013 
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